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UNSATURATION AND PREDICATION
»
An Essay on Frege *s Philosophy of Logic
(April 1975)
William H. Walters
Directed by: Herbert Heidelbergcr
In the opening chapter I offer an interpretation of
Frege's philosophy of mathematics, one which is in keeping
with his claim to have argued for the epistemological
thesis that arithmetic is comprised of analytic judgments.
Central to this interpretation is the suggestion that
Frege took a notion of analysis which Kant had directed
upon concepts and redirected it upon whole propositional
contents. By this means Frege attempts to justify his
use, in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik , of "definitions"
which are ontologically augmentative. In particular, Frege
holds that the pair
The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs
There are just as many Fs and Gs
have the same content, though the former makes reference
to numbers whereas the latter does not, while the latter
is epistemologically prior to the former. In this way
Frege gains numbers without needing to call upon non-
empirical intuition to account for our arithmetic knowl-
edge. I further argue that Grundp;c3etze der Arithmetik
does not bring any basic change on these matters, that it
Vcould not» if Frege is "to continue to hold that arithmetic
judgments are analytic and not synthetic a priori.
Chapter II represents an attempt at clarification of
Frege's conception of logic. I develop his idea of logic
as lingua characterica
. where such a lingua would be a
canonical notation whose grammar is that of logic and which
(potentially) is a universal language, a language in which
what can be said can be said. Frege’s thinking about logic
deepened with his conception of the laws of logic as laws
of truth. Frege’s thoughts on truth, developed in pro-
viding a semantics for his canonical notation, place him
squarely in the "correspondence theory of truth" tradition.
I suggest that we may look upon Frege’s theory of reference
— his semantics of Begriffsschrift — as an attempt at an
exhaustive answer to such a question as how language is
"about the world" so that what we say can be true (or
false.
)
In Chapter III, having expounded Frege's semantics,
I examine the origins of this semantics through attempting
to display a path which is inviting at its beginnings, and
which follows individually appealing steps right up to
such "paradoxical" conclusions as that the concept horse
is not a concept. And I argue that the unsaturation of
concepts which gives rise to such "paradoxes" is more
deep-seated in Frege’s thought than has been generally
acknowledged. Tinkering will not eliminate the problem
Vi
since unsaturation is an essential element of Frege's
semantics of predication — to reject it is to reject his
account of predication, if not his conception of logic.
The "problem”, most generally stated, is the ineflability
of Frege's semantics; the semantics of the lingua cannot
be stated within the lingua itself.
Chapter IV opens with a defense, of sorts, of Frege's
largely ignored horizontal-stroke. In particular, I
argue that Frege was not inconsistent, as is sometimes
alleged, in holding both that the denotations of predicates
are incomplete and that the denotations of sentences are
not. I then turn to inquiring into whether the ineffability
which attends f’rege's semantics is avoidable through some
alternative account of predication. An examination of a
representative selection of commonly held views leads me
to conclude that Frege is correct in his judgment that a
"necessity of language" precludes the statement of an
otherwise adequate account of predication in a manner
which is consistent with the import of that account. At
least this cannot be done while remaining true to Frege's
philosophy of logic.
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1• • • distinctions between a priori and a posteriori,
synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, not the
content of the judgment but the justification for
making the judgment • . • . if the truth concerned is
a mathematical one , « r [t]he problem becomes • • •
that of finding the proof of the proposition, and of
following it up right back to the primitive truths*
If in carrying out the process, we come only on general
logical laws and on definitions, then the truth is
an analytic one, • « •
GOTTLOB FRIGE
Frege’s definition of ’analytic* explicates well what
is meant by saying that the logicist (Russell's)
philosophy of miathematics has refuted Kant and estab-
lished the analytic nature of arithemetic truths. There
is, however, a subtle difficulty here . . . which is
genei'a.llv overlooked,
ARTHUR PAP
CHAPTER I
LOGICISM
$1. Frege’s Program and a Problem of Definition
The central concern of this essay is, as the title
g\jjggf>sxs, with Frege’s account of predication. On chxS
view, predicative expressions are said to denote concepts.
Such denotata are said to be unsaturated j they effec-
tively deflect all attempts at singular reference to
themselves, I shall, in Chapter III, be extensively
concerned with the whys end therefores of this apparently
bizarre doctrine,
"Why bother?" it might be asked, since this view of
Frege's would seem to be universally rejected, A desire
to straighten the historical record perhaps provides
2sufficient justification* Beyond this, however, I have
come to believe that many, perhaps most, of those who
have dismissed this curious feature of Frege's philosophy
have done so too quickly* While some of the consequences
of holding that concepts are unsaturated are notorious,
others have not been terribly well appreciated. Thus
they are not investigated, or not in the light of Frege's
general philosophical outlook. Yet upon investigation
it will be seen, I believe, that some of these conse-
quences, ones which strike us initially as most distaste-
ful, are nonetheless unavoidable. Or so I wish to argue.
I have in mind in particular the ineffability bred of
unsaturat ion. In Chapter XV, which concludes this essay,
I shall argue for this, arguing that it is not possible
to provide an account of predication the statement 02'
which is consistent with the account provided. At least
this cannot be done, so I shall argue, while being true
to a certain conception of logic, one on v/hich the laws
of logic arc laws of truth.
This picture of logic, leaned upon in xhe later
argument, is developed and attributed to itege in
Chapter II. There I explore Frege's idea of a
characterica , relate this to his thesis that the laws
of logic are laws of truth, and locate Frege squarely
in the Aristotelian tradition of viewing truth as
correspondence of language with reality.
3I begin this essay with some remarks on Frege’s
philosophy of mathematics. And let us recall that it
was Frege’s investigations into the foundations of math-
ematics that moved him to develop his logical theory.
Here too my purpose, partially, is to clarify an impor-
tant episode of our history through procuring a better
appreciation of a central aspect of Frege’s logicism,
one which at first comes into focus over the justification
of certain definitions. Additionally, the perspective
provided on Frege’s logicism should put us in a receptive
state of mind to take up next Frege’s conception of logic.
In 1879 Frege published a booklet of some 88 pages
beari.ng the title Begriffsschrift , eine der arithmetischen
nachgeb i1det e FormeIsprache des reinen Denkens .~ In
this he set down modern first-order predicate logic in
a complete and consistent form, though he did not attempt
to prove either of these results. He used negation and
conditionality to give truth-functional logics universal
quantification, for predicate logic. Also included were
identity theory, and an essential, though inexplicit,
second-order logic. In the "Preface" Frege announced
that
1. Begriffsschrift , a Formula Language , Mode_lg d upor} That
of ^ATitlirnet ic , f Pure Thought . Translated in From
Fre7’:e~ to Godel , van Heijenoert.
Hereafter, Begrif fsschrift .
4« • • arithmetic was the point of departure
for the train of thought that led me to my
Begriffsschrift . And • • • I intend to apply
it first of all to that science, attempting
to provide a more detailed analysis of the
concepts of arithmetic and a deeper foundation
for its theorems."^
Towards this end he included in Begriffsschrift a defini-
tion of the notion of the ancestral of a relation in
terms of the logic of his system? this was to figure
essentially in the definition of number Frege would later
give
.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetic follov^ed five years
hence This v/ork divides rather evenly into two parts*
It begins Y/ith a brilliantly critical discussion of a
wide array of views on topics in the philosophy of mathe-
matics, focusing especially upon opinions as to the
nature of arithmetic truths and on the concept of number*
The latter half of the book is an extended argument for
the viev/, which Frege claims only to have made probable,
that
the laws of arithmetic are analytic .judg-
ments and consequently a priori. Arithmetic
thus becomes simply a development of logic,
and every proposition of arithmetic a law
of logic, albeit a derivative one.
2, Begriffsschrift, p. 8.
3* The Foundations of Arithmetic « Translated by J.L.
Xustin*
Hereafter, Grundlagen .
, Grundlagen , p. 99*4
5This is the thesis of logicism.
Frege had informed his readers at the outset of
Grundlagen that, with regard to the distinctions between
the a priori and a posteriori, and the analytic and the
synthetic
,
• . • I do not • • • mean to assign a new
sense to these terms, but only to state ac-
curately what earlier writers, Kant in par-
ticular, have meant by them*^
Thus it was Frege's aim in Grundlagen to make probable
the idea that arithmetic was analytic in Kant's sense*
And so to make probable the conclusion that Kant had
been mistaken in holding that arithmetic truths were
synthetic a priori. We would then be freed from having
to evoke and make sense of such ideas as that of Kant's
pure intuition, at least as regards our philosophy of
number.^ That Grundlagen has a general epistemological
character was emphasized by Frege in his "Introduction”
;
while "reception by philosophers v/ill be varied, depending
on each philosopher's own position", he hopes that "£s]ome
one or another perhaps will take this opportunity to
7
examine afresh the principles of his theory of knowledge."
5* Ibid
.
, p* 3>
6. Cf. Parsons, "Mathematics, Foundations of" in Edwards'
Encyclopedia , p. 193»
7* Grundla.^en , pp. x-xi.
6How then did Frege intend to establish his view that
arithmetic truths were analytic in nature? Roughly
speaking, by convincing us that arithmetic v/as derivable
from logic by purely logical means. Somewhat more ex-
actly, if we suppose we possess an axiomatization of
arithmetic, say with Feano's axioms, then, if within
an axiomatized system of logic we could derive each of
those arithmetic axioms, Frege would regard his thesis
as established. Of course such a derivation is impos-
sible. For arithmetic has its distinctive vocabulary
v/ith which we speak of numbers and operations upon num-
bers, and in logic no mention is made of numbers and
arithmetic operations, at least not in so many v;ords.
Definitions must supplement derivations if the latter
are to make the intended point. But then, as Arthur Pap
reminds us, "any statement could be made to express an
analytic truth in [the] sense [of being derivable from
Q
logic alone] if any definition whatever wore admissable."
This focuses our attention upon the question of justify-
ing such definitions as we employ in shifting from a
purely logical to an arithmetical vocabulary, justifying
them in such a way as to sustain the claim that arithmetic
is analytic in a non-Pickwickian sense. Actually there
are severa]. problems in this area. One very general one
6. Semantics and Necessary Truth , p. •
7we might, put this way* How are we to get numbers out of
logic? Additionally there may arise specific questions
over particular definitions, over Frege's definition of
the one tone relationship, for instance*^ Somewhere in
between the very general and the quite specific the
question may arise as to the justification, if numbers
are to be identified with certain logical objects (sets,
perhaps), of identifying the progression of numbers with
one rather tlian another progression of these logical
objects. Paul Benacerraf, for one, has argued that since
there is no principled way of picking one sequence of sets
with which to identify the numbers over other equally
suitable candidates, we should reject the claim that
individual numbers are particular sets*^^ But I shall
not be concerned with this issue. More generally, it v/ill
be no part of my aim to resuscitate logicism. My concern
will be to shew how Frege was attuned to the general
problem, which I shall refer to as Pap's problem, of gain-
ing numerical discourse adequate to the workings of
arithmetic out of non-numerical discourse, and this in
a fashion which opens the way to arguing for the view
9. See Duinmett, "Frege, Gottlob" in Edwards’ Encyclopedia,
p. 23^*
10 "What Numbers Could Not Be", Philosophic Review,
LXXIV (1965) ^ 47”73*
8that arithinetic is analytic in Kant's sense* (The actual
argument will proceed over a pavement of major technical
accomplishn’.ents , but these will not come in for discus-
sion. )
In Grundlagen Frege gains numbers by definition, or
what he calls definition. We may distinguish between
definitions v/hich allow the eliraination af the defined
expression and those which do not. Eliminative defini-
tion may be accomplished either directly, by providing
an alternative expression with which to replace that
defined, or paraphrastically, through showing how to
avoid use of the defined expression by paraphrasing
sentences in which it occurs into others without it.
Russell's theory of descriptions popularized this pro-
cedure, known as contextual definition, in at least
certain segments of the philosophical community.
Michael Dummett believes that contextual definition
plays a significant role in the program of Grundlagen .
When Grundlagen is read in its natural sense,
v/ithout the importation of views stated only
in Frege's subsequent v;ritings, it is plain
that he regards his principle that words have
meaning only in the context of sentences as
justifying contextual definitions and took
this to be one of its most important consequences
.
And that the use of this type of definition is justi-
fied, in Frege's eyes, by what I shall call Frege s
11 "Frege", p. 228
10
is better attuned to the function which the Dictum does
play for Frege in Grundlagen » Indeed my major aim in
this chapter is to bring out how it does performi, which
I think has not been well appreciated.
A non-eliminative definition* while not providing
means for dispensing with the defined expressions* settles
the use of that expression* at least for certain key
contexts. Prominent here are recursive, or inductive,
definitions. We shall encounter one such, Tarski's for
truth- in-L* at the tail end of this essay. For now I
simply pass this by? noting only that the "definitions”
Orundlagen which will hold cur attention are not of
this sort.
The Grundlagen type of definition whereby numbers
are gained is non-eliminative however. We may initiate
discussion of this by quoting at length a passage of
Grundlagen where Frege is discussing Kant on definition.
He seems to think of concepts as defined by
giving a simple list of characteristics in
no special order; but of all ways of forming
concepts, that is one of the least fruitful.
, . /a geometrical illustraticn will make
the distinction clear ... If we represent
the concepts . . . by figures or areas^ina
plane, then the concept defined by a simple
list of characteristics corresponds to the
area cominon to all the areas representing
the defining characteristics; it is enclosed
by segments of other boundary lines. With a
definition like this, therefore, what v/e do
-- in terms of our illustration -- Is to use
the lines already given in a new way for
the purpose of demarcating an area. Nothing
11
essentially new, however, emerges in the
process. But the more fruitful type of
definition is a matter of drav/ing boundary
lines that v/ere not previously given at all.
What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot
be inspected in advance; here, we are not
simply taking out of the box again what we
have just put into it,i^
In part Frege is recommending that definitions need not
be limited to the conjunctive; other logical operations
may just as 3.egitimately be called upon in providing
definitions. But this is not the whole force of the
passage. Other logical operations will also simply trace
old lines in different patterns, whereas, ’’the more fruit-
ful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary
lines that were not previously given at all," We must
postpone discussion of just wha.t these "definitions" will
look like. But Frege implies that they may yield up
something "essentially new", and we may anticipate that,
in the case of our concern, what is "new" will be numbers.
It is through the "more fruitful type of definition" that
P’rege attempts to solve Pap's problem in a fashion
compatible with his program of establishing that the
truths of arithmetic are analytic in the sense of Kant,
Preparatory to taking this up, let us reminisce a little
on the sense of 'analytic* for Kant,
14, Grundlagen , pp. 100-101
12
$2, Analytic ity and Analysis
In his Prolegomena Kant states that
• • < there is a distinction in judgments • • •
according to which they are merely explicative »
adding nothing to the content of knowledge,
or expansive , increasing the given knowledge.
The former may be called analytical , the latter
svnthat leal judgments .15
He goes on immediately to say.
Analytical judgments express nothing in the
predicate but what has been already thought
in the concept of the subject, though not so
distinctly or with the same (full) conscious-
ness* When I say: "All bodies are extended,"
I have not amplified in the least my concept
of body, but have only analyzed it, as extension
was really thought to belong to that concept
before the judgment was made, though it was
not expressed* This judgment is therefore
analytical
Analytical judgments add "nothing to the content of
knov/ledge." The point is put in the Critique this v/ay:
"through analytic judgments our knowledge is not in any
17
way extended, •
Companion to this view is the idea that analytic
judgments are arrived at through conceptual analysis,
1
8
"by dissecting given concepts" as Kant says in
Prolegomtena * In the Critique he speaks of arriving at
15* Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. l4.
16. Ibid* , p* 14*
17* Immanuel Kant ' s Critique of Pure p* 49*
18* Prolegomena , p* 24*
13
analytical judgments by "merely breaking [a concept] up
into those constituent concepts that have all along been
thought in it ^ In a similar vein his Logic
notes say
Analytic propositions one calls those proposi-
tions whose certainty rests on identity of
concepts (of the predicate with the notion of
the subject.) Propositions whose truth is not
grounded on identity of concepts must be
called s\Tithetic
Here Kant runs together the idea of something being true
in virtue of its constituent concepts » and its being
known to be true through attention to these concepts.
And he seems to assume, here and elsewhere, that some-
thing which can be thus known to be true cannot be other-
wise known. This is probably false. But these matters
do not concern us. The point is the priority of concepts;
v/hat is analytic can be known through conceptual analysis.
A third point is that Kant*s remarks upon analytic
judgments tend to presuppose that all judgments, or
propositions, are of what he calls subject-predicate
form, where 'All bodies are extended' provides an example.
I shall assume, however, that tlie analytic-synthetic
distinction is intended to be both exclusive and exhaus-
tive. (In these respects this distinction would be like
i9* Critique , p. 48.
20. Logic , p. 117*
14
the a priori-a posteriori distinction,) Exclusive, in
that nothing is both analytic and synthetic; nor, I shall
assume, analytic at one time (or for one person) and
synthetic at another (or for another). This condition
requires that what we speak of as analytic, or, alterna-
tively, synthetic, must be thought of as having, or
bearing, fixed truth-values. Let us not here worry about
vfhat such must, or may, be. The distinction is exhaus-
tive over the domain of truths, or bearers of truth, in
that each truth is either an analytic truth or a synthetic
truth, (We may conveniently ignore falsehoods.) The
analytic-synthetic distinction will thus cover more
ground than has been thus far suggested. One trivial
addition will be those truths, such as ’Bodies are bodies',
where the "predicate" does not explicate (even partially)
the "subject", but simply is the "subject". In his
Logic Kant says that such truths as these are tauto-
logical , ^ ^
More importantly, the distinction must have appli-
cation to propositions of any form. As was implicit in
the statement of the second point above, I would suggest
that there is nothing inherent in Kant's idea of truths
knowable t/irough conceptual analysis which restricts its
applj cation to propositions of any particular form, 'All
21, See Logic , p, 118,
15
brothers of sisters are siblings of sisters* would seem
to count as analytic as readily as 'Brothers are siblings*,
or 'Bodies are extended*.
What then of (e.g.) *If John is a brother of Mary,
then John is a sibling of Mary'? Whether this counts as
analytic will turn on whether sentences of the form
If S . then
1 1
are analytic. And generally, whether the truths of logic
are analytic truths. I assume that Kant v/ould (or did)
22
classify logical truths as analytic. Certainly this is
how Frege took him, for the Grundlagen program presupposes
it. And surely if Kant treated the analytic-synthetic
distinction as exhaustive he must have considered logic
to be analytic. He could hardly have failed to mention
that the truths of logic were synthetic a priori if that
was his viev/. But the intuitive justification for classing
the truths of logic as analytic seems to be missing.
Before continuing with this, we may summarize the
foregoing v/ith the following scheinatizationi
22. "The judgments in the science of logic itseli are...
entirely a priori. I have not found any statement
in Kant that they are analytic and not syiithetic,
but... I am prepared to assume that they are all
properly regarded as analytic Paton, Kant * s
Metaohys ic of Experience , vol. 1, p. 2l4.
16
Truth
Tautologies Explicatives
Let us now consider the question: What» according
to Kant* do explicatives and logical truths have in common
which warrants according them the same epistemological
status? Kant in several places writes as if there was
a single source of analytic ity and that this was the law
of contradiction. Thus in the Prolegomena he states
that *'[t]he common principle of all analytical judgments
is the law of contradiction’*. ^ The implied claim, that
a proposition is analytic if and only if its denial is
self-contradictory* may be true* but it hardly seems
explanatory. On the one hand, how would we determine
that 'Some vixen is not female* is self-contradictory?
Presumably we would reason that since a vixen is a female
fox the claim in question in effect amounts to stating
that something both is and is not female* which is self-
contradictory. But clearly the law of contradiction
plays a subsidiary role in our being certain that all
vixens are female, one subsidiary to the idea of concep-
tual analysis.
23* Prolegomena * p . 14.
17
On the other hand# how would we determine that the
following is self-contradictory* Though all men are
mortal and Socrates is a man# nonetheless Socrates is
not mortal* We can derive an explicit self-contradiction
from this* But in so doing we will employ various
principles of inference* So we shall be justified in
calling the claim denied by our initial statement analytic
only if v/e have independent justification for supposing
that the principles of inference used in deriving the
contradiction take one only from the denial of analytic
truths to self-contradictions* (And that the denial of
the denial of an analytic truth is itself an analytic
truth*) And no such justification is forthcoming. Thus
neither the explicatives, nor the logical truths, have
their epistemological status explained# at least in any
direct way# in terms of the law of contradiction.
1 shall not pursue further this matter of a common
ground for logical truths and explicatives. It would
not seem that a unified account of Kant's analytic judg-
ments would be required for the purpose of assessing
Frege's claim to show that arithmetic is analytic in
Kant's sense. To this end we need only ask whether Frege's
initial resources are analytic in Kant’s sense# and
v/hether each step he takes therefrom results, one way or
another, in a proposition v/hich should be considered
analytic in Kant's sense, and whether in this way we
18
arrive at arithmetic. Though if we thought that no
general account of analyticity could be given, this might
diminish in our eyes the epistemological importance of
such success as Frege may have achieved with his program.
Before leaving Kant for Frege let us look a bit
more closely at those analytic propositions which are,
intuitively, most deserving of the label, the explica-
tives. Let us first note, in passing, what I shall call
Kant's conceptual atomism. This is the thought, at least
implied in Kant's discussions of analytic judgments, that
any given concept of any given proposition has a unique
(though perhaps null) analysis into component concepts.
Or at least that it is not possible to have differing
complete analyses of a given concept, v/here a complete
analysis issues in ultimate constituent concepts, and an
ultimate concept is one itself without constituents
(i,e,, susceptible only of the null analysis,) To provide
an analysis of a concept is the same as to define that
concept. And we might call a complete analysis a complete
"?Ll
definition,'' Kant seems to have this latter in mind when
he speaks of "analytic definitions" in Logic as follows,
24, Kant was not as clear as Frege would be that a list
of concepts does not constitute a definition , Failure
of appreciation on this point forecloses the use of
logical operations other than conjunction in one's
definitions, which was a complaint Frege lodged
against Kant.
19
All F.iven concepts, be they given a priori
or a posteriori, can only be defined through
lysis . For given concepts can only be made
distinct by making their characteristics suc-
cessively clear. If all characteristics of a
given concept are made clear, the concept
becomes completely distinct} and if it does
not contain too many characteristics, it is
at the same time precise, and fi‘cm this springs
a definition of the concept. ^3
For he notes.
Since one cannot become certain by any proof
whether all characteristics of a given concept
have been exhausted by complete analysis,
all analytic definitions must be held to be
uncertain. 26
Analytic truths, at least of the explicative variety,
are, we might say, true by definition. But to so remark
is in no way to hint of conventionalism.
Explicatives are truths which we may come to know
are true through appropriately attending to their com-
ponent concepts. We can learn, for instance, that vixens
are female foxes through learning that the concept of
vixen contains both the concept of female and the concept
of fox. This is the view. Yet a difficulty lurks. For
the description of the case presupposes the learner to
possess the concept of vixen, and so, presumably, to
already know such trivialities as that vixens are vixens.
But if this is so, how would one learn that vixens are
25* Logic , p. 143
26. Ibid., p. 143
20
female foxes, given that the concept of female fox is
the concept of vixen? Yet it seems indisputable that
this can be done* A person can be in a position of com-
prehending v/hat to analyze, and yet not possess the
analysis* Still we may be puzzled by this combination
of knowledge and ignorance*
Concepts, for Kant, have fixed constituents* When
we learn that, for instance, vixens are female foxes it
seems that, for Kant, what we do is scrutinize the concept
vixen so as to somehow apprehend its parts. Yet it is
puzzling how we can comprehend the concept and yet fail
to apprehend its parts, as if comprehension were like
stuffing something in one's pocket paying it no heed*
Complementariiy, it is unclear on what model v/e are to
imagine the process of attempted analysis* That Kant was
alive to such difficulties seems evident from the second
passage quoted in this section.
Similar puzzles turn up, though somewhat altered
in form, at a crucial juncture of Frege's philosophy
of mathematics. In Grundlagen they will arise in
connection with definitions of the more fruitful type*
Later much the same issues are focused upon a crucial
axiom of his system of logic, or so I shall argue
further on* The Kantian puzzles of analysis are
relocated as a result of Frege's shift from concepts to
21
propositions as the target of analysis. His success in
resolving them will determine, in part, the adequacy of
his solution of Pap's problem.
$3* Frege's Solution
Let us begin by recounting and recasting the earlier
observation on what Frege need do to establish that arith-
metic is analytic in Kant's sense. It is enough if he
were to (1) begin with resources v/hich Kant might well
accept as purely logical resources, and so also as ones
which issue in analytic propositions, and (2) while
making no move not analytically implied by propositions
already certified as analytic, arrive at arithmetic, by
deriving Peano's axioms for instance. To accomplish (1)
about all Frege would need to do would be to defend his
analysis of statements of generality, such as 'All bodies
are extended', in terms of predication, truth-functional
conditionality, and universal quantificaxion — the
analysis which is called to mind by the notationi
(x) (Bx:-’Ex) . To these ideas we need add only those of
negation, identity and second-order generality to have
the basic ideas of the system of logic presented in
Begriffsschrift . It seems unlikely that Kant would
dispute that any of these was purely logical. And so
the logic of Begrif
f
sschrift, which Frege would later
call the fundamental part of logic, would seem to count
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as analytic for a Kantian# Anyway I shall assume that
this is so*
Grundge^set ze der Arithmetik #^^ the first volume of
which was published in 1893 » shows some important changes
in Frege's logical system. For the time being we may
think of this system as the fundamental logic of
Begriffsschrift enriched by set theory. The enrichment
occurs via the ill-fated Basic Law V (BLV), the axiom
alluded to earlier. Granting that arithmetic can be
couched in the notation of set theory and that its axioms
so expressed are provable in that theory# to argue that
we thereby show arithmetic to be analytic would require
a defense of a claim that BLV itself is# in some appro-
priate sense, analytically true. To this we shall re-
turn ($4). First wo shall take a closer look at what
goes on in Grundlagen .
But let us observe that to show that Frege's logic
is essentially Kantian would not itself be to show that
Frege and Kant were in agreement on all matters re3.ating
to the nature or epistemology of logic. It is possible
for two people to agree on the logical truths and yet
disagree on hovr we know them. V/e shall take up this
27* The Basic Laws of Arithmetic . Translated (in part)#
v/ith an introductory essay, by Montgomery Furth.
Hereafter, Grundgesets e
.
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topic in Chapter II* Here* in passing* we may acknowledge
the presumption that Frege saw himself in substantial
agreement with Kant over the epistemology of logic. For
he tells us that he is using what he takes to be Kant*s
notion of analyticity* and he never -- at least during
the period of our concern in this essay* roughly up
through the early years of this century — suggests that
he thinks of logic* at least in its fundamental part, as
other than analytic*
We now turn to the issue of how Frege* in Grundlaficen *
sought to show that arithmetic was analytic* Philosoph-
ically (as opposed to technically) the central passage
starts at section 62, which begins with the questions
2 0
”Hov/ * • • are numbers given to us * * *?" It may not
be immediately clear just what Frege is asking. Our
approach v/ill be to let his response instruct us as to
his intent. But at the outset we can at least confirm
the importance of this question for Frege. In the second
volume of Grundgeset^e * published in 1902, Frege wrote that
"if there are logical objects at all — and the objects
of arithmetic are such objects — then there must also be
28 Grundlagen * p* 73*
Conversations with Philip Hugly impressed upon me
the importance of this section*
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a means of apprehending them, of recognizing them*"^^
Then, while this volume was awaiting publication, Frege
learned from Russell of the inconsistency in the
GrjmdKQsetze system of logic. He responded with an
appendix to that volume which concludes with this remark*
The prime problem of arithmetic is the
question, In what way are we to conceive logical
objects, in particular, numbers? By what means
are we justified in recognizing numbers as
objects? liven if this problem is not solved
to the degree I thought it v/as when I wrote
this volume, still I do not doubt that the
way to the solution has been found *3^
Though the form of words changes, the question of how we
are to apprehend numbers, how they are to be given to us,
remains in the forefront of Frege’s thinking*
Before moving directly to Frege's Grundlagen attempt
to answer his question, let us briefly recap certain
"results” established by this juncture of the essay*
Here we may lean on a summary Frege himself provides*
Let us cast a final brief glance back
over the course of our enquiry* After
establishing that number is neither a col-
lection of things nor a property of such?
yet at the same time is not a subjective
product of mental processes either, we
29* Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege * Fdited and
translated by Peter Geach and ifax Black, p* I8l*
The assumption that numbers must be logical objects
marks something of a shift in view fronj that to be^
found 5n Gruji^ii^en , and also a hardening of position*
30 * Grundges etze , p. 143*
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concluded that a statement of number asserts
something objective of a concept*^!
By **statement of number” Frege intends such statements
as * Jupiter has four moons* and 'Venus has zero moons'#
He regarded such use of number words as their "basic uset”
or their basic use "in the context of a judgment.
And, whereas he does not say so explicitly, his thought
would seem to be this. In the first place we use number
words to count. In counting things we are always counting
things of some sort. And so when we come to express the
result of our countings we offer a statement of how many
things there are of the given sort. The statement 'Jupiter
has four moons' is such a statement. ("How many moons
does Jupiter have?" — 1 , 2 , 3» ^ • • • Jupiter has four
moons.) Such a statement of number "asserts something
objective of a concept" since, in our example, wh^it is
being said is that exactly four objects, no more no less,
fall under the concept of moon of Jupiter, or more simply
that four are the moons of Jupiter*
Continuing with Frege's recapitulation.
We attempted next to define the individual
numbers 0, 1, etc*, and the step from one
number to the next in the number series.
Our first attempt broke down, because we
had defined only the predicate v/hich we
31 . Grundla^^en , p. 115*
32. Ibid. , p. 59 .
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said was asserted of the concept, but had
not given separate definitions of 0 or 1
,
which are only elements in such predicates.
This resulted in our being unable to prove
the identity of numbers, it became clear
that the number studied by arithmetic must
be conceived not as a dependent attribute,
but substantivally. Number thus emerged
as an object that can be recognized again,
although not as a physical or even merely
spatial object, nor yet as one of which we
can form a picture by means of our imag-
ination.33
Although the basic use of number words is in attributive
constructions such use is not adequate to arithmetic.
Briefly, we may think of number words as employed in the
attributive construction of “statements of number*' as
functioning as indices upon numerical quantifiers. Thus,
•Jupiter has four moons* might be symbolized in standard
notation asi (Ex4 )(x is a moon of Jupiter). Then Frege's
point can, I believe, be put as follows. V/e cannot express
such essential facts of arithmetic as that every number
has a successor if number words are limited to indexical
position of numerical quantifiers. For what would be
needed would be to somehow treat the position of
(e.g.) *4* in the above as itself open to quantification.
But this would be to no longer regard '4' as an indissol-
uble part of 'kx^'. When we come to state arithmetic
33 • ibid
.
, p. 59
2 ?
laws we need numbers numerical quantifiers are inade-
quate* Thus » though in their basic use number words do
not refer to objects, since they function not as singular
terms, but rather as attributives modifying sortal terms,
or as we have just put it, as indices on numerical
quantifiers, numbers nonetheless are objects, Frege
concludes* But then how, and with what justification,
do we make our acquaintance with numbers, the objects of
arithmetic? How, and with what justification, do we make
the change from using number words to count with, to
using them tc refer to numbers?
Continuing once more with Frege's summary remarks.
We next laid down the fundamental principle
that we must never try to define the meaning
of a word in isolation, but only as it is
used in the context of a preposition* only
by adhering to this can we, as I believe,
avoid a physical view of number v/ithout -j-
slipping into a psychological view of it*-^^
This brings us back up to section 62, whose first two
sentences run in full.
How, then, are numbers to be given to
us, if v/e cannot have any ideas or intuitions
of them? Since it is only in the context of
34* Cf* Frege, "Function and Concept" in Philosophical
Writings ? for example such remarks as* "The first
place where a scientific expression appears with a
clear' cut reference is where it is required for the
statement of a law*" (p* 21) Also, the closing
remarks of this address*
35 • Grundlagen, p. Il6.
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s. proposition that words have any meaning*
our problem becomes this* To define the sense
of a proposition in which a number word occurs
Here* as in the summary, we find Frege referring to what
we have called his Dictum. The next stretch of text
indicates in an initial way, the role Frege's Dictum is
to play in his philosophy of arithmetic, at least in
Gruxidlagen . Frege takes the task at hand to be
to define the sense of the proposition
"the number which belongs to the
concept F is the same as that which
belongs to the concept G"j
that is to say, we must reproduce the content
of this proposition in other terms, avoiding
the use of the expression
"the Number which belongs to
the concept F".
In doing this, v/e shall be given a general
criterion for the identity of numbers. When
we have thus acquired a means of arriving at
a determinate number and of recognizing it
again as the same, we can assign it a number
word as its proper name. 3?
Abbreviating the sentence 'the Number which belongs to
the concept F is the same as • . . ' to,
NxFx = NxGx,
Frege says, in effect, that "we must reproduce the content
of this" in non-numerical terms; to accomplish this would
be to provide a means of recognizing numbers.
How is this to be done? Frege, citing Hume, puts
forv/ard the idea of defining numerical identity in terms
36. Ibid. , p . 73*
37* I bid
.
: p. 73*
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of ones one correlation, the just-as-many-as relationship.
This is an idea he will endorse. But, having cautioned
that ”it raises certain logical doubts and difficulties,
which ought not to be passed over without examination",^^
he here emphasizes that he is not proposing "to define
identity specially for this case."^^ Rather the "aim is
to construct the content of a judgment which can be taken
as an identity such that each side of it is a number",^®
and so "to use the concept of identity, taken as already
knovm, as a means for arriving at that which is to be
regarded as being identical." "Admittedly", he adds,
"this seems to be a very odd kind of definition to which
ho
logicians have not yet paid enough attention ..."
Interrupting Frege, hov./ might we state the definition
he has in mind? The thought is that we are to use the
idea of one »one correlation to express the content of the
previously set-off sentence. When there are just as many
Fs as there are Gs, so that the Fs are correlated one tone
with the Gs, let us say, simply, that the Fs equal the Gs,
underlining * equal' to signal its somewhat special use.
38. Ibid.
,
p. ?4
39. Ibid. p. 74
40. Ibid., P. 74
4l
.
Ibid., p. 74
42. Ibid. p. 74
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Then Frege’s definition can be stated this way.
(A) NxFx = NxGx iff the Fs equal the Gs.
It is worth emphasizing that Frege has, in effect, told
us that the loft and right side of this bi-conditional
are the same in content. Otherwise put, an instance of
the left side, (e.g.) 'The number of cows is identical
with the number of horses', v/ill express the same sense
as a "like'* instance of the right side, ‘The cows equal
the horses', which is to say that there are just as many
of one as the other.
Continuing with Frege, he says that this "very odd
kind of definition", which in fact is one of the "more
fruitful type" earlier mentioned, "is not altogether
4 ?
unheard of", as "may be shown by a few examples." At
this point he launches into a discussion of an example
involving parallel lines, which discussion is critical
for our understanding of what Frege is trying to show.
However I v/j.sh to interru.pt Frege once more, this time to
take cognizance of a remark by Peter Geach.
With our (a) in mind Geach has written that
Given this sharp criterion for identi.fying
numbers Frege thought that only prejudice
stood in the way of our regarding numbers
-O* Ibid. , p. 74
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as objGctG.
^
am strongly inclined to think
he is right.
With what I take to be the thrust of this remark I am in
agreement; on this I shall be more explicit further down.
But it is deserving of notice that, as it stands, the
remark is both inappropriate and inaccurate. Inappropriate,
since, as we have observed, Frege claims to have already
established that numbers are "self-subsistent objects'*
before taking up the problem of how numbers are given to
us, which leads him to put forth (A). Inaccurate as
regards Frege's views, since, as also noted, Frege in
effect tells us that the definition (A) raises "certain
logical doubts and difficulties, which ought not to be
passed over v/ithout examination." Such examination
eventually leads Frege to revise, or reformulate, the
definition in terms of extensions of concepts. On this
Geach writes that "the importance of Frege's doctrine
concerning extensions has been grossly exaggerated because
it has been thought an essential part of his doctrine
concerning numbers*'. Geach says that he is going to
ignore it, and does. Now, as regards Frege's thinking
at the time cf Grundlagen 1 am, on this point, in
sympathy with Geach. I shall bring this out through
44 , G.E.Me Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Thr^e Philosophers
,
p. l 6l.
45. Ibid. , p. 158
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examining Frege's examination of one of those "doubts
and difficulties") all in due time.
Let us now get back to Frege's discussion of his
example involving parallel lines, to which I attach
much importance. He writes.
The judgment "line a is parallel to
line b", or, using symbols,
S // b,
can be taken as an identity. If we do this,
we obtain the concept of direction, and sayi
"the direction of line a is identical with
the direction of line b". Thus we replace
the symbol //by the more generic =, through
removing what is specific in the content of
the former and dividing it between a and b.
V/e carve up the content in a way different
from the original way^ and this yields us
a new concept,^^
Frege seems to have just told us that the pair of
sentences
(a) Line a is parallel to line b,
(b) The direction of a is identical with the direction of b,
have the same content, but that they "carve up the content"
in somsv/hat different ways. How do these sentences differ?
They differ, or seem to, in logical structure. This
difference v/e might show schematically this v/ayi
xRy
Tx(Fx) = Ty(Gy),
They differ, or seem to, in their logical consequences,
(a), but not (b), implies something of the form
• Orundlagen, pp, 74-75®46
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(Ex) (xRy) .
(b), but not {a)» implies something of the form
(Ex)(x = Ty(Gy))
•
And they differ in what we might intuitively speak of
as their ontologies* the objects (or entities* in general)
to which reference is made within the sentences. For
(b) speaks of directions* no mention of which is found
in (a) — or so it seems. There can be no question xhat
Frege regards our pair of sentences as sharing their
content. But was he prepared to treat these apparent
differences in structure, consequences, and ontology as
real ones?
In Bepiriffsschrift Frege had written that
the contents of two judgments may differ in
two ways* either the consequences derivable
from the first ... also follov/ from the
second* ... or this is not the case. . . .
£ln the first case] I call that part of the
content that is the same in both the con-
ceptual content .^7
This passage has its unclarities. But on a natural
way of taking it Frege would be saying that on his view
tv/o sentences are the same in conceptual content just
in case they have the same logical consequences. This
has the consequence that all logical truths come to have
the same conceptual content* and it seems to me doubtful
that Frege ever held to that. But if Frege did hold a
^ 7 * Bea:r .lffGSchrift * p. 12.
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view with this as a consequence at one time, it was no
longer his view come Grundlagen .
That we encounter "a new concept" with (b) of the
earlier pair of sentences assures us that the sentences
differ in logical structure and consequences. And there
can be no doubt that Frege means to sa.y that the process
of redistributing the content of (a) to get (b) yields
US something new. For in his ensuing remarks he tells
us that the basic ideas of geometry "must be given
originally in intuition," and whereas intuition provides
us v/ith an idea of parallel lines no one "has an intuition
48
of the direction of a straight line." Rather, "the con-
cept of direction is only discovered at all as a result
of a process of intellectual activity which takes its
4q
start from the intuition . • ^ Thus sentences (a) and
(b), which seem to differ in the ways noted, differ in
epistemological status, according to Frege. We shall be
in a position to affirm the truth of the second, under-
standing what we affirm, only if we are in a position to
similarly affirm the first. But not conversely. We can
knov/ two lines to be parallel and yet not know that their
directions are identical.
48. Grundlagen, p. 75
•
49* Ibid. p p. 75*
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It is worth noting a similarity between the pair
(a) and (b), and the pair
(c) Vixens are vixens
(d) Vixens are female foxes
of our earlier discussion ($2). In each case we have a
pair of sentences which agree in content v/here» so we
assume, it is possible for someone to know that the first
is true and yet not know that the second is.
As important as the similarity is this difference.
In the second case we could argue that the content is the
same on the Kantian grounds that the concept of vixen is
analyzable into the concepts of female and fox. Whereas
in the first case there is no similar concept, or (proper)
portion of propositional content, the analysis of which
grounds the claim of common content. Rather the focus of
the "intellectual activity" must be the propositional
content as a whole. Here v/e see the influence of Frege's
Dictum,
Earlier we noted certain puzzles with Kant's idea
of analysis. How is a coupling of knowledge and ignorance
such as can occur with the pair (c) and (d) possible?
Hew, knowing one, does someone learn the other? Such
questions apply also to Frege's idea of alternate carvings
of common content. And he, no more than Kant, directly
ansv/ers our questions. Such hints as he offers turn on
the idea of symbolism. Earlier in GrundlaiLe n he suggests
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that some concepts can only be attained by means of
SiTnbols when, in discussing Mill, he says we must “dis-
tinguish between the symbols themselves and their content,
even though it may be that the content can only be grasped
by their aid»“^^ And in the essay “On the Justification
of a Scientific Concept-Script [Begriffsschrift]" of 1882,
he had this to say about symbols and symbolism.
SyD'ibols hold the selfsame significance for
thinking as did the discovery of using the
wind to sail cross-wind for navigaxicn* Let
no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good
deal depends upon a practical selection of
them. Furthermore, their practical value
is not diminished by the fact that after much
practice v;e no longer need to speak out loud
in order to think. The fact remains that we
think in words or, when not in v/ords, then
in mathematical or other symbols.
Without symbols v/e would further hardly
raise ourselves to the level of conceptual
thought. In giving the same symbol to siiiiilar
but different things, we no longer symbolize
the individual thing but rather that which
they have in comjnon -- the concept -- and the
concept itself is first gained by our symbol-
izing it, for, since the concept is of itself
imperceptible to the sense, it requires a
perceptible representative in order to appear
to us. Thus it is that tne sensuous opens
up for us the world of the non-sensuous
Nov/ if we recall a remark of Frege's mentioned prior
to taking up the parallel lines case*
We are therefore proposing not to define
identity specially for this case, but to
50 . Ibid. , p. 22.
51 , English translation* Mind , 73 (1964), pp. 155“‘l60.
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use the concept of identity • • • as a means
for arriving at that which is to be regarded
as being identical • • ,32
we might try and capture Frege’s thinking this way.
From the content of ’Line a is parallel to line b* we
are to symbolise out the concept of identity, and (somehow)
use this as the means by which we redistribute the remain-
der of the given content, so that now we can represent
the content in question this wayt The direction of line
a is identical with the direction of line b. We do not
thereby alter the propositional content in question;
rather we come to apprehend it differently, from a new
perspective, by means of an alternate symbolism. This
picture, as difficult as it is to clarify, was of much
importance to Frcjge’s thought. However I do not want to
attempt to assess its ultimate usefulness. All that is
required for present purposes is that we appreciate that
Frege was committed to the view that the likes of (a)
and (b) are, for all their differences, the same in con-
tent, and, given that, that we may speak of them as
analytically equivalent in a natural extension of Kant's
usage of 'analytic*. Assuming this, what proves crucial
for Frege's purposes is whether by means of the sort of
analytic activity he mentions new objects can come into
viev;.
52, Grundlagen , p. ?4.
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In the parallel lines case it is not just the con-
cept of a line’s direction which newly appears; we also
come upon directions* or so it seems* Our conceptual
activity* if all goes well* enriches our ontology* And
it is by analogous procedures that Frege wishes to argue
that numbers are given to us*
Frege's next step is to put the (tentative) results
of the previous analytic activity into the form of a
definition* He opens section 65 v;ith the remarks*
Nov/ in order to get * • • from parallel-
ism to the concept of direction* let us try
the following definition:
The proposition
"line a is parallel to line b/’
is to mean the same as
"the direction of line a is
identical with the direction
of line b*"53
This is offered as an instance of the "more fruitful type
of definition"* And* says Frege, offered in place of the
numerical example* our (A)* "because I can express myself
less clumsily and make myself more easily understood*
The argument can readily be transferred in essentials to
ell
apply to the case of numerical identity.
Frege then takes up some of those "doubts and diffi-
culties" to which we have twice earlier referred* These
lead him to reject the above definition and so also that
53* ibid * * p * 76
3^ • Ibid^ * p* 78 * n* 1*
39
of (A)* But I believe we can best appreciate the thrust
of Frege’s thought if we temporarily set aside these
**douDts and difficulties*' and* assuming the legitimacy
of our (a)* sketch out how Frege’s reasoning could proceed
from this to his logicist conclusion* This done we shall
come back and look at the *'doubts and difficulties" and
the move Frege makes in response to them« The thought is
that it will then be clear why it v/as appropriate to
defer that discussion for the moment.
Let us suppose that (A) legitimates the use of
numerical abstraction operators* (e*g.) ’NxFx’* that "we
have thus acquired a means of arriving at a determinate
number and of recognizing it again as the same , . .**
Still* sines the right side of (A) involves* at least
implicitly* the idea of one* one correlation we have not
yet* it may be objected* "defins[d] the sense of" the
left side in non-numerical terms. Frege removes this
objection by providing* in Grundla.-yen * a definition of
one* one correlation in terms of his Begriffsschrift logic.
Given then that we are authorized to use numerical ab-
straction operators we can — though this was not Frege’s
actual procedure — define ’zero’* ’successor’ and
’(natural) number’ using just these operators and
Begriffsschrift logic* the third of which v/ill make use
of the Segriffsschrift definition of the ancestral of
a relation This done* we shall be in a position to
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derive Peano *3 axio^is for arithmetic with the Begriffschrift
logic and these definitions, for ’zero*, ’successor', and
'(natural) number' are the only primitive, non-logical
terms occurring in these axioms. The technicalities of
these definitions and derivations are now familiar and
will not here concern us.^^ What I wish to emphasize is
their dependence upon (A), and the fact that Frege regards
(A) as a case where a propositional content, that repre-
sented by the right side, has been carved up in an alter-
native manner so as to give, in this case, the left side
with its apparent reference to numbers. We shall return
to this, but now let us pick up again with Frege's
discussion.
There is one of the "doubts and difficulties" that
Frege spends the most time on; it leads him to revise
the earlier definitions* We limit ourselves to comment-
ing upon it. Frege writes that
... there is [a] doubt which ma.y make
us suspicious of our proposed definition.
In the proposition
"the direction of a is identical
with the direction of b"
the direction of a plays the part of an
object, and our definition affords us a
means of recognizing this object as the
same again, in case it should happen to
55 . See the discussions of Charles Parsons in "Mathematics,
Foundations of", and "Frege's Theory of Number" in
Philosophy in America , edited by Max Black,
pp. 160-203*
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crop up in some other guise » say as the
direction of b. But this means does not
provide for all cases. It will not, for
instance, decide for us whether England
is the same as the direction of the
Earth's axis, • , Naturally no one is
going to confuse England with the direc-
tion of the Earth's axis; but that is np
thanks to our definition of direction,
It might be thought that v/e could simply count as
false such claims as that England is the direction of the
Earth's axis. But how are we to sort out just such "waste
cases" so as to then rule them false? Not on the basis
of their form; for we can not assume that a direction of
a line v;ill only be referred to just that way, i,e,, as
a direction of a line.
If we possessed the concept of direction, then# says
Frege, v/ith regard to
The direction of a is identical with q
"we could lay it down that, if q is not a direction, our
proposition will be denied, while if it is a direction,
our original definition will decide whether it is to be
denied or affirmed® But this idea fails, for "we
lack • • , the concept of direction,
Vi'e have said that it was Frege's view that we attain
the concept of direction through redistributing the content
560 Grundlagen , pp. 77-78
•
57. Ibid,, p, ?8 ,
58. P* 78
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of a statement of parallel lines over the symbols of a
certain statement of identity. And Frege did say that
**if we do this, we obtain the concept of direction.** And
yet we have just quoted him as saying that, for all that,
we do not possess the concept of direction. Have we
caught Frege in a contradiction? I think not. But what
is the source of this apparent conflict, and how shall it
be resolved?
There is a sense in which we do possess the concept
and a sense in which we do not. We do not possess the
concept in just this sense* we are not able to set out a
procedure to deal with the "waste cases" which does not
beg tha question. For notice that the last mentioned
suggestion of Frege's requires us to be able to determine
for any object whether or not it is a direction; thus it
tells us no better tha.n the previous attempts that Jingland
is not a direction.
V/e do possess the concept in the sense that we know
that England is not a direction, know which are "waste
cases", and knov/ that a way has not been provided by v/hich
to deal with them. This distinction is implicit in
Frege's remark "that we cannot by these methods [i.e»,
those thus far considered] obtain any concept of direction
with sharp limits to its application ..." V/hereas in
59 • Ibid. , p. 79
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a sense we have a concept of direction, we have not managed
definition of it for aii cases* On this ground Frege
deems the initially offered definition inadequate. And so
he shifts his approach.
"Seeing that we cannot by these methods alone obtain
any concept of direction with sharp limits to its appli-
cation, nor therefore, for the same reasons, any satis-
factory concept of Number either, let us try another way."^^
Here Frege turns to using extensions of concepts. He
gives this definition of direction* "the direction of
line a is the extension of the concept "parallel to line
6l
a"." And then the analogous definition of number* "the
Number v/hich belongs to the concept F is tne extension of
the concept "equal to the concept F"."
Definitions in this style satisfy Frege on method-
ological scores in Grundlagen . But the immediate justi-
fication of this latter definition is that (A) follows
from it.^^ It is with (A), the analogue of the extension-
less definition of direction, that the philosophical
interest lies.
To pull these remarks together, let me recast a point
60. Ibid.
, p. 79»
61 . Ibi d.
, p. 79*
62. Ibid. , p. 79-80*
63. See Parsons, "Frege *s Theory of Number"
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recently made. We may usefully distinguish between epis-
temologicai concerns and methodological concerns* and
correlatively, between methods of concept attainment and
methods of introduction of concept words into scientifi-
cal3.y acceptable discourse. ''£T]]h9 concept of direction
is only discovered at all as a result of a process of
intellectual activity which takes its start from intuition
• •
•** This is reflected in the extensionless definition*
since* according to Frege* we proceed from an intuition
of parallel lines to the concept of direction. But this
definition is not adequate to science; it lacks "sharp
boundaries" and so* from the perspective of an adequate
methodology* is not a concept at all. Methodological
rigor leads Frege to the definition given in terms of
extensions
•
Analogously* the concept of number is only gained
by means of countings* the results of which are expressed
in statements of number, wherein number words have their
basic use* Through counting too we learn how to estab-
lish that there are, or are not, just as many of cue sort
of thing as there are of another. And then through re-
distributing the content of the general case of just-as-
many-as judgments we arrive at the concept of number.
This is reflected in (A). But this, for reasons given in
discussing the concept of direction, does not provide a
scientifically acceptable concept of number. And so here
^5
too Frege turns to extensions. He adds# in his later
suniTiary # that "this way ^i.e.# the way of extensions]] of
getting over the difficulty [the one we looked at] cannot
be expected to meet with universal approval# and many will
prefer other inethods ... I attach no decisive impor-
tance even to bringing in the extensions of concepts at
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all." Bringing in extensions was simply a device used
(rather unreflectively) to meet a self-imposed method-
ological requirement.
Still we might wonder how the use of extensions
helps us at all, Cr.n we not object that Frege *s final
definition of the concept of direction does not itself
lay down that lingland is or is not an extension and so
no more than previous attempts tells us whether England
is# or is not# the direction of the Farth's axis? Frege
simply passes this over with the remark "I assume that
it is known what the extension of a concept is."^^ But
this is an issue that sooner or later must be faced#
especially v/hen# as in Grundgesetze # extensions (or sets)
come to play a. central role. Here we might just lodge a
question. The concept of direction was to be made sharp
through using extensions# or sets. But if the concept of
set is not reducible to# or explainable in, other terms.
Grundlagen, p, 11?.
65 «> Ibid, , p, 80# n» J.
,
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how then could we assure ourselves that this concept has
sharp boundaries? To this we shall return somewhat
later ($13 )*
In Grundlagen Frege attached no epistemological
importance to his use of extensions? this I have been
trying to convey. And this is what I take to be the thrust
of Geach’s remark, earlier quoted. If so, then it should
be clear that, and why, I concur with it. Now, hovi? does
this bear upon our guiding problem?
Pap’s problem, simply put, is how does one get from
speaking in purely logical terms to talk of numbers, and
arithmetic generally, and what licenses the move? Frege
has an answer. It turns on the idea that a given propo-
sitional content can be analyzed in different ways, some-
times with the effect that we come to appreciate the
presence of new objects. More specifically, with the
statements (or statement forms)
There are just as many Fs as Gs
The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs
we have such a situation. The first is epistemologically
prior to the second, but shares with it its content.
Thus, having acquired the ability to make just-as-many-as
judgments we are in a position to rcsymbolize such and
thereby apprehend numbers. Take this together with the
tecimical accomplishments of the definitions of one i one
correlation and the ancestral of a relation in (arguably)
4?
puiely
-tOgical "teriTiS and you have "the importanl; elements
^undlai^en picture. And we can appreciate that it
was by no means implausible that Frege had shown the way
towards demonstrating that arithmetic was analytic in the
sense of Kant. As we have seen* this involves not just
working with a richer logic, but also extending Kant's
conception of a (narrowly) analytic truth so that (A),
for instance, may be regarded as an analytical equivalence.
When Frege gets down to the task of working out the
details of the Grundlagen picture various alterations
occur. Notably, come Grundgesetze . extensions (or sets)
no longer have an arguably incidental role. Frege’s
philosophy of set theory is now pivotal for his philos-
ophy of mathematics. Still, I would, and shall, argue
that, epistemologically speaking, there has been no break
with the Grundlagen outlook. This will be a subject of
comment in the next section and again in (iiil3), where it
can be discussed in terms of the logical theory of
Gr undgesetze previously set out ($9).
$4. Logicism and Platonism
Frege never sought to deny nor dispense with the
assumption that number words, in their arithmetic em-
ployment, refer to numbers? in this sense he was a
Platoniot in his philosophy of mathematics. Let us
sharpen this notion of Platonism. We might- say that
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someone is a Platonist in this sense if that person holds
that numbers vsxist or assigns being to numbers. And we
might say that it does not matter whether the person
distinguishes various kinds of being, assigning numbers
a kind of being not possessed by, say, tables and chairs.
To say that numbers are, is enough. But then the question
v/ould arise as to how seriously the person takes the kind
of being accorded numbers. If this sort of being is also
granted, say, Pegasus, or Hamlet, or the present king of
France, we may not wish to associate the name of Plato
with the view. For our purposes v/e may cut through such
worries over the v/orthiness of some kind of being by
characterizing a Platonist position as one on which the
following two claims are adhered to. (1) There are
numbers, ea.ch of which has a unique successor. And,
(2) in science, existence claims, including that of (1),
are univocal. (V/hat is, is.) Thus a philosopher who
held that the ’there are* of 'There are tables* and
'There are luimbers* was ambiguous, perhaps through assign-
ing numbers and tables to different ontological categories,
would not be a Platonist in our sense. Nor v/ould someone
be a Platonist under our characterization if they, like
Carnap, held that the 'there are* of 'There are numbers'
and 'There are prime numbers* was ambiguous. However
in the sense here given the term Frege clearly was a
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66Pla'tonist* Let us refer to such a Platonism as onto~
logical Platonism*
It seems to be generally possible for two philoso-
phers to agree upon the existence of entities of some
broad category and yet fail to agree about how it is v/e
know about these things* For instance# many who have
agreed that there are physical objects have disagreed
amongst themselves as to whether we perceive them# infer
them# construct them# or v/hat* There is# however# a
certain kind of epistemological attitude prominently
associated with ontological Platonism. It is the attitude
William Kiieale is thinking of when he writes
many « * * accounts of a priori knov/ledge
have been inspired by Plato’s notion of
contemplation . . * as a kind of iioteilec-
tual gasing in which the soul may read off
facts about super-sensible objects.^/^
This picture is especially associated by philosophers
with mathematicians v/axing philosophical* Here is one
confirming instance from the writings of G.H. Hardy#
I believe that matiiematical reality lies
outside us# that our function is to dis-
cover or obs_erve it# and that the theorems
66* This could be objected to on the grounds that
Frege’s logical theory is essentially a many-sorted
logic* However# there is only one sort of obje cts *
In any case my main concern here is not with ontology#
but epistemology.
67. William and Martha Kneule# The Development of
Logic # p* 636*
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which we prove and which we describe grand-
iloquently as our 'creations’ are simply
our notes of our observations*^^
It is this picture from which I wish to disassociate
Frege { he is not* as I shall put it» an epistemologica l
Platonist *
Thinking still of Grundlagen and ouj: (a) I would
contrast Frege’s thought with the following sort of
picture* We can imagine someone viewing (A) as com-
pendiously correlating previously unconnected accomplish-
ments* On the one hand we have learned to count* express
our results in "judgments of number", and so come to
comprehend just-as-many-as statements* Independently
of this we have acquired soma acquaintance with numbers
and their properties* And now, putting both hands before
us, we realise that an intimate relationship binds the
two together, and so come to appreciate the truth of (A)*
On Frege's picture, having come to comprehend a just-as-
inany-as statement we are able to recarve the content of
it so as to re-express this content by means of a state-
ment of numerical identity* Such a transformation is
reflected in (A), and it is by such intellectua]. activity
that we apprehend numbers* This picture supports the
claim that (A) is an analytical equivalences the other
does not*
68. G.H. Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology ,’ pp. 123-124*
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In Grundla/ren the likes of our (A) are called
definitions! they are those of the "more fruitful type"
by means of which we gain something "essentially new".
In Grundgesetze however only direct eliminative defini-
tions are counted as definitions,^^ Thus while in
Grund3,agen "definitions" were ontologically augraentative,
in Grundgesetze all ontology must come through the axioms.
Still I regard this more as a shift in the application
of ’ definition' than an indication of any fundamental
divergence from the Grundlagen picture. In particular
I v/ould argue that the same type of justification which
Frege provides in Grundlagen for (A) lies behind the
introduction of Basic Law V of the system of Grundgesetze ,
BLV is the axiom which enriches Frege's fundamental logic
with a theory of the extensions of concepts. We may
convey the gist of this axiom® while avoiding for the
present Frege's own notation and the intricacies of its
intGrpretation® with the use of contemporary class nota-
tion as follows,
(B) x(Fx) * x(Gx) iff (x)(Fx iff Gx)
.
This may be reads The class of Fs is the same as the
cD.ass of Gs just in case all and only Fs are Gs,
69 , "We introduce a new name by means of a def init.1 on by
stipulating that it is to have the same sense and the
same denotation as some name composed of signs that
are familiar," Grundgeset ze, p, B2,
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Duimnett, supposing a shift in Frege's practice in
the use of contextual definitions from Grundlagen to
and regarding the role of Frege’s Dictum in
Grundlagen as justifying the use of contextual definition,
finds that the Dictum *'has no place in Frege’s later
philosophy • • I disagree. As has been already
implied, I see Frege’s Dictum supporting (B) of Grundgesetze
in much the fashion as it had (A) of Grundlagen . However
Dummett has another reason for supposing Frege’s Dictum
to be of diminished importance in the later philosophy.
0?his is that "it accords a distinctive position to sentences
which he was no longer prepared to recognize This, I
believe, expresses a genuine insight; to such matters I
shall return somewhat later ($15)
•
I have indicated that with (B), our simplified
version of BLV, we have expressed the result of carving
up the propositional content represented by the right
side so that something "essentially new" comes into view;
this is represented on the left side with the statement
of set identity. I must defer offering such direct
textual support as I can for this interpretation until
the logical system of Grundgesetze has been presented.
In ($13) ihe matters under discussion will come up again
70 • Dumnett, "Frege", p. 233.
« Ibid., p. 233.
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and textual citations made. But in the meantime I can do
something better than providing direct textual support; I
that this interpretation must accord with
Frege *3 thinking.
In his ‘‘Introduction'’ to Grundfresetze Frege, having
j.ndicatod hi.s coricern with "the epistemological nature"
of the laws of arithmetic, informs us that
with this book I carry out a design announced
in my Grundlai^en der Arithmetik of 1884, I
wish here tc substantiate i:a actual practice
the view of Number I expounded in [that] book.'^^
The "design" of Grundlagen was, of course, to at least
make probable that the laws of arithmetic v/ere analytic
truths. This, we may suppose, remains the program, though
Frege has by and large now dropped the Kantian vocabulary.
If we have been on the mark in our portrayal of Frege’s
reasoning in Grundlagen , we would expect to find in
Grundgesetze some juncture at which a transition is made
from one mode of discourse to another across a bridge of
a common propositional content, a content analyzable first
in terms of one mode, subsequently in terras of the other.
It is in this way I would have us regard BLV, Let us look
at this again, or rather the approximation (B), and set
aside our knowledge of its paradoxical implications.
How might we picture to ourselves how someone might come
?2, Grundgese t«e , p. 5*
5^
"to gr3.sp "this .law"? It night be held that* on the one
hand, we may acquire a knowledge of the logical properties
of concepts through familiarizing ourselves with funda-
mental logic, and on the other hand, and independently,
w© may gain some appreciation of sets and their relations
one to another, and then at some point we consider the
two together and realize that a systematic connection
holds between the domains of concepts and classes v/hich
we give expression to with (B), cr 3LV. As before, this
is a picture from which I would disassociate Frege, for if
such were his view, the set theory which issues from BLV
could not possibly be called analytic in anything like
Kant's sense, for BLV itself v/ould surely have to count
as synthetic a priori* Hence arithmetic, which is to be
made to appear within the resultant theory, vvould be
synthetic a priori also* If arithmetic is to be shown to
be analytic, BLV roust be thought cf in a manner analogous
to that discussed with (A)«. It functions as a general
rule for the redistribution of content of certain forms
of sentences so that new entities, new objects of logic,
come into view. (In this it differs from the other
Grundgesetze axioms •) The ultimate basis or our appre-
hension of numbers is through a generalized analytic
equivalence of statements of concept co-extensiveness
and statements of set identity * Platonic av;areness of
seta, or numbers, plays no role*
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is ofisn s'ts.'tGd as thG thGsis 'thA't arith**
metic is reducible to logic. Then it is observed that
true* or plausible* logic must embrace
set theory. So the question arises as to the warrant*
or merit, of counting the truths of set theory as truths
of logic. For an understanding of Frege’s thought this
is not the best way of coming at matters. An apter
question is whether the truths of sex theory are analytic
truths. And I portray Frege as arguing that they arei
set theory is an analytic extension of logic. Given
that* it would matter little what we chose to say on
whether set theory is part of logic.
It is also misrepresentative xo speak in a single
breath of Frege-Russell logicism. For* though I cannot
argue it here. I believe it to be clear that Russell
never advocated the epistemology of number I am attri-
buting to Frege. Russell from at least the time of his
book on Leibniz (1900) until coming under the influence
of V/ittgenstein around the time of his lectures on Oiar
Knowlcd/^e of the External World ( 191 ^) v;as an epistemo-
logical Platonist. Under Wittgenstein’s influence he
moved towards the idea that the truths of mathematics
were just so many tautologies. And though he never
succeeded in clarifying to his own satisfaction just
v/hat this amounted to* it is clear it is a view for which
Frege would have had little sympathy.
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We have been considering the nature of Frege’s
response to Pap’s problem* We may round off these re-
marks by considering Frege’s position in the light of
another complaint lodged against logicism# one Poincare
put this way in 1894.
If • • • ail the propositions fwhich mathe-
matics J enumerates can be deduced one from
another by xhe rules of formal logic, why is
not mathematics reduced to an immense tautology?
The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially
new, and, if everything is to spring from the
principle of identity, everything should be
capable of being reduced to it. Shall v/e then
admit that the enunciations of all those
theorems which fill so many volumes are nothing
but devious ways to say A is A?73
Frege had himself raised this issue in Grundlagen a
decade earlier,
A very emphatic declaraticn in favor of the
analytic nature of the lav/s of number is that
of W.S* J evens* "I hold that algebra is a
highly developed logic, and number but
logical discrimination*
“
But this view, too, has its difficulties*
Can the great tree of the science of number
as v/e know it, towering, spreading, and still
continually grov/ing have its roots in bare
identities? And how do the empty forms of
logic C07ne to disgorge so rich a content
73* Henri Poincare, "The Nature of Mathematical Reason-
ing*" Quoted by Tobias Danzig in Number , p. ?2,
The contest of the remark is a discussion of mathe-
matical induction? for a recent discussion of Poincare’s
position see Parsons, "Frege’s Pliilosophy of Number*"
7^* Grundlagen , p* 22.
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Given our earlier discussion we might phrase Frege’s
reply this way* Arithmetic is not just logic, but rather
an outgrowth of logic, an analytic extension of logic*
Or, to use Poincare’s terms, whereas arithmetic does
spring from logic, it is not reducible to logic. How-
ever suggestive we find this way of marking a distinction,
what is at stake is the conception that given just logic
and the idea that a given propositional content may be
symbolically re-expressed so that something “essentially
new” emerges, arithmetic may be shown to be analytic in,
Vvhat is arguably, Kant’s sense. Thus arithmetic is not
synthetic a priori, nor logic empty.
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If . • • we set aside all cognitions that we must borrowfrom .obJ^c^;£3 and reflect solely upon the use of the
understanding in itself, we discover those of its rules
which are necessary throughout, in every respect and
regardless of any special objects, because without them
we would not think at all . •
.
[it] follows that the
universal and necessary rules of thought in general can
concern solely its fo;^, and not in any way its matter.
Accordingly, ^ the science containing these universal and
necessary ruies is a science of the mere form of ourincsllectual cognition or of thinking. And can there-fore 1 orm lor ourselves the idea of the possibility of
that of a general grammar which
the mere form ol a language in
which belong to the matter of
such a science
,
just as
contains nothing beyond
general, without words,
language.
Now this science of the necessary lav/s of the under-
stand.s.ng a.nd reason in general, or — which is the same --
of the mere form of thinking, we call logic .
KANT
The most reliable way of carrying out a proof ... is to
follow pure logic, a way that, disregarding the particular
characteristics of objects, depends solely on those laws
ujjcn which all knowledge rests.
FREGE
I understand by ’laws of logic* . • . laws of truth*
FREGE
CHAPTER II
LOGIC
$5* Traits of Logic
Frege, who reflected so deeply on the nature of
mathematics p and who so greatly enriched logic, provi.ded
us with scant reflection upon the nature of logic itself.
What is studied under the heading of *logic*? What is
the logician's i>ubject matter? Let us try and tease out
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ansv.’ors roight weXl lia.YG bsen Fr6ge*s*
I"t is possible to get rather good agreement upon the
extension of ’logic*, about what principles are logical
principles* As stated previously, logic for Frege in I879
included predicate logic with identity plus some unher-
alded second-order logic* With Qrundgesetze we find this
fundamental logic essentially unchanged (viewed mathe-
matically), except for the addition of notation for defi-
nite description and an axiom to govern it* But now the
second order logic is explicit, and in its terms is intro-
duced a set theory* And there is more* A many-branching
structure of higher-order logic unfolds* If we think in
terms of basic ideas — roughly those of first order logic
plus set theory — many logically minded philosophers
would regard all of Frege's logic as logic, and all would
regard much of it as logic* But even if agreement v/ere
complete on Frege's logic extending to include all, and
nothing but, logic, we would not want to identify the
tv/o without further ado* For we want to commend Frege
on extending logic beyond what it was, and to be able to
sensibly inquire into possible additional developments or
alternatives. Thus even complete agreeinen'*, with Frege on
the logical truths would still leave the questioni V/hat
is logic?
The study of logic we might say is the study of the
logical truths. Which it is* But t)ie circularity of
6o
"this reiT-ark is too bla'tan't "to S6rv9 as an answer "to our
question*
In logic one studies principles of valid reasoning.
True > but here what is intended is not so much pieces of
reasonings which people have actually gone through so
much as reasonings which are such that if anyone went
through them they would be reasoning validly. Or, more
simply, we. may drop this talk of hypothetical reasonings
and speak .instead of arguments in the abstract and, in
particular? of the relationship of premisses to conclusion
in valid arguments, arguments such that were anyone to
rehearse them they would be reasoning validly. In this
way logic is conceived as a study of the consequence
relation, that is, the relation of logical consequence
vrhich holds between just the premisses and conclusions of
logically valid arguments. And what then is the force of
•logical* in 'logical consequence* ? Just this, when a
set of premisses bears this relation to a conclusion,
conjoining the premisses and taking th© result as ante-
cedeiit of a conditional with the conclusion as consequent
yields a truth of a peculiar sort, namely a logical truth.
And so it is that we have moved through a rather tight
circle back to the idea that logic deals with the truths
of logic*
Let us try another tack. Various remarks of
Gruridlagen suggest that it was Frege's view that the body
6l
of human knowledge divides three ways according to “the
ultimate ground upon which [rests] the justification”^
for particular knowledge claims. Physical science requires
the support of sensory evidence, in addition to drawing
upon logic and mathematics, and also geometry* Euclidean
geometry was for Frege, following Kant, an a priori
science; it makes no justificatory use of the senses, but
rests upon a special sort of intuition.^ The truths of
logic — and aritiirastic also, as it was to be shown
rest upon neither experience nor intuition* But then
what do they rest upon? What is the ground of logical
truth?
It seems almost to have been Frege *s view that it is
bstter not to ask this question, because one is bound to
go wrong in trying to respond to it* This sentiment is
closely connected with his disgust with what he termed
psychologism, the attitude, roughly, that we must look
to what goes on in our minds when we speak to understand
and clarify the meanings of our words so as to know of
what we speak* ^ In any case Frege does not directly deal
with the question* We are left with the negative charac-
terization of whence the laws of logic gain their authorityt
!• Grimdlagen , p* 3»
2* See Grimdlagen , p* 75 PP* 101-102
3* Cf. Dummett, ”Frege”, p* 225*
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neither froia the testimony of the senses, nor from
intuiti on*
Asking as to Frege's vievjs on the ground of logical
truth has not yielded a positive characterization of
logic. Let us look into a closely related matter, that
wnich Frege calls the ’'domain*' of various sciences. He
says we may "compare the various kinds of truth in respect
of whe domains that they govern,"^ "Empirical proposi-
tions hold good of what is physically or psychologically
actual, the truths of geometry govern all that is spatially
intuitable, whether actual or the product of our fancy*"'^
Whereas "the truths of arithmetic govern all that is
numerable. This is the widest domain of all; for to it
belongs not only the actual, not only the intuitable, but
ever>-t.hing thinkableo"^ As with arithmetic, so with logic
j
it too governs "everj-thing thinkable".
Euclidean geometry governs everything that is
spatially intuitable, or imaginable. It is not possible
to imagine anything noii-Euclideanly, though one can
reason about non-Euciidean space. Logic, says Frege,
governs everything thinkable. But he cannot want to
imply that it is not pcss.ible for someone to think illogi-
4. Grimdlageru p. 20.
5 * Ibid. , p. 20
o
6. Ibid.
, p. 21.
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callyj he does not wish to deny that people reason falla-
ciously. It laust rather be his view that one cannot think
correctly on any topic except in conformity with the laws
of logic. But then one cannot (on Frege’s view) think
correctly about physical objects, the denizens of Euclid-
ean space, except in conformity with the laws of Euclid-
ean geometry. 0ns can however think logically while
denying any of these laws. Here then is the difference
Frege is after between the domains of geometry and logic#
Whereas one c-^ii reason in such a manner that one would
be reasoning correctly only if some laws of logic were
false, it IS not possible to reason at all in accordance
with a denial of logical or arithmetical laws. Just "try
denying any one of them", he says, "and complete confusion
sets in. Even to think at all seems no longer possible,"'^
If it is not possible to reason correctly upon any
topic, including logic, except in conformity with the
laws of logic, then the domain of logic is universal.
For, if one could so reason, logic would not apply to
that reasoned about, and hence the domain of logic would
not be universal. Universality, then, is one mark of
logic as Frege conceived it. From this characteristic
we can extract a condition which will allov/ us to compare
Frege’s logic v/ith its predecessors and possible successors
y. Ibid. , p. 21
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or competitors. If we come upon, in any area of thought,
principles of inference which are recognizably logical,
then these principles would have to turn up in any system
of logic which v.'as a complete logic. Thus to know of
logical principles not found in someone’s logic is to
know that logic to be incomplete. Of course it is not
always a simple matter either to recognise logical
principles or to determine that the effect, at least,
of some such principle cannot be gained in a given system.
Still this idea does provide us with a hold on comparing
one system with another in the absence of anything like
a definition of logic.
Oi course if there is a principle of inference not
reflected in our logic, then there will also be logical
truths not be iound there either. For, if wc take an
argument whose conclusion follows validly from its
premisses by such an unrecognized logical principle, we
may form its corresponding conditional by taking the
conjunction of its premisses as the antecedent of a
conditional whose consequent is the argument’s conclusion.
This statement v/ill be a logical truth, but one not
recognized by our logic. For if it were, it could be
used to justify a rule of inference, since the correspond~
ing conditional of an argument is logically true just in
case the argument is logically valid. So our incomplete"
ness criterion, such as it is, can be restated this way.
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A coriplcte logic completely covers the truths of logic,
A second characteristic of logic may be mentioned,
one v/hich, though largely unremarked upon by Frege, seems
clearly to be in keeping with his thinking. This is that
logic is evident in the following sense. The fundamental
truths of logic are (to be) self-evident, and the basic
rules of inference evidently truth-preserving, so that
any logical truth which is not itself self-evident can
have its trutn established either from self-evident
truths, or ones which themselves trace back to self-
evident truths,®
How, we may ask, should v/e take ’self-evident* in
this context? Is it self-evident that tv/o plus two equals
four? Is the fact that I now have a haiid before my eyes
self-evident to me right now? I suppose that for Frege
simple arithmetic truths are self-evident in just the
sense of that terjTi he required his logical axioms to be
self-evident. This would seem to have the consequence
that self-evidentness grades offj some aritnmetical truths
are not quite self-evident, others less so, etc. But I
knov/ of no reason to expect that Frege would have balked
at this. The same situation holds in logic itself. What
Frege required in his formal work was that his axioms be
paradigifiatically self-evident, so that all theorems of
8, Cf* Quine, Philosophy £f Lop:ic
, pp, 82-83*
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the system would be evident in the sense stated, that is
potentially self-evident. (Setting aside such facts as
that some theorems will be too long or too complex to
grasp, and others will have proofs too long to take in
»
from beginning to end.)
As to the second case questioned, I would expect tnat
Frege would clsxm that this fact, that of my hand before
eyes, is not (was not) se3.f-evident
, or not self-
evident in the same sense of the term as it applies to
logic. My reason is that I expect that his insistence
on the epistemological importance of the a priori -
a posteriori distinction to figure here, though J. am
not sure just how,^
To some extent, these traits of universality and
evidentness pull in opposing directions. Universality
counsels an expansionist policy; evidentness places
constraints. Frege in his attempt to show that logic
encompasses arithmetic was forced to strain the evidence
condition? as he later admitted. In 1902, speaking in
the Appendix to the second volume of Grundgesetze of its
9 « This issue was the subject of a debate running through
several decades between (prominently) Quine and Carnap,
a defender of the Kant-Frege distinction. Quine's
Philosophy of Log^ic contains his reply to Carnap's
"W.Y. Quine on Logical Truth" in P.A. Schilpp, The
Philos OT)hy o f Rudoloh Carnap (see especially p. 9l4)
;
see Quine on obviousness, especia.lly pp. 96-97 .
6?
Basic Law V* Frege wrote
I have never concealed from myself its lack
of the self-evidentness which the others
Li.e#, the other axioms] possess* and v/hich
must properly be demanded of a law of logic,
and in fact I pointed out this weakness inthe Introduction to the first volume
However what he had actually said in this "Introduction''
was.
^ ^i'SP’dte can arise, so far as I can see,
With regard to my Basic Law concerning
courses-of
-values (V)? which logicians
perhaps have not yet expressly enunciated,
and yet is what people have in mind, for
example, where they speak of the extensioras
of concepts c In any event the place is
pointed out v/here the decision must be made.^^
I think the tenor of these remarks is the hope, perhaps
expectation, that here familiarity will breed self-evidence*
And Frege had reason for this hope? his axiom represented
a very general example of the sort of case we have dis-
cussed where a given propositional content receives
alternate symbolizations. What forced the issue was a
letter Frege received from Russell in 1902,*^ For, as
v/e have said, the axiom in question was that by which
Frege vms to derive set theory from his more fundamental
logic. It states, in effect, that there is a class
Grundgesetze
, p* 127*
Ibid*
, pp*
12. This letter and Frege *s reply are included (in trans-
lation) in van Heijenoort, From Frege to Godol .
68
answering to every predicative expression: a separate
class for non-co-extensive predicates* Russell’s letter
indicated to Frege that this axiom engenders a contra-
diction* Russell's paradox.
Logicism requires set theory to be logic or its
analytic extension. But what we seemed to have learned
since Russell turned up the contradiction named for him
is that if a set theory is strong enough to reach arith-
metic* its axioms do not have the self-evidentness Frege
required* while if one proceeds from only self-evident
principles, arithmetic lies beyond reach. Either way
Frege's epistemological program would fail.
$6 . Logic as Lingua Characterica
In a brief note* "Logic as calculus and logic as
language"*"^ Jean van Heijenoort suggests that "from
Frege's writings a certain picture of logic emerges, a
conception that is perhaps not discussed explicitly but
nevertheless constantly guides Frege", one that finds
expression in Frege's conception of his Begriffsschrift
as a lingua characterica , and not a mere calculus
13» This judgment is a familiar one; I came to it, I
believe, through listening to Richard Cartwright
and reading Quine.
14. Joan van Haijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and Logic as
Language", Synthcse , i? ( 1967 ), pp. 324-330.
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raliP5.iB§tpr. Van Heijenoort in referring to this con-
ception speaks of the universality of logic. We shall
explore this idea and try to clarify the picture van
Heijenoort attributes to Frege.
Frege typically used the phrase * lingua characterica *
in contexts where he wished to dissociate himself from
the Algebra of Logic school of, notably, Boole and
Schroder. In particular, he used the phrase to stress
what he took to be a difference of purpose between him-
self and thCEse other logicians.
Frege begins the paper "On the scientific justifi-
cation of a concept-script [Begriffsschrift]", which we
have quoted from earlier ($3). with this remarki
The need for seme method of avoiding
errors in one's ov/n thought as well as
misunderstanding on the part of others has
titse and again made itself felt in the
more abstract scientific disciplines. Both
these shortcomings are rooted in the im-
psrfecticn of language, for the fact is
that in ^r^der to thiiik we must use sense
symbols ^
Ho goes on, somewhat further down, to state that ‘'language
is not in such a way dominated by logical laws that com-
pliance with grammar would of itself guarantee the
correctness of thought processes
. In addition,
“logical rules ... [have] proved little protection
15« Hriglish translationt Mind , 73 (1964), pp« 155"i60.
l6. Ibid.
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[from error] because they have
. . . remained external
to content. He concludes that "we have need of a
system of symbols • • , whose logical form cannot be
escaped by the content."^® This he says, we do not get
with the logical symbolisms stemming from
Jjeibniz which have recently been revivedby Boole, R, Grassman, St, Jevons, h.
Schroder and others. Here one has thelogical forms, if not entirely complete,but the content is lacking* Any attempt
to replace the letters in these symbol-
isms with expressions of content such as
analytic equations would with the result-
ing complexity and ponderousness ~~ why,
even ambiguity -- of the formulas obtained
point cut how little suited these symbolisms
are for the construction of a true
Bogrif 1 sschrift , For such I would like todemand tne followings it must have simple
modes of expression for the logical relations
v/hich, being limited to the very necessary,
can be mastered with ease and surencss.
These forms must suited to combine v/ith a
content most intimately, ^
9
Meanwhile Schroder had written a review of Beg;riffs 3 chift
in whicii he claimed to find little, other than cumbrous—
ness of notation, not already present in the works of
20Boole To this Frege replied that
17. Ibid^
18. Ibid .
19. Ibid.
20. Zeitschrift fur Mathematik und Physi k, 25, Historische
literarise he Abtei.lung, til -94. ‘Referred to by Jean
van Heijenoor't in his introductory to note to
Begriff.sschrift in From Frege to Gode l, p, 2,
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what IS primarily ovorlookad in this reproach
• u'thatj my purpose was other than
ooole s* My intention was not to represent
an abstract logic in formulas > but to express
a content through written signs in a moreprecise and clear way than is oossible
through words* In lact I wanted to create
not a mere o^lci^lus rat iocinator but a lincua
C n3.]r3 C c 0
-i* 3-C3, XJi
To these remarks we can add the following of a somewhat
later vintage*
In comparison with Boole's Symbolic Logic my
Begril f sschrift appears cumbrous; if one con-
siders it merely as Symbolic Logic — as a
c u 1us ra i oc inator and not as a 1 ingua
^
^But this disadvantage~be^mes
an advantage ii one uses it for its proner
purpose* It is precisely this cumbrousness
that makes it possible for the eye to take in
in one glance —
- at least as regards the
principal features — a complex logical struc-
ture*^ By means of this cumbrousness the more
complicated formulae gain a perspicuity that
would not be reached without it? and then
often would a chaos present itself to the
eye v/hich could hardly be extricated from
confusion*^*-
Frege's Begriffsschrif fc is intended as a calculus
rgJ^lQcinatcr * As Frege puts it, this time in Grundlahen .
21* "Cn the Scientific Justification of a Begriffsschrift”
*
22* Frege's notes (p* 251) to P,E.B. Jourdain's "Develop-
ment of Theories of Mathematical Logic and the
Principles of Matnematicsi Gottlob Frege", Quarterly
Journal of Pure and Aimplied Mathematics > A3 (I 912TT
pp* 23?“ 2 b9 » Jourdain included a note (p. 237)
saying that "Professor Frege has most kindly read
this paper in manuscript, and added* • .notes" ; they
were apparently written in I910*
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It IS designed to produce expressions which are short
and easier to take in, and to be operated like a calculus
by means of a small number of standard moves.
^3
well the Begriffsschrift is to "be suited to combine with
a content most intimately." From Grimdlagen again, "it
is designed ... to be capable of expressing not only
the logical form like Boole's notation, but also the
content of a sentence
, how shall we understand this
idea of Frege's that the forms of a linaua character^ c.
Shall be suited to the expression of ccatent?
We get some help through considering what Frege
found inadequate in, for example, Boole's symbolism. For
example, this notation provides no way to sjoubolize such
a Simple sentence as 'If something is red and round, then
it is red,' For one thing, there are certain technical
difliculties with Boole's notation for general ity,^-^ But
more importantly, Boole intended that his sjrmbolism was to
be adequate to two distinct sorts of interpretation, a
class interpretation and a propositional interpretation?
indeed, he argued that it was. We were free to interpret
the symbols of Boolean formulas as representing eitiier
23* Grundlagen
. p, 103,
2^* Ibid,
, p, 103, n, 1.
25. See C*I» Levels
and Kneale and
pp, ^11-412,
* A Survey of Symbolic Logic ,
hneale, Jevelooment cf Logic
pp. 56-57.
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classes or propositions Either one or the other, but
not both. It is not possible to call upon the resources
Of each simultaneously. But this we would need to do to
sjm,bolize our example, which is wny we cannot. With
Boole's symbolism we do not have a notation in which we
can simultaneously express compounds of sentences while
articulating the content of the component sentences in a
way which reveals logical relationships among parts of
the sentences. There is no way. for instance, to show
with the notation that 'Something is red' follows logi-
cally from 'Something is red and round". Frege's
Begriffsschrift was intended to allow us to articulate
the content of complex thoughts so as to bring out
logical relations between these thoughts and others
composed in part of their parts., and so forth.
Van Keijencort remarits as fol.l.ows on Frege's aim of
having a logical notation “suited to combine with a
content most intimately*', (He passes over the “class
interpretaticn" of Boole's s^Tnbolisir.*
)
Frege frequently calls Boole's logic an
"abstract logic", and what he means by that
2b. Actually the “prwcpcsitional interpretation" was itself
a class interpretation of sorts? in it the various
"elective s;,Tnbols" stand for,, not classe.s of objects,
but instead classes ol times (or durations, the two
not being distinguished}
, intuitively the times at
which the "symbolized" proposition is true. A
result was that truth tended to slide out of the
focus of concern.
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IS thax in this lof^ic the proposition
remains unanalyzed* The proposition is
reduced to a mere truth-value. With theintroduction of predicate letters, variables,
ana quantifiers
, the proposition becomes
articuxated and can express a meaning* The
new notation allows the symbolic rewriting
of whole tracts of scientific knowledge,
perhaps all of it, a task that is altogetherbeyond the reach of the propositional cal-
calouius!^?""” ivnaa. not sii^ply a
Adopting van Heijenoorfs idea that Frege’s notation
is intended to allow the ''rewriting” of ''whole tracts of
scientific knowledge” in its terms, and remembering that,
if this is so, then much non-knowledge would be similarly
expressible, and, further, keeping in mind that the
purpose of a Bcgriffsschrift is to make logical relations
manifest, we might be led to the following characxerization
of a 1 ingua characterica i
A lingua chaxacterica (1) is (or includes)
a grammar, a language
-frame, which provides a
set of linguistic structures adequate to arti-
culate the logical structure of any suitable
scientific propositional content so that, when
supplemented v/ith appropriate ncn-logical
vocabulary (as allowed for by the open cate-
gories of the grammar) any suitably scientific
propositional content can be expressed in the
temps provided and in such a way as to make
manifest the logical relations among it and
other similarly expressed propositional
contents *
Further, ( 2 ) it must always be possible
to (finitely) determine logical relationships
among expressions of the lingua (at least in
principle *
)
27 e "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language”, p* 325
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So characterized, a lingua charactericn must be, in
currently accepted usage, a forrrsal system , a system
vhereby in its specification we are provided with an
effective characterization of what is a sentence (formula)
of the system, and an effective characterization of what
is a proof in the system. That is, we must be provided
with a means of determining, for any sequence of expres-
sions of the system, whether or not it counts as a
sentence, and for any n-long sequence of sentences of
the system, whether or not the sequence of the first
n— 1 sentences counts as a proof in the system of the
nth member of the original sequence,
(1) states a strong condition of universality, or
potential universality; (2) enforces maximum logical
rigor. Did Frege actually regard his Begriffsschrift
as meeting these two conditions? On (2) first, it seems
clear that he did, and that indeed at least with the
presentation of the system in Grundgesetze Frege doss
attain this level of rigor. It should be noted that Frege
does not explicitly set out an effective characterization
of what shall count as a Begriffsschrift-sentence
, and it
is by no means easy to see just how this is to be done.
Still it would widely agreed that, with Grundgesetze and
perhaps even with Begriffsschrift , v/e are offered a
formal system. Thus, for ii^stance, the judgment of
van Heijenoortt “Frege was the first to present, with
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all the necessary accuracy, a cardinal notion of modern
thought, that of formal system
On the first condition (1), whether or not Frege
actually regarded his Begriffsschrift as such a lingua,
I would, echoing van Heijenoort*s remark, say that a
conception of logic as, ideally, providing the grammar
for such a lingua is a conception which accords well with
much of what Frege says about logic and can plausibly
and instructively be thought of as guiding his work.
Except that there is a difficulty in our statement of
idea, at least as it could be held by Frege j this
requires a major alteration of (1). Before taking this
up let us expend a few words on the working terminology
of this essay#
Thus far we have spoken rather haphazardly of the
content of sentences, or statements, or judgments, and
so forth# This practice is not inappropriate in dis-
cussing Frege's works prior to the I890's, but needs
improvement when later writings become the focus of
attention, as shall be increasingly the case. For about
this time Frege introduced what is most commonly referred
to as his distinction of the sense and reference of
expressions#
In his "Introduction" to Grundgesetze , in the process
23# Ibid#, p# 324#
7?
or indicating changes «M=n ne nas introduced into his
egrtffsschrtft since Be^riffssch^. p^ege tells ushis prevxous conceptual content
-has now split
into What I can * thought- and
.truth-value-, as a'cln-
sequence of distinguishing between sense and denotation
or a sign. In this case the sense of a sentence is a
thought, and its denotation a truth-value. -29 where I’rege
hero used
-thought- (
-Gedanken- ) Church and others have
used
-proposition- to .uch the sa.e purpose. And both
intend nuoh the same in speaking of sentences expressing
C^dr^en] thoughts or propositions. Both would agree
that more than one sentence (expression) may express the
same thought (sense). And that it is possible for there
to be thoughts that no sentence expresses. I shall
capitalize
-thought- henceforth when used in this way.
Still talking philosophical lexicon. I shall offer a
row words on sentences. Natural language sentences, some
of them, clearly enough express Thoughts. Equally clearly
not all of what we would ordinarily call sentences do, for
a variety of reasons. Kor instance some are in the- wrong
mood. It seems to have been Frege
-s view at the time of
Grundgeset^ that only declarative sentences have (con-
ceptual) content, that is. express Thoughts, and it will
suit the purposes of this essay to concur. Among declar-
Grundf^eaetze
, pp, 6-7,
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atxvea n,ost at best oray incompletely express Thoughts.
Indextcal elements of some variety (tense, demonstratives,
etc.) are present in most ordinary sentences. Such
sentences Frege on occasion speaks of as incomplete
sentences. These are noted for their systematic shifting
in truth-value with the context of their employment. Fven
among sentences that do completely express Thoughts
problems arise. Some fail of truth-value altogether.
This is the case with
-Pegasus flies', for instance, others,
through ambiguity of one sort or another, apparently ex-
press more than one Thought and so, in particular cases,
may be read with either truth-value. Perhaps we should
withhold from the latter the designation
-expresses a
Thought', reserving this for expressions whose content is
uniquely a Thought. Adopting this suggestion. I propose
for the purpose of this essay to so restrict our use of
-sentence- that it apply to only those expressions that
express Thoughts and do not fail of truth-value, i.e., to
sentences which are either fixedly true or fixedly false.
Koro accurately. I shall have this class in mind in making
various "theoretical" remarks, while continuing to use as
examples sentences with tensed verbs and other indexical
elements. Given this restricted usage of 'sentence' per-
haps we may say that all sentences have a suitably
scientific sense, as we were, on van lieijenoort's prompt-
ing, earlier employing this phrase, and so it may be
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dispensed with.
Let us now take up the difficulty alluded to a bit
baok With condition (l). fbis oondition was stated in
ter^s Of the logical structure of Thoughts, as we now
say. But such talk of unique logical structure of Thoughts
is out Of Place. This is apparent in a „ild way fron tne
Kantian ease where the sentences
-Vixens are vixens" and
•Vixens are female foxes- would be held to be expressions
of a common Thought. Since the sentences differ in
structure, which, if eithpr .ne , will we say shows jUre logical
structure of the Thought in question^ Here one might try
saying that, if either does, it is the latter, by holding
that in analyzing the concept vixen one was also coming
to more finely apprehend the logical structure of that
concept and so also of Thoughts that contain it. I shall
not pursue the plausibility of this approach to the
particular example, for it will not work in general. It
IS not applicable, for instance, to Frege
-s example where
the sentences
-Line a is parallel to line b- and
-The
direction of line a is the same as the direction of line
b- would be held to express the same Thought. Here the
difference in structure is sentence-wide, and so the
alternative structures are competing in a way the pre-
vious pair were not. And neither can, consistent with
Frege-s epistemological views, be taken as showing the
logical structure of the Thought in question. But the
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atte.pt. to speak coherently of Thoughts having deter-
-nate logical structure runs afoul of deeper prohle.s
than this suggests.
Setting aside for the
.oment the idea of Unaua
£Mracte^.
„e r.ay think of Frege's Begriffsschrift as
an attempted axio.atisation of logic. Speaking so.ewhat
loosely we .ay suppose that, in intention, any logical
truth would find expression in that system as a theorem
Of the system. Then consider such a disjunction as 'Snow
la White or snow is not white'. How will such a logical
truth be expressed in a system such as Begriffsschrift
Which lacks a symbol for disjunction? We might suppose
that our logical truth was inexpressible in such a system,
that such a sentence form as
-Sj=, S2
would not be adequate for the expression of disjunctions.
And this on the ground that only a disjunctive sentence
adequately expresses a disjunctive Thought.
To this it might be replied that we could simply
alter the notation to include a symbol for disjunction.
This IS so. But if we thought it necessary, then we
should be thinking that, as it stands. Begriffsschrift.
for vhe lack 01 a symbol, does not axiomatize truth-
functional logic. Further, consider such a sentence as
•Snow is white or snow is white or snow is white' which
someone might argue has its (sentential) logical form
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best portrayed this way.
. ,«“.r
»...
.. ....
place disjunction. Once thi*^' i ' ^ •u his is admitted, itDecomos clear that if Bep-»'ifir., .
^^“’schrift needs a symbol fortwo-place disjunction if it is to ho n
,
IS be able to express cer-tain logical truths, then it will al-o r-oo, •e o equire a symbolfor three-place disjunction. And so on P-^ SO . From which it
^ould follow that no system could eve- axiomatize sententiallogic, at least not if we require a finite vocabulary for
our axiomatization*
If we shall not succeed i„ our purpose through
ending additional primitive notation, what about intro-
ducing a symbol for disjunction into the notation by
definition, perhaps this way*
But how are we to take this 4finition- if it simply
provides us with short-hand notation, then we shall not
have gained the means to express disjunctions, either we
already had this, or we still do not. Suppose the
"definition" is not just an abbreviation, then what
warrants its introduction?
We might try claiming that sentences of one form
express Thoughts distinct from, though logically equiv-
alent to. Thoughts expressed by sentences of the other
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...
.«
...
........
.,„
^
'vhate, tnat the sentences.
Snow is white
Snow is whin, or an..
.ai..,
.......
,..„,o,a.
.0, „,o „ ...„
.
View would also be committed to claiming that each of
those sentences expresses a Thought distinct from that
expressed by
snow is White or snow is white or snow is white.
SO xortn. Yet it cannot be the case that we encounter
a now connective at each iteration. For this wouih i.piy
an rnfxnate number of such connectives and render our
-story Of truth-functional logic inexplicable. So it
seems we must be meeting up with& n ohe old connectives in
new contexts. Now consider the Thought expressed by the
last set off sentence and the followi:^g two pictures of
its logical structure#
v^(Sj^,V2(S2,S^;)
V3(S^.S.,Sj)
With the first we represent it as built up with two
occurrences of a two-place connective, with the second
we port.ray the Thought as ronta ic ining a single occurrence
of a three-place connective. What is to be our ground
for preferring the first portrayal to the second? We
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sa, that only this preference is consistent with
our taown mastery of truth-functional logic. But this
would he wrong. Our knowledge requires a finitely survey-
able group of connectives, so I shall assune. But this hyitself does not force a choice of the first representation
ovex' the second* Nor win • a. ^H ll at dictate the preference of
see combination of one-, two-, and/or three-place con-
nectives over a single four-place connective when we take
up the next meniber of ou- e-tendable senes of sentences.
Siiow IS white or snow is white or snow is white or snow
is White'. More importantly, the proffered reason for
preferring the first to the second portrayal does not
give us grounds for preferring either to the following.
-S^ (-S^zd S^) ,
To agree to consider only connectives of at most (say)
two places would not be to agree on what connectives
occur in any given Thought.
Our recent reflections argue, I believe, for the
conclusion that we have no principled way of picking one
logical structure from a number of possible alternatives
for attribution to a given Thought, and that, consequently,
we should reject the idea that we make good sense in
speaking, as before, of logical structure of Thoughts.
This conclusion was already explicit in the Grundlagen
application of Frege’s Dictum which we have discussed.
However present reflections go beyond that in the following
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respect, w.en Fre,e envisage, carving up tPe content of
a Thought tn alternative «ays both logical and non-logical
content were affected. What has been argued Just now is
that even if we hold non-logical content constant, we
Tnaks sense of a .01 thought having a unique
logical structure, otherwise put. we cannot distinguish
among so-„alled logically equivalent Thoughts where we
have agreement in non-logical content.
Our earlier attempt at clarifying the idea of a
linSia charac^c^ is in need of revision, it will not
do to speak, as we did. of articulating "the logical
structure of any Thought. Nor would it be adequate to
require that a lingua be able to express, one way or
another, any Thought. For it is crucial to Frege’s enter-
prise that a given Thought can be analyzed in terms of
logical structures which are not logically equivalent.
So we must require that a lingua have the resources for
representing all such alternative analyses In suitably
distinct ways. This idea of a lingua being adequate to
represent all possible analyses of any Thought is a
somewhat elusive one. We might hope to pin it down
somewhat by reverting to talk of language as follows, A
lingua ctara^terica has the grammatical resources adequate
to express any sentence, that is. express the Thought
expressed by any sentence, and this by means of a sentence
alike in logical structure to that discernible in, or
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suggested by, the origina] h„l. However this will not do.for reasons previously gone over in* response to noting
at Prege.s Begrillsschrirt. lor instance, does not
.ahe
« e 01 a symbol lor disiunction. Ihe
.ost we can require
a ong the lines ol preservation ol logical structure isthat a li^
^ equivalent tothat intuitively divined in. or attributed to, a given
natural language sentence which enables it to be
-rewritten.,
preserving content or sense. When this condition is „.et
let us speah ol the lingua sentence as transl^
natural language sentence .30
.ppi^
^ character-
xsation 01 a lingua characterica. a universal language.
«.ore in keeping with Frege-s program and his practice.
Earlier ($5) in discussing Frege’s idea that the
domain ol logic is universal, we were led to a view wh^ch
-ay be recast, in light ol recent remarks, this way. a
lingua translates all logically true sentences (given
suitable non-logical vocabulary.) Hence Begrillsschrilt.
for instance, would be incomplete il some logically true
sentence could not be translated into it. Now this
notion 01 logical completeness might seem weaker than that
inherent in the idea that a lingua can translate any
sentence. However a simple argument seems to show that
s?mone-« of^l'p require a reasonable,.mtneos l rength, but I shall i(^ore this.
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the two ideas are equivalent.
Clearly if a logic is complete in the sense of pro-
viding a gra..ar for a language into „hich any sentence
can be translated, then it is adequate to all logical
truths# or all which can kqW be expressed at all. So only
the converse can be doubtful. But suppose we had so.e
sentence not translatable into a particular l^^.
,,,3
sentence will have logical consequences. Picking one wefor. a corresponding conditional as before; this will be
a logical truth. Then if the lingua is adequate to logic,
this conditional can be translated into the
.lingua. But
wxth It (we .ay suppose) will be translated the antecedent
Of the conditional, which-f n was tne sentence supposedly
without translation in the linp-na i +In terms of an example,
consider
( 1 ) Tom is a big butterfly,
which has as a logical consequence (so it seems)
(2) Tom is a butterfly.
It seems we cannot maintain both that (1) has no trans-
ition invo, saj, Bogriffssohrift and that Begriffsschrift
is adequate to logic, since if the latter were true, we
could translate
(3) (1) only if (2)
into the notation. But to do so would, it seems, provide
a translation of (1). i conclude that the two completeness
conditions are equivalent.
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$7. Epistemology of Logic
We have previously remarked that much as philosophers
can agree, for instance, that there is a tree in theQuad vhtle disagreeing over how this Is knovnt. Kant andPrege could agree on logic in that th«« ey agree on what are
the truths of logic and vet not h» .y be in agreement in their
responses to such questions as.
How do we know logical truths are such?
principw principles, termed logicalrincii^les, be accepted by us?
S'-cu"<S. Of logical
I do however find it instructive to view Frege's philos-
ophy of logic in a Kantian light. And remarks so made
will serve to complement earlier urgings against treating
Frege as an epistemological Platonist in his philosophy
Of number and set. For if. when we turn to Frege's views
on fundamental logic we were forced to employ the Platonic
picture of mind coming into epistemic contact with some-
thing apart from itself, those earlier remarks would be
diminished in inieresb*
Both Kant and Frege would agree, I take it. that
there is some sharp and principled way of demarcating the
logical truths from other truths. In this sense at least,
for both logic is an autonomous domain. So our above
questions, which imply this, are not phrased inappro-
I88
y- ax leabt not on this score.
For Kant, logic abstracts from +h content, or
»atter, of particular cognitions, it is the •^ science ofthe mere forms of thinicinp-
pas^ee th e
conceived, logic encom-
thinking. To think at
CO
provides, to reasonrrect y is to think in confora,ity with the laws of thescience of those forms.
These ideas get sharpened and made concrete with
Frege. s conception of a li^u^ ^^a^i,,,.
.
-ceptive to anything which can be said, instead of
speaKing of forms of thought we sne-k -,f mt, p a of grammar, cr
syntax, hnd we are able to so frame our syntax that thelogical form of sentences formed from the syntax is
manifest, and the logical relationships among such
sentences are effectively characterized, m this situ-
ation we might find an intuitive iu^-tifirai-, ,^ cation for thinking
of logic as analytic. The logic of s i
i
j-ogi 01 a lingua analyzes
thought into an exhaustive arrav nr -u--,.® y of possibilities of its
expression*
Indisputably, passages with a Platonic flavor crop
op throughout Frege's writings, perhaps increasingly so
fn the period under consideration. In some ways the most
Platonic passage in Crundlawer, occurs in the "Introduction-
Where Frege says
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If evervthiner ^
nothing maintained itse??*^e^“^ithere would no ?onge^ biof geftins: to k-r»nw^ possibility
and everything would^he about the worldfusion
. . . Wharl- V Plunged into Con-
or concents i^reanv a “m . history
our knowiedfre of e>r,yJ^ history either of
of words* Often it is^o^i^^ 2* J>ieaningsintellectual effort after immense
tinued over centuries ^thp+^t^last succeed«=^ in
fPat humanity at
concept in its pure ^
the irrelevant LcreLons whicrjeU"ft°“'from the eyes of the mind,31
Here it can seem as if Fre^-p iq --kv i,-g is thinking of concepts
much as Plato did thp p«»w™oOl e Forms. However, in quoting fromS£mi^ v/e left out the middle of the passage. It
reads
sprour^rihP^i"^^^? concepts
nat^ ^*T’ «®"lhfS\,rd‘isoover^thnr
to define them^csyo^ologi-all v‘Of the nature ollhriS^mi^d.
and everything subjective,
away with truth!'3^^''°“®“ ®"‘*' ‘‘°®®
And replacing it serves to remind us of the context of
Fi-ege's remarks, his continuing struggle to free logic
and mathematics from the clutches of psychologism. Re-
marks such as the following dot the pages of Grundlerer .
31* ^rwdlagen
. p. vii,
32* Ibid * , p, vii.
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""
-^-olutely no concern
can cont^ibute^anythS^ it
foundation of arSme?fc5‘r'^"®''
ev;r'in*'Lycrc!-v° 9«®stion whatso-
-
-tter 0?
In the closing paragraph of his
-Introduction" to
balf Of „hich is taken up with a diatribe
agaanst the peychologistic views of Benno Brd.ann, Brege
gasps.
Ihe distance between mv vipwlogical logicians* psycho-
that there i^^ no enormous
havinranv ^ook*s
°vir.e^u:rT:. “
By remembering who is the enemy we shall be prepared
for some countering hyperbole, and better placed to
maintain perspective*
The earlier quoted Grundlagen passage may be counter-
balanced somewhat by this note included in Grundlagen.
An idea in the subjective sense is whatgoverned by the psychological laws of
33 * Ibid > a p, y*
3^* Ibid « , p, vi,
33 - Ibid.
, p, 105,
36. ^J^ndgesetze o p, 25,
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charac?er?''\n\dL''L^^ Pictorial
belongs to logic and is sense
sensible
• ,
‘ Suh non-
M Sr -
'•idea*' nrn,/L myseli . . , use
is becrusa^^^t^^^ jective sense, it
w!th wo'rl 4af meanings
a very subjective, idealist^rn^ assumed suchhis true view wa^ marf<> co,.y,pXexion, and
discover a? <liifidult to
or faKs'witt tha?
logif:37 psychology and
The counter-weight lipc? p>,«S les in Frege seeming to portray him-
self as advocating and developing the "true view" of
Kant. Since it is unlikely that anyone would regard
Kant as an epistew:ological Platonist on any topic, we
my suppose that Frege did not so regard himself i„ the
sphere of logic.
What is crucial, Frege seems to be saying in speaking
as he does of the objectivity of concepts and so of
arithmetic, is a sharp distinction between psychology
and logic. This Kant also emphasized.
presuppose psychologi calprincip_es in logic o But to brine- suciiprinciples in logic is as absurfas tobring morality from life. 38
Kant’s comparison of logic and morality is instruc-
tive. It is at least suggestive to think of Frege on
3?* ^run^ejS^ij p. 37» n. 1.
38* Logic
, p, l6.
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logic in parallel with Kant on morality. And this idea
is suggested, to some extent, by such remarks of Frege
as these. ' ^
be called ‘law^ of
coTicPiv^bH asserting what is, can bet-onceivea as prescri h-Jr-.o- --iJi u
think in conformitv wTth
^ one ought to
than for l^ws 0.^0^!^'* ihfspecial ti-Mo 4.u"^ * ^ne lat/ter nave a
o^v
to the name »’iaws of thcu^hfy If we mean to assert that thevtne most general lawc;
verc^alitr ® wnich prescribe uni-rs ly th^ way m which one cnght tn thir,k-if one IS to think at all. 39 °
To develop the suggestion a bit. let us recall a portion
Of Kanfs discussion in his Funjament^ Princinles of the
Metaphvsj^s of Morals. In the section headed '•Hsteronomy
of the Will as the Source of All Spurious Principles of
Morality” Kant writes that
seeks the law which is to
ness^of"?+*^
anafisre else than in the fit-its maxims to be universal laws of
oJt or‘i?^el-''^d’ if it goesu 01 Its f an seexs this law in the
resu??fLf alwaysesults iielieronc^ The will in that casedoes not give itself the law. St i1 i^
through its relation
39* Grundgesetze
. p, 12.
^0. Immanuel Kant. Fundamental PrincipTes of thP
of Morals, p. y/~7~
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U sec.uently. having
.ivihed the possible foundations of
-nality into those which depend upon e.pinical pnincipies
those Which depend upon national principles, he tells
us that
••[e]2£irical £rinci£l^ are wholly incapable of
serving as a foundation for
..oral laws-.'^l essentially
because this would be to attempt to found the necessary
upon the contingent. Much the same reason lies behind
the demand of Frege and Kant to Keep logic distinct fro.
psychology. Whereas the empirical could conceivably
suggest principles, logical or moral, in neither case
could it authorize our acceptance of either sort of
principle.
In discussing rational principles as a possible
foundation of morality Kant maintains that if we are not
going to simply build our conception of morality into
our conception of the source of morality
"ill remaining
conception made up of the attri-^
V M bnd dominaiion! com-
ven“4nc^^ "Jlri conceptions of might and
on t‘ii^
Sjstems of morals erected
to moraiUy,t!^"“" directly opposed
Briefly pvt. might does not make right. Summing up the
general outlook, there can be no sort of apprehension
whereby mind supposedly gains moral principles, or
P* 58.
P» 8o.
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directives fro™ something independent of it pe itGod, or Nature, or what ha^,o
„
--
"hioh. at the time,
authorizes for us the acceptance of the,»
„
i^<.ance r se principles.
e ™ust ash. Are they rights Are they truly moral
principles? And no source other than morality itself
can answer these question<?tions.
,uch, roughly, is Kanfs
view.
It is the rejection by Frege of a
-rational source-
iust as much as an
-empirical source-, of logic that I
am tentatively, and somewhat controversially, suggesting,
ere is textual support from Grundgeset...
.
thoughrSatiy’^oontra'dinerours
-- to be laws of^rutr"anH°"%'^“^*'^Of human beings* taking p natural laws
will ask, who is rie-htf ~~
takin-~-A k 1 + J^ign ? Whose laws of
of trSthV^.^ “Ith ;y,e laws
It would not matter. I submit, whether the imagined beings
were (held to be) divine. Nor would it matter whether we
ourselves were the beings in question in this sense. In
-consulting the Forms-, or whatever, certain principles
occur to us Which differ from those with which we have
previously operated. I„ any and all such cases we must
ask. Which are the laws of truth? Ultimately there is
no source outside of logic itself which can authorize
se tze
, p. 14.
95
for us a. answer. This see.s to .e the spirit of the
remark that
-I ta.e it as a sure sign ei a
.istahe ii
logxc has need of metaphysics and psychology
- sciences
that require their own logical first principles.-'*'*
let even if we work ourselves around so that we are
sympathetic to this outlook, questions remain, even if
they are not Just the same ones we started with. Dummett
has instructively observed that
recen?rrthff^rst oie?*?of
was wha? we ca^l;^orind-\"Sw":e" c'anlL^llIv"oui claim to this knov>fiedre* ana ^ ^
Skentic?s^^“^”°‘‘^®'^^ Frobiem was now
after Descartes total* Phi’osopner
spective. and in this''respec^ hr'looKed’'®"'
xajxico* i‘cr Fretre^ as for them* iox^ic
get lo-i?^i’^‘®
philosophy: if we do not
fi|ht!^:5 nothing else
But how will we know when we "get logic right"? What do
v/e have to go on here?
$8* Truth
In his Grimdgese:^
"Introduction’* Frege wrote that
Our conception of the law
necessarily decisive for
of the science of logic.
s of logic is
our treatment
and that con-
Ibid., 0, 18 .
45 * Dummett
,
"Frege pp. 225-226
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How then did Frege understand the word
-true -
7
How wouldhe have us speak of truth?
In making that remark Frege, as so often, had
psychologism in mind, it is easy, he held, to slide from
a recognition that laws of logic prescribe patterns of
correct thought, and are. in this sense, laws of thought,
"into supposing that these laws govern thinking in the
same way as laws of nature govern events in the external
world. In that case they can be nothing but laws cf
psychoxogy
, .
.•‘7
something being true gets
confused with someone-s supposing something to be true,
until
in the end truth is reduced to individii^l <=:
lly'tf Alffhf^fto
C..X
iHis is: being true is differentfrom being taken to be true, whethe3 3v oneor many or everybody, and in no case is tobe reduced to it. There is no contradiction
true which everybody
I understand by laws of
he true, but laws of truth
But this is not the only route to "psychological
logic", in his Grundlagen "Introduction" Frege had warned
that if his Uictum is not observed "one is almost forced
P-ru.nci/: e3etze
« p, 12,
^7. Ibid.
, p. 12.
46. Ibid.
, p. 13 ,
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And
to taka as the meanings of words mental pictures or acts
Of the individual mind-.'*9
principle.
"always
. . . separate sharply the psychological from the
logical, the subjective from the objective
. .
.»50
in Gr^e^et^.s
•Introduction-, while not mentioning
the Dictum, he once again offers a diagnosis of a major
cause of psychologism.
Because the psychological loe:icians f i i
recognite the possibility therfbefni
-S^e^oS^’f actuaffi.e.,
thftenL-O^^.^S airectly or indirectly on
olS
sense., j, ,hey taics ccncepcs to be ideac;and thereoy assign them to psychoiogy.51
The nature of their error lies in forgeting that thoughts
are not subjective. So that, for instance, I may have a
thought w.iioh I relate to you so that you understand it,
and convey it. in turn, to someone else, who voices dis-
agreement with it, and so forth. And so, in looking for
the meaning of the words used to convey some thought they
are led "into the mind" of the one who has the thought;
finding there only various ideas, they assign such the
task of, individually, being the meanings of words.
Thoughts then become combinations of ideas. And,
[t]hus everything drifts into idealism and
-rom that point with perfect consistency
^9* Grundlag:en
» p, x.
Jt>id .
, p. X.
•51 • Grundt^esotze
, p . 1 6 *
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into solipsism
•
. • if we omnn 4.
anything but what was w-5 + h^ grasp
then a conflict of opinions"rbe^ ri"" selves.
n.utual understanding’^wouW
arbiter in the conflict ^ fPPointedt-oniii of opinions.
Some pages on Frege continues,
put'^Sli'^the'sentence
”Cha-!fthe Saxons" as neither true nor®?®ias fiction, iust a<^ Zl I false, but
regard, for
-xancto L ^^ccustomed to
carried Deianeira sentence "Nessus
for even ti: sen?4cr'L"?f i^'venus-;
Deianeira across the ri
And again.
^ ^
^h^rivertvenu^’^couW^b^ue on y i., the name "iMessus" had a bearer, 53
with the words "ThifbiaSf 17 ">y, ideas
TrJLl — ,tdrsL?e'ne1 7oI?U fllfeT"
’
that my“iLa"of''grLn^is"Lferted^cf^^“''’Of this blade of^assf
sentence there uo i;aiKit IS idealists who foist
in this. gra . I repeat 1IS n talk v/hatever of mv ideas*
that sense upon us. 5^
Here is
us discourse
conquered the
'Charlemagne
'
that the one
revealed the style in which Frege would have
about truth. The sentence ’Charlemagne
Saxons’ is true just in case the names
and ’the Saxons’ have (unique) bearers such
stands in the conquering relation to the
Other. And a familiar style it is On*:, rh-r+rvo IX IS. une, often associated
with Aristotle, which embodies what A.N. Prior has called
52. Ibid.
, p. 17.
^3* Jbidi.» P* 20.
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•’the
wrote
nerve of the
In a familiar
correspondence theory" of truth. 55
passage of the Metaphysics Aristotle
contradiotions?"but*^of^o '^"^®5''!'®‘*iate between
either affi^ Ar a! subject we must
is olAar ^'^the nrs^^'^cT ?^®dicate. This
what tr.e true and define
Here we have a statement
- though not the first, for the
Idea is present in the Sophist - of wnat, following
Tarski (and the Warsaw group of Polish philosopher-
logicians generally) is commonly termed the classical
conception of truth. 5? its hallmark is the central role
of a notion of reference. In our talk of truth we aim to
provide a systematic account of how sentences, or sen-
tences through their parts, make reference to what there
is, which account enable^?cfictuxes us
..o explain, or understand,
how it is that truths are true.
"Correspondence Theory of Truth” inEdwards' Enc^lopo dia. p. 224
.
x
56 . Me vs
, 1011 b.
57
Truth^?n Tarski's "The Conoeot ofi ioririaiizea Lan.^uages” (o. I53) in
'
^4~ruth^iA and (more ri^^iyji.xUu/1 cinJl iir^OOi p ^ C i Cn * X l r' in k* t r* O 0 ( T
1 Q6q) r.rt At aJDilO£xiiU ^-^0 (Junehazinuerz A.jdukiewicz,
iJ}Ji££ios of Philosoph y
. pp, 9-18.
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A variant idea also looks back to Aristotle.
=«Parated to be
has the truth, Vhile”'he''^h combinedin a state contrary to tharof'i'^^''-^is in error. Thi^ objects
is called truth -p when is v;hat
when is it not*'» present, and
mean by these tenns we
think trulylnat^o; a“
are nnlp Kh+ v,... i, pare, that you
say this ’have th^^truth^^B^^®
In this perhaps equally well-known passage we find an
idea Which turns up this way in Kussell-s Lectures on
j^^iosl AtoTnism .
The first truism to which I wiohdraw your attention
— ara r L;,.
^
'9,,
agree with me that these ‘tht-r^rhs*"
I thatiT
.j. .,-S7-c..o„
xnem,
. , , when I speak of a factI mean the kind of thing that makes’a'o^o-position true or false.
. , I Thus, for in
versei;^as%-'’'‘'’ va^iL in-
bta^em^n? i. ' rerde^ld ?rue"b./n%'""=“
'
’
fact. If 1 say^r^io'^^rL^arrfZ-^'tt
menfi
Agctin, Dammett, in his widely read article "Truth" tells
us that an "important feature of the concept of truth"
which the correspcndejice xheory expresses" is "that a
58. _MetaDfivcjic3. 1051b.
59. Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy
^
^ ^.nd Kn m'/l.e
d
p-e (edited bv
of Logical Atomism"
Robert C. Marsh),
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statement is true onlv i-ry there is something in the
virtue of which it is true.-^O
Ihe additional quasi-causal element which appears in
«3e sets Of remarks through the expressions
-because..
->^33
. . . true-, and
-i„ yictue of- i wi,h to hold
separate from the clae;c;i«oi- C assical conception of truth as cor-
respondence with reality. T^^t I find no hint of it in Frege's
writings. ® ®
The classical conceotion of ••ru+h *. -.wa cx wrut seems to carry withit some rather difficult problems. For it seems to pre-
suppose that it is possible for us to relate to the world
tn such a fashion that we can say how it is. And this
would seem to require that our oonceptualisations carve
reality at its joints, and that cur referential apparatus
engage with what there is. Onlv iruruy 11 this were so could
our statements be true, that is. say how reality really
For some, highlighting such assumptions nay induce a
scepticism, one avoidable only through rejecting the cor-
respondence theory and holding that reality is what we
make of it. For others, the impossibility of comparing
conceptualisation with reality will dictate the view that
the scepticism-inducing problem is a pseudo-problem. But
this too may lead to a rejection of the classical concep-
60 '
••Truth" in .Philosophical Lo^ic(eaited by x’.P'* Strawson), p, 03, —^
—
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tion on the ground that it Is senseless tr> ^ uc x o speak of an
„.u„ „
seneelesd to speak of correspondence between words and
world.
While the issues raised here are important I wish to
pass the™ by, since Frege does not see™ to have worried
the problems, and any discussion I could offer would be
too tortuous to be worth the excursion. However I would
like just to register the claim that, whereas deeming
the question of the ultimate nature of reality a sense-
less one may lead to a rejection of the classical con-
ception Of truth, it need not. And I would mention
J.L. Austin and Quine as recent examples of philosophers
who have maintained versions of a correspondence theory
while rejecting the question of reality's ultimate
nature.
One or another reaction to the mentioned problems
may be a source of adopting one of a variety of non-
olassical conceptions of truth. Karl Popper has broadly
dravm a contrast between the "idea of objective or abso-
lute truth that is truth as correspondence with the
6l Cn Austin* compare the section on "Realitv" in
pinol' both repr^te^in
— ^a^rs. On Quine compare ''The ScopeauQ J.,yigua^Te of Science" in^ Wavs of Paradox,^espeoia-ly p, 126, and Chapter III
^hflC’SOPhy of Logic
.
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and •subjective (or
-episte.ic.) theories of
truth". '’2 The latter
S“
-f K:s(/rr“Characterized? for
or bv its example, by its history
Tw« 1
® reicxtion to other bel^e-^c, ^LNon-classical theorioc;'] =,11 . ,
less, that truth is\hat
with^'ce^^ain rules ?rcritefia?^?''o^r^^^
bility?''^^.
In this grouping belong the views of Frege
-s "psycho-
logical logicians" with their idealist, coherentist
tendencies which he so stoutly opposed.
Having located Frege on the classical side of the
truth divide. I wish to indicate a bit eiore specifically
what his view involves. Here, once again, we shall be
involved in bringing to the fore a conception which under-
lies and guides Frege
-s work, but which receives no ex-
plicit discussion on his part. The theme will be how
discoursing upon truth can provide what we shall call a
semantics for a logical system such as Begriffsschrift.
Our approach will be slightly oblique.
62
' ^^^224-225^''’ and Refutations.
63, Ibid.
. p, 225.
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Consider the sentences
W Jack i3 Ured although Jill is not tired
( 5 ) Jack is tired because Jill is tired.
Hach appears to be composed out oi a pair of sentences,
the same pair in each case. Further each implies
(6) Jack is tired.
Tnus both Of the following would seen to be logical truths.
( 4 ) only if (6)
(S) ( 5 ) only if (6),
Now it seen.3 we can say why (7) is logically true in a
way in which we are unable to say why (8) is so. Of ( 4 )
«e know that if it is true then both of its component
sentences must be true alsoi and conversely, if the com-
ponent sentences are both true, then so too must be (4).
That is, we can state what are necessary and sufficient
conditions of the truth of (4) in t«rnc? nfXwims o its component
sentences. Otherwise put, •although*, in (4) expresses
truth-functional conjunction. With regard to (5) we know
that if it is true then both of its component sentences
must be true also, but the converse does not hold. It
IS not sufficient that Jack be tired and Jill not for (5)
to be true. Since each of the seemingly component sen-
tences of (5) is implied by (5), it seems each must, in
some way, be a logical component of (5). On the other
hand, they do not compound truth-funotionally in ( 5 J. In-
deed wo c.re In the dark as to the logical structure of (5).
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The noted difference between (4) and (5) can be al-
______ing the internal structure" n-p +v>x o of the component sentences
Xh unproblematic), but not how to so translate (5).
seems appropriate to register this difference in our
knowledge of (4) and (5) bv savir,^ *^ y^^fc> what v/e know why (4)implies (6), but not why (5) dop«5*y o; es, equivalently, that we
know Why (7) is a logical truth, but not why (8) is. The
sense Of •explain', or
-knowledge- at worh here seems to
he this* We know how ^.-.4-to determine the truth-value of the
complex sentence (4) from its component sentences, and
knowing just this enables us to know that (7) is true.
We do not know why (8) is logically true, since we do not
possess knowledge of (5) analogous to what we have of (4)
v.-hioh would enable us to determine, using just it, that
(8)
is true.
Now consider the following.
(6) Jack is tired
(9) Jack is very tired
(10) Something is tired.
(10) would seem to be a logical cons
and (9), thus each of the following
truth.
equence of both (6)
would be a logical
(11) (6) only if (10)
(12) (9) only if (10)
.
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Since (lO) T>n+\ / J.J5 noT j.Xoelf a lop'io^i +rMt+u
-Log cal truth nor either (6)
or (9) a logical falsehood, it see.s that if either (n)
or (1.) ts logically troe. its antecedent „ust in so.e
way guarantee the truth of its consequent.
For the lihes of (6) Frege offers the following
account, an account taken up in detail in Chapter m.
Jack IS a proper na-ne. and so purports to refer to some-
thing. via., some object, *is tired- is a predicate, and
also purports to refer to or.mo+i,ii-i something, viz., a particular
concept, and so (6) itself „ui pe true just in case the
referential relations hold, and the object in question
falls under the concept in question. If we accept this
account of (6). then if we knew that (6) was true we
would be able to determine, on the basis of that knowl-
edge. that (10) was true. Or rather we would if we accept
some account of (10) on which it gets treated as claiming
in effect that at least one object falls under the concept
of being tirsa, and let us. Given this account we know
whj if (6) is true, then so too must be (10), that is.
we know why (ll) is a logical truth.
We are not so well off as regards (12j. Neither
Frege, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has an account
to offer ^or (9) such that on that account we would know
why if (9) were true, so too must be (10), and so why it
IG that (12) is logically true. Frege’s accounting of
(6) does not app.ly in parallel to (9) since there is no
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concept answering to the phrase
.is very tired*. (i
ume this will be granted and do not consider how weknow that this is so.) Once again, the di«erence in ourknowledge oi (ii) (,3) is renected in the iact that
we know how to translate ( 6 ) into a notation such as
Begriffsschrift. but we do not know how to similarly
translate (9), whereas we can express ( 6 ) and (10) in
Begriffsschrift so that (10) is derivable from ( 6 ), we are
unable to do the same with (9) and (10). Again, the
logical structure of ( 6 ) is - as treated here - that of
a simple predication wherein a proper name and a predi-
cative expression concatenate to give a sentence. Frege-,
account of predication tells us (if correct) the conditions
under which predications are true, and in so doing in-
structs us. by implication, on why the likes of (11) nust
be true - or rather, accomplishes this, if at ail. in
conjunction with his account of existential statements.
We have considered two examples of logical truths
With regard to which we are able to explain why it is
that they are logically true. I wish to generalize a
thought implicit in the examples. In general, we may
say. we know why a sentence which is a logical truth is
such When we are able to recognize parts and modes of
combination of these parts in the particular case so that,
in tei-ms of a general account of the referential and
(perhaps) non-referential function of sentence parts of
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these sorts, an. a general account of how such parts forn
« o es, we can show why
- given that the referential
worh is perforce, according to plan - the sentence „ust
he true. To provide such an account, in general, for the
logxcal truths of some system of logic would be to give a
semantics for the system. I believe intended re-
Of his in Crundge^ to constitute a semantics
for Eegriffsschrift in this sense. At the same time.
Begriffsschrift is conceived, in the ideal, as a lingua
Oharacterica. a universal language, indeed I think we
can capture much of what Frege had in mind in speaking,
in his “Introduction" of Grundgesetz,e of a "thoroughgoing
development of my logical views"^^ with the idea that
Frege now thinics of a linp-uad as requiring a semantics as
an integral part.
Since any sentence figures in logical truths, not
just as a whole, but through its various parts, to possess
a lingua would be to possess the means for spelling out.
with regard to any sentence in the lingim. the conditions
under which it would be true, its truth-conditions. And
since any sentence translates into a lingua , in effect a
lingua would provide the means for stating truth-condi-
tions for any sentence. To possess a lin^a then, would
be to have an understanding of an exhaustive set of ways
64, Grundg:os c ~t7.e
, p, 6,
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». t™. I, ,„u ...
•• «sh, „„ to h„. „ „„„ ,, ,,, „„„o„,
truth possible? For we cohIhuld respond to this question
ostensivelyi Tn otipj x ne or these ways* That ic. k,y ma is* by sentence
p&rts of such and
.u.h sorts conung together in one of
tnus and so wa,^s. (Re,»enber. this question •How is truth
possible?- IS not to be confused with the problems earlier
mentioned and set aside*)
It ia in this light that I would have us consider the
theory of reference Frege provides for his Begriffsschrift
t" Perhaps the most important conclusion
that Frege drew from his attempt to say how truth is
possible was that, as he might have put it, unsaturation
id unavoidable. Understanding what he meant by unsatura-
tion and why he was led +o +>1-10 ^j t this conclusion will be major
concerns in the ensuing chapter*
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Consider
"the sentsne^a •m
^
Linguistically we distine-ijidh + ^ Prime number*.
a predicative part *is a nrT° a subject *two*latter we usually associate assert
i
not essential t-p ^ ^ ^ ive force. Y^»-f +k-;
stage, it JanAot be said^that^h®^® ® statement on thething, nor is he rIsponsiMe actually asserts any-
orprt' +?* eliminate the assertive^fn^'’ state-predicative part, as force from the
the sentence'^will sliH rLai^ar^tsi" of
-hey are, and it is impor+rpi 'ffstinctly different asthis difference cuts deep and J*'® Point thatfirst part, 'two*, is a'rrn^f- blurred. Thedenotes an objects It itself is'^sn^ certain number,does not require a complement^ Thr^^ea? whicha prime number', on the other hand part, 'is
'all"^?h’ denote an object'"'
a com-
^ i t e iirst oart r, a bhail also
lirated. To this distlT^TTf^^ second p.art unsat-
naturally corresponds an^anp ^ symbols there'"
realm of denotatLnsi to distinction in the
object, ana to the ^rediL^iSrL®^^""-"® corresponds anWill call a concept. ^ corresponds what I
tion. For the cleco^posuLf *=® ^ sofini-
urated parts must bp'reca^dph satuiated and unsat-logical structure, which must feature of
accepted but which cannot
' brredu-eri andprimitive. recused to something more
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CHAPTER III
THE SEMANTICS OF FUNCTION AND ARGUMENT
$9. Exposition of Notation
Wo begin this chapter with a sketch of the basic
ideas of Frege's systora of logic, as presented in
Grun^et^, by following Frege through his exposition
of primitive notation, supplementing this with occasional
remarks of historical cr clarificatory nature. In this
e.xpoG.ition
.T, follow Frege *s order of introduction of
Ill
pr'iini't xvs w?+-v»
' exception. Discussion of the
notatioTi for definite description isx x IS deferred to the next
section ($10) where it serves
-^o set th« +- e stage for what
co.es next. This is an atte.pt to elucidate Frege-s
semantics through seeing it as flowing naturally anP
powerfully from certain a=-<-mr^-n „. a„o.mptions about apparently
complex names. After some further discussion of certain
aspects Of Frege's philosophy of set theory, we take uo
the so-called paradox that the concept horse is not a
concept and attempt to assess the importance of this claim
Within Frege *s philosophy.
In Frege builds from eight primitive
names, bach is a function-name. There are no purely
logical singular terms which are primitive. Singular
terms, or proper names, do occur in the purely logical
notation; they make their first appearance in Frege's
exposition when the resources for constructing sentences
become present. This since Frege holds that sentences
are proper names, each a name of one of two objects, the
True and the False. The existence of this pair of logi-
cal objects is assumed in the ensuing explanations.
The first introduced name is the symbol
— ( ).
This little stroke, with its attendant argument place
shown by the pair of parentheses, is simply called the
horizontal. The horizontal, it is explained, is a
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^ ^-Maco function-name. It denote.
a one-£l^
and yields objects as values, in particular, when the
True is taken as argument this function yields the True
as value, and in all other cases, i.e.. for the False, or
any other object as argument, it yields the False as
value. The horizontal has the effect, then, of double-
negation. It might be read ’It is the case that
. . .’,
at least when a sentence fills its blarJ:. Since it de-
notes a function from objects to objects, only names of
objects, £rooer nan^, may fill its blank. I shall
generally use open parentheses as above to indicate
positions for proper names, and use apostrophes to indi-
cate distinct positions as required.
In B^riffsschrift what was outward.ly the same sign
had been called the content-stroke. Its function
.bad
been somewhat vaguely characterized as serving to combine
"the signs that follow it into a totality" so that they
have a content that can become a judgment."^ This sort
of talk is absent from ^im^gesetze
. Semantically speak-
ing, the horizontal is on a par with the sign for negation,
next introduced. Still the horizontal is peculiar, and
its peculiarity is reflected in the fact that it is a
syntactic requirement of Frege's Begriffsschrift that
1 • Begriffsschrift
, p , 12.
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a well formed formula begin with -*-h^ w •
.he horizontal stroke.
n ($ 5) I shall comment further upon this.
_
The negation-strohe is introduced as a short verticalfine placed mid—wav alon^r uy ng tne horizontal thus
“T ( )
.
This exoressior' ic;n IS also a one-place function-name. It
denotes a function which yields the False when the True
fs taken as argument, and yields the True for any other
Oboect as value. So. for instance, if Prege had a proper
name for the Sun, say *©», then
“TT 6
would be a name of the True.
The horizontal and the negation-stroke are thus, in
effect, the two singulary truth-functions. However, (i)
tnej are names of functions, not syncategcremata. and
(li) these functions are explained for all objects, not
just truth-values, as arguments. Further, each function
takes only objects as arguments, they are first-Ievej
functions. As well each yields, for any object as argu-
ment. a truth-value as value, Frege terms function-names
Which denote functions with this property concent-wnr.i, .
Both the horizontal and the negation-stroke are one-place,
first-level concept-words. Concept-words, as one might
expect, denote cojicents, concepts are a special case of
functions, viz., those which yield a truth-value for
every argument. Predicative expressions are. for Frege.
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COnCept-WOr'Hcj V.,,4.wo.cis, Dut no prireitiva logical «v^J-o„icai expressions
dica^ive expressions, unless t.e identity-sign i=
counted. ^
are
so
luno^ru
.ion-na.es.
.ao. ol tnese denotes a function v,nion
,
.ruth-value When both places have been
0 with arpcents. Frege calls such two-place func-lons lotions, and the expressions which denote thorn,
wo allow
.concept, to apply generally to functions which
yield only truth-values when fully oo.pleted. so that wehave one-placo, two-plaoe. n-place concepts, and similarly
with concept-v/ords.
The symbol for identity,
.
•
...> » - > lo a primitive two~
place concept-word. Frege explains
( )-(•)
as
the
all
denoting a function which yields
"( }-argumenf is the same as th
other cases it yields the False.
the True just
G "(
* )“argumen
Here we make
v/hen
t”j in
use
of our apostrophe convention
places in the concept-word,
other first-level functions.
for holding open distinct
Note that identity, like all
takes only objects as
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arguments,^
cai:er.."T'"'“"
.a.
.el. i.at «.at
.e t.ere
X entity of content-
.iffe„ fro. (e.g.) negation
an. oon.ltionaUty m t.at
-It applies to na.es an. notto contents. There he used a trim»iple-bar, and regarded
names which flank thi'^ sicrri o© 4-v.as Thereby giving up their
ordinary function of r=ferrir.^ +„ >, •.i rring to objects in favor of
t*®t'erring to the.salve*?lves in so.e manner, so that identity
statements spo.e of the flanking expressions, saying of
the. that they had the same content. Evidently Frege was
>»oved to this view, which on its face is puszling and
•Ufficult to integrate with the other doctrines of
B^ifl^hrift,'^ through noticing that different identity
functional logioranS ?h!? ^^sis for truth-
conditional when it is fla-ikeri j
onctioas as the bi-
wonder whether Frege Leded ?-' LT ?''-‘®^’tive notation, we yp"! ~ o.s a piece of pri.i-
tion could be define'd in te-m- Oisjunc-tionality. So couirwfnol‘dL-?ne"®®?^^°"l>i-ocnditicnal, as a roiMu-i-tioi nt- 2?.*® thethe standard
.anner‘> pj.^
^ conditionals in
statements (whos'^^tir.fao no? identity
identity was an indefinable 'logicfl i^ioticn!
3 « Begriffs s ehi^ift
. p, 20,
Frege gives for identity in Begriffssrhri f+may be expressed, (i) either not (F.x
must hi niw
' “ Frege's interpretation
’x"'
Sccl-rLoe^tn thing in its firsts.nd something else in its secondoccurrence aiid in (ii), -
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statements may
.Ufer in epistemic interest, wpiie at the
same time holding that one had exhausted the meaning of a
name «hen its denotation had been specified. The fact
that the morning star is the evening star requires the
confirinaxion of astronomy, while thi*, eoiwi.ij , nij.8 is IS not so with the
that the morning star is the morning star. Yet if
reference is all there is to content (at least in the'
case of names of objects) how shall we account for the
difference in interest that attaches to these two claims?
In "On Sense and Reference" Frege rejected the Begriffsohri
reply of ruling names ambiguous in reference between their
occurrences on one side of an identity sign and elsewhere.
Here and henceforth he distinguishes between the sense
and the denotation of proper names, and signs generally.
Ihe view which Frege came to hold would seem to be one on
which the content of no name is exhausted by its having
denotation; there are (e.g.) no Russellian proper names.
Any expression of which we could sensibly inquire into
Its denotation has sense, though some of these same expres-
sions fail of reference. This allows the Grundgesetre
explanation of •=•. Our differing interest in the members
of such pairs of identities as 'The morning star is the
morning star* ana ’The morning star is the evening star*
is seen as arising from difference in sense of the names
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Which flapJc the expression of identity.5
_
The next sy^hoi. or rather faniiy of sy^hois, Prege
introduces is desired to capture the idea of ,eneraiity.
or to be quite explicit, generalitv wi+h» &^“'^ra±ixy-with-respect-to-
objects. Hare is an example.
In this is a place-holder for a first-level function-
na^e, it functions analogously to our open parentheses in
first-level function-names. And we shall use distinct
Greek capitals to mark distinct argument positions. All
bnt V, in the example, is the name of a particular
function. It is a s^cond-l^el function-name, it denotes
a ^ond-leyel function. As first-level functions take
objects as arguments, so second-level functions take
first-level functions as arguments. However the value
of this function for appropriate arguments is an object,
ana ^his is true for functions generally. generality
5 •
"ts^y! °S°tiu"l°wiJ'/^o discussion in this
that Prer--3 tairn- register the idea
epist^moioglcS Pla^oniJf?n"h?s f
The thoup-ht tneory of meaning,
q it would construe the move fromS and R are the same in sense to the sense oFs ^rSense of R on the model of the move
^ -Ls the same as the direction of line b;
.huo^ to avoid epistemological Platonism, unless"it
djf^'e-eniTip^^P^ simply holding that sameness andii e.ence n meaning are objective relations itself
h^J'^onl^s
epistemological Platonismin one theory of meaning.
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function takes one-plaoe, first-level n-notions-u cx as argu-
ments and yields the True v/he-i the o. nen argument function it-
self yields the True for all objects as arguments, and
yields the False in all other cases. Other na..es of
this generality function may be formed by using other
letters uniformly i„ place of
.fl. of our example. How-
ever before this beeomes necessary we shall have reverted
to more common orthography.
In this notation we have, ir pf-Tof'+ +n n eifect, tne univex'sal
quantifier. But note that (i) like the previous ••con-
nectives", this symbol has denotation, and (ii) that the
generality function is explained for first-level, one-
Place functions generally as arguments. Its denotata
val-, hovievsi, in every case yield a truth-value as valuej
so this function is itself a concept, a second-level
sLe^^crLlluon'af introducing
lo .enlrt^EKHteT-'
pLeralt^v o?\ of a generality from thef a negation. These, bv the v/av, are iust
o? ?hfn' i° suooort hif
Introduction toM3.thGniQ~t .iCtiX
.^ op'i.c will, show#
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concept, and the
"quantifier** iq o >.4 xiiier is a second-level concept-
word,^
Thus the following
Where the initial horizontal has been absorbed into the
line setnnent preceding the concavity.^ is a „a„e of xhe
False, And so is
Whereas both
TvS-(U)
and
TvSrr(!i.)
8 .
modern notation, •(x)Fx»oust the two significant oarts, »(x)on Frege's analysis. Hence thero^can'b^ ^ ^
quantification" nor any question'of quantifiervarf
-bles matoning quantified variables in i>e-e®s svstL
the aLve it^wnnla such a formula as
ce-’ts (Fdi+n.”° appropriate, as Furth sug-g ^t haitoi s Introduction, Grund^esetr.e. n v-v-;?i
SnSe^t
-""bound"™
S"Unfrfro’'"?f I'^iiers. letters of L styledistinct from the apparent abound) variables,
F'L"more"r%f°^ of Lsf^st;;!x*or more on this see note 27 ,
IVn'J-t 'T-
= 0
">P0sed of the small verticalstroke, ,he ne^ation-strpj^, and the two portions oftne horizontal stroke, each of which may be rfgL'ded
• m our sense. The transition from
.Z^Z/^r..r/'~A7'^r‘ from
'V . * I call amalgamation of horizon-Grundgesetze
. pp, 39-40 .
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are names of the True, since they are negations of the
preceding pair. The last example «e might, with caution,
road as
There is something,
since
t5t0(^O
IS, in effect, the existential quantifier; as Frege says,
"... this is how ‘there is' is to be rendered in the
Begriffsschrift ."9 This view is also stated explicitly
by Frege in his essay "Function and Concept", 1 ° and was
present in Begrifl^schrm.^ and Grundlae-en .l^ though
without the semantics of Grundgesetse. Also in "Function
and Concept" Frege echoes his Grundlagen opinion that
"the ontological proof of God's existence suffers from
the fallacy of ti-eating existence as a first-level con-
»|13cepte“ We learn from Carnap that Frege continued in
this belief in 1913.^^
It is instructive to contrast Frege's views on
9 * Grundgesetze
. p,
10, Philos or/hical Writings » pp* 37-38.
Begriffsschrift
. p. 27.
12. Grundlagen » p. 65.
Vjr
i
tings
, p, 38. Cf* Grundlagen
. p. 65.
1^'. Rudolpn Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography" in
B^P Ll'C’'3cphy of jLudplph Carna 0 , edited by
PoA. Schilpp, j)o 6.
~ ““
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quantification with those of the Algebra of - •
,
- i.ogic school
U6). Here we may quote van Heijenoort again.
• • a Boole has his universe class 'i-nn nlMorgan his universe oP , ana De
bv •!* p,H ^ discourse, denoted
The universe of discourse
What we agree°io"fonsider arfc^er^aln^SL
be a ques?icn"TcS‘
'
could^noi even saf
self to onlunive-sr v?^ restricts him-
universe universe is the
there !!’.•. consists of all-that
V/e have mentioned that Boole thought of his symbol-
ism as admitting of alternative interpretations, and the
objection of Frege that since Boole's interpretations are
incompatible they cannot be called upon simultaneously
so that much we wish to say cannot be articulated in the
symbolism. However, from Frege's point of view, there is
a more fundamental difference between himself and Boole.
Boole regarded his notation as requiring some interpreta-
tion or other, whereas Frege's Begriffsschrift was in-
tended as a language whose formulas stood in no more need
of interpretation than the sentences of natural languages;
indeed less so, since they would be unambiguous. To
understand '(x)(x=x)'. or '-^,1=^.. ft is no more
15. van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and Logic asLanguage”, p. 325 , s
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necessary to specify a universe of discourse than it is
to do so for the sentence •Everything is identical „ith
Itself. This point t,ust not be confused with the fact
that any new notation must be explained to us so that we
catch on to hov/ it goes.
This difference in attitude is still very much with
us. Quine, for instance, speaks for Frege, as well as
himself, in such a passage as this.
The existential quantifier
... is a lo^i-
idiom ^®f^^®"'^®'^/®ndering of the "there' is"I .
^
The bound variable »x* ranges over
^-^i^tential quL?ifersays tnat at least one of the objects in +hpuniverse satisfies the appended condition".
.
On the other hand, when Donald Kalish, whom we may take
as a representative of the current model theoretic ap-
proach to logic, provides what he calls a semantics for
a syntactical system, not in terms of the notion of truth,
but instead in terms of nhe more general notion of truth
in a model, he identifies himself with the Boolean
attitude. For one element of a model is a specified set
of entities intended to serve as the values of the vari-
ables of the syntactical system. There is nothing contra-
Pregean about model theory, per se. The point is just
16. Quine, ’'Existence and Quantification" in OntologicalFelativitv
, p, 94, ^
17- Donald Kalish, "Semantics" in Edwards* EncvcJ ooedia.
p. 351 .
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that If. with Frege, you regard the laws of logic as laws
of truth you will not think of yourself, while doing
model theory, as studying a "more general notion" than
oi truth. To similar matters we shall return
in ($17).
To pull together some of rhe remarks on Frege's
notation made thus far. let us introduce into the notation
the expressions 'the morning star' and 'the evening star',
abbreviated •«. and 'FS' respectively, each with its
customary sense and reference. Then each of the following
r.is r= MS
MS = S3
denotes the True, and so likewise does
(MiS = MS) = (MS = ES)
18 .
19.
^"l^t^onsr'oombinaUo^s
metTo fig;r:s:-etc?^"ofthe
was oSi-
occurring in the exact sciencespuu into el feet (in some form at least, if notthe one neibniz had in mind) by Ere^e
. , , (Kurt
pf4^25'f)“~'^^ — edited by P.A. sThil^,”
Note that these three
Begriffsschrift since
expressions are not formulas of
they lack an initial horizontal.
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We may. from this denotation of the True, selectively
delete two occurences of the proper name 'MS* so as to
obtain the one-place function-name
(( ) = MS) = (( ) = £3).
This in turn may be universally quantified! that is. we
may replace the place-holding '0 - in the second-level
function-name previously discussed so that we obtain
MS) = (a = Es).
This we know also denotes the True
knowledge otherwise by saying that
( ) = MS
• We may express this
the concept-words.
( ) = ES,
denote concepts which are such that whenever they take
the same object as argument, they yield the same object
as value.
Identity, we know, holds only of objects. Thus we
are precluded from inquiring into the "identity-condi-
tions" of concepts. Nevertheless it is clear that Frege
viewed concepts (and functions generally) as indistin-
guishable when, as with the example pair, for every
argument they yield the sane value
We may al.so note that the above pair of concept-words
must, by reasoning parallel to that implicit earlier on,
be distinguishable in sense, since completing each with
20, See note 51 , and the passage it notates.
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*MS* gives a m i r» j.pa.r of sentences distinct i„ sense.
Before getting back to krege's exposition of bis
Prt»itive fonction-na^es. here see.s to be a good pla^e
to „,ention briefly an expression passed over. I refer tothe turnstile. • I-*, which Frege callsf the assertion- si^ii
,
It is Frege's contention that wi+h u /^l with such (complete)
.formulas
as we have exhibited thus far we have expressions which
only designate a truth-value, without its being said
which of the two it is «P/w -j.••wo I IS. To write, for instance.
--H^n=n
,
is merely to denote a truth-value, and not. as we would
wish to assert thereby that everything is the sa.e as
itself,
-we therefore require another special sign to be
able to assert something as true. -22 this purpose
Frege lets • f-' precede the name of a truth-value
- more
strictly, the assertion-sign prefixes what we have called
well-formed formulas, a requirement upon which is that
the left-most symbol be the horizontal - so that, for
examplG, with
it is asserted that everything is the same as itself.
Frege regards the assertion-sign as composed of a
vertical component, which he calls the .judgment-stroke
.
21* Grundgesetza
. p, 37,
22 » Ih i
d
» f p * 37*
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and a horizontal, in the explained sense, thereby doubly
guaranteeing that what is asserted is either true or false,
or at least denotative of either the True of the False.
Frege's remarks on assertion and its sign, those
quoted and those companion to them, are puzzling and worth
puzzling over. On these matters 1 shall have something
-ay later ($15 ). At this juncture I shall simply re-
cord two observations. First, the assertion-sign is
neither a name, nor a part of any name, in this respect
It is like the sign which Frege uses to introduce defini-
tions, the double-stroke of definition, and the signs
which he uses to mark inferences, called transition-
signs .23 Secondly. Frege tells us that he calls "the
pres 6111:3
"tion i.n BGsrif'f's'^rhri
-p+ n-r r, ; o .ISsennit of a judgment by use of
the sign • a oroEosition of BegriffssohrVf-, or
briefly, a £rooo3r^...2'* Frege's Basic Laws
(axioms) are propositions, and the rules of inference are
stated to insure that only propositions may be inferred
from one or more propositions, it is propositions, and
not ruunos of truth-values, which form the substance of
Frege's logical theory, or so we might wish to say.
23 * See Grundp*esetze
« pp, 82-83*
24 , p, 38. Frege's term
Furth renders it v/ith 'proposition*
gives on pp, Iv-lvi of his ''Fditor*
. Late r , in ($15 ),these expressions assertions.
here is 'Satz'j
for reasons he
s Introduction"
I shall call
127
Retumin, to Prege's exposition, after the generality
notation which we have discussed Frege introduces his
notation for the cmn^^-of.values of a function.
^0(x).
This, like the generality notation, is a one-place.
second-level function-name,
-el' servir... , u ^V3 rving, as before, to
hold open a place to be filled with a one-place, first-
level function-name. However the function which it de-
notes is not a concept; in this respect it differs from
functions met with through primitive notation to this
point. This function takes its argument, a one-place,
first-level function, into what Frege calls the course-
of-values of the function; as a special case it takes or.e-
place. first-level concepts into their extensions. What
then are courses-of-values. or extensions? Frege stipu-
lates that whenever two one-place, first-level function-
names denote functions which yield, in parallel fashion,
the same values for the same arguments, the oourse-of-
values-names formed from the two function-names denote one
and the same course-of-values. And generally, such in-
distinguishable functions have identical courses-of-
values. Such is the force of Basic Law V. It is this
which enriches Frege's fundamental logic by set theory,
and in such a fashion that the way is open to Russell's
paradox*
If we inquire via current set-theoretic notions as
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to What courses-of-values are the ™oat appropriate anewer
would be that each is an infinite set of ordered pairs
<x,y> each of whose y-member is the value of the parti-
cular function in question for the x-r,eo,ber as argument.
Extensions are sets of ordered pairs all of whose y-.„embers
are truth-values. If we go through an extension and gaoher
together all the x-members whose co-ordinate y-member is
the True we are left with the class of objects which
satisfy the concept whose extension we have gone through.
In this way we can "recover" classes from extensions.
Subsequently I shall, on occasion, speak of such classes
and extensions more or less interchangeably.
Next Frege uses the course-of-values notation to
introduce a surrogate definite article. I hold off on
this notation and its explanation until the next section.
Frege then introduces the second primitive, two-
place, first-level function-name,
(•)
-T-r;L ).
With it the truth-functional and first-order part of the
notation is complete. This denotes the conditionality-
function which is explained as yielding the False when
the "lower-argument" is the True and the "upper-argument"
is any object other than the True, and yielding the True
for all other combinations. Thus, the earlier remarks
on “connectives'* being not syncategoremata and taking
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objects in general as argument apply here as well. So.
for instance, if the Sun was the
•'lower-argument", then
the True will be the value for whatever object is the
*'upper-argument"
Some pages on Frege completes the primitive vocabu-
lary he will actually use in Grundgeset^ derivations
with notation for second-order generality; more speoifi-
oally, generality-with-respect-to-( one-place)
-first-
level-functions. Hers is an example
In this 'y ~S • is a place-holder for a second-level
function-name of one argument — the concavity notation
for "universal quantification", for example — where ’m.
stands for what will indicate the particular second-
level function, and marks the "apparent variable"
25. For notation thus far introduced Flollowing axioms. rege provides the
3LI. }—
-r a hr- a BLIIa. H F(a)
^ b La Us- f(a)
— a
BLIII, r-~|- g — BLIV
.
)~j—
(
—a) -
Lp(—
-a) =
(—b)
(”rb)
^ g(a=b)
BLV. ( C f(C ) = a g(a)) = (-nSa- f(a) = g(a))
The remaining axioms are given in notes 26. and 29.See notes 7. and 2?. on the use of Roman letters(iree variables) in the axioms.
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occur, for example, within and without a par-
ticular "universal quantifier". What is naned is a
function Which takes one-place, second-level functions
as arguments. So it is a tMrd-1^ function. I„
particular, this function yields the True as value when
the second-level function which is the argument itself
yields the True as value for all its arguments, and yields
the False for second-level functions which yield the False
for any argument. Here again the function in question is.
as well, a concept. A simple example of a Begriffsschrift
formula which uses a name of this function is
This is a name of the , .raj.w.e, ^ince not every object falls
under every function.
Frege's system allows for an ascending hierarchy of
levels of functions and function-names. In a way his
semantics compels such ascent. Further, functions of
mixed levels are possible, these ramify the hierarchy.
However Frege makes no use of such mixed functions, nor
does he go beyond the third-level of functions in his
26. This notation is governed by the following axiom.
BLIIb. I—, (f(^))
(/^ ))~<L'~
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firuudseset^e derivations .2?
$10. Definite Description
IT.,..,
»..1
.«,, «... „„
27 ,
we
I !^ve observed (note 7.) +ha+ ^
axioms with Roman letters
variables. Thus the axioms a eiiect are freeout truth-value (see rrn^n stand are with-
so v/e need to think oHh'jfff^; i?ly quantified. (See ^ implicitly universal-
that the introduetion'^rt^Br^
would introduce names nJ .Quantifiers'*
the axi oms. If inst=ad^orr^^°'‘'^'‘"' I'^'^ictions into
funotion~naras!!*“ S^then'^%iv"^°-’'^°'^‘^.^ second-level
would be licensed to rlSlaffth^l^^ l^iHSILUcs,(appropriate) variable an
"existential quantified' initialhave, in the new
"Quantifier-^ p^fnically a third-leverfuncnL' on-name, specif.
Frege's se,r.anticr!LSses
dzing" upon the position ft general-At each step we introduce «r. ‘^nd so forth,
semantics says is a
an expression whicn the
a position accessible to’ouantff?n^+°'''^ which occupiesFrege's reason for Perhaps
variables was. at least axioms with freefor such a regress.
Partially, the potentiality
ness of Frege ^s^sv?tem''^ot^? incomplete-
i =:”*«sr*5iL-
after we have sp^nt somi' time wol-k”ing^oul Inf®’’
wltW^^^
^ncom^in!i^L"s (which
chows that incompleteness;
idea, disoussea earlier lls?
out evident, at llasl If wlh that logic is through-
the tru^ ho V
-‘-east i „his is taken to imply that
with -ogle can be encompassed by a systemself-evident axioms. ‘
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generality and existence functions, et al. This abun-
dance Of entities is closely bound up with that ™ost
puezling Of Frege
-s views, that which received its
.ost
well-known expression in the remark that the concept
is not a concept. Our discussion of definite
description, besides being of some independent interest,
will serve to set the stage for an extended look at the
intertwined origins of Frege's ontology and his views on
unsaturation.
Frege desired that his notation have a symbol which
would substitute for the ordinary definite article, m
accordance with what in Grundgesetze he described as his
••basic principle”,
-that every correctly-formed name is
to denote something-.^e required a piece of notation
which would have denotation whenever completed to a well-
formed name. When the definite article aids in defini-
tively describing an object, our surrogate notation should
do likewise. But what will be the denotations for those
visibly similar expressions which do not manage to single
out just one thing? Frege's suggestion amounts to treat-
ing expressions of the form 'the F\ when there are no,
or more xhan one, Fs, as denoting the class of Fs — more
exactly, they shall denote the course-of-values of the
F-function. For t}ie intended surrogate he introduces
Or und
g
e
s
e t z
e
» p* 9,
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the notationt
\( ).
This is to denote a one-place, first-level function in
accordance with the following stipulation. If the argu-
ment is such that there is an object, s, such that the
argument is x(z=x), then a is the value of this function
for that argument! if there is no such object, a, then
the value of this function for that argument is the argu-
ment itself. Intuitively, if the argument of the function
is a class, then if the class is a unit-class, the value
of the function will be the sole member of that class, and
If the class is not a unit-class, the class itself will be
the value of the function. And if some object other than
a class is the argument of the function, then that object
will be the value of the function,
A fev/ examples are helpful# In each case let *a'
abbreviate the given name of the argument.
(i) If a is the course-of-values of the function,
natural satellite of the earth, Na is the moon, since it
is an object, z, such that a = i(z=x), i.e., the identity
statement.
29. This notation is governed by the following axiom.
BLVI.
I
—a =\r(a=£: )
Frege collects his axioms together on p. 105 of
Grund/resGtz e •
13^
x(x is a natural satellite of the
denotes the True.
(ii) If a is the course-of
-values
author of Princrg^ Wathemati r.,
. is
values of this function, on the grounds
work was co-authored there is no object
a = x(z-x)
.
earth) = x(x=the moon)
of the function,
tne course-of-
that since the
* z, such that
(iii) If a is x(2=x). sa is ^(2=x) - and similarly
for any course-of-values which is not the extension of
a concept.
three Cases are the ones Frege mentions. He
does not explicitly consider what happens when, say,
•Everything is self-identical* or 'Frege* completes the
function-name. But it is easily seen that, just as with
(xii). so with these cases the value of the function will
just be the argument. Thus the following will be true.
VFrege = Frege.
Frege concludes this section of Grundgesetze by
remarking on a certain "logical danger". If. from such
an ordinary expression as
-author of Princinia Wathemet^ca
(I change Frege's example) we were to form the proper
name *the author of Princioia r»!athematica *
.
we should commit a logical error, becausethis proper name, in the absence of further
stipulations would be ambiguous, hence evendevoid of denotation
. . . and if we were
to give this proper name a denotation ex-
pressly, the object denoted would have no
connection with the formation of the name.
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waf entitled to infer its [an author of Pri rtf' i r>^ 1 , u • i
should be onlv yet we
just that to conclude
whxILr ?ie^-unoti^^
or nrre"°h^^
under which falls°no^ob ject*^^’
falls' exLuy^on; oSoec??3§®°"
Perhaps Frege is here inveighing against the sort
Of suggestion he once offered for dealing with rotten
descriptions, those which fail to describe uniquely.
.air the rot by means of a special stipulation, e.g.,
by the convention that 0 shall count as its reference.
When the concept applies to no object or to more than
one. "51 still the intent of the above passage is not clear,
What advantage does Frege see gained by the Grundveset.e
technique? The inference which we are "only too inclined"
to make is no tetter, since the conclusion on either of
the two suggestions will be false. Fer.haps an advantage
is seen in this. On the Grundgesetse view we shall be
less inclined to fallaciously draw the conclusion, hence
the virtue of the apparently elaborate symbolism of Frege’s
surrogate definite article.
If the goal of weakening an inclination to draw what
may be an illogical inference is a worthy one. we might
30
. ^j^undgesetze
, pp, 5O- 51 .
Reference’* in Philos ophical Writini-s
p. . ~ ““
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wonder whether it could not be achieved so.e other way.
A suggestion to the point would be to weaken Frege's
requirement that the surrogate 'the F- itself denote at
every occurence to the weaker requirement that all
expressions (not themselves definite descriptions) which
contain definite descriptions denote. Let us hold onto
this idea for a paragraph.
A puztling feature of Frege's theory is that the
function-name which goes surrogate for the ordinary
descriptor is a first-level function-name. Confronted
with the theory we naturally take '\' as the canonical
substitute for the ordinary 'the' (in at least one prom-
inent use of this expression.) But when thus viewed, the
canonical 'the' seems to perform a double role; it takes
the function-name which follows it into its oourse-of-
values, and then yields the "sole member" or the course-
of-values itself, as the case may be, as value. Would
we not gain a closer fit with intuition, and at the same
time simplify theory, if we introduced the descriptor
function as a second-level function understood as yielding,
for F as its argument, the sole F, if such there be, and
otherwise yielding, say, the class of Fs. The effect of
this would be to locate description at the same level
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wit.h Quan'tif ica'tion
•
The point of these reflections is this. If „e com-
bine the weakened requirement of a paragraph back with
the suggestion that we treat definite description and
quantification as both second-level functions we shall
be led naturally and direcxly to a version of Russell-s
theory of descriptions. Setting aside the rotten cases.
•The F is C may be understood by a Fregean as 'There is
just one F and it is G'. It is then not difficult to
see how to use quantification and identity to re-express
•The F is G' in a way that rules the rotten cases false,
provided we have allowed to lapse the requirement that
the F must always have denotation*
Why did Irege treat his descriptor as a first-level
c Geach makes this
observes that
point in a reverse manner when he
when Russell says that expressions like
the King ol France* are not names butincomplete symbols* he is saying what
would be put thus in Frege *s^ terminologvs
In "the King of France is bald", "the
King of i ranee" is not a name of an
object; what it stands for is something
incomp2.ete
, • , , a second-level concept*
within which a concept falls if and
if there falls under it someone
v/ho is a King of France and apart from
v;hom nobody IS a Xing of France. ( Philo-
Writings * editor’s note, p. 51 •)
33* The reader unfamiliar with the procedure may consultQuine s i(ilitbods ol Logic * for one work* where will
be lound a clarity of exposition surpassing any
Russell himself provided.
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functior.-na.c7 I not
..now. Penhaps it was tProu.P
treating such expressions as 'the natural satellite of
the earth- on the model of
-the successor of zero-, what-
ever may have suggested the view to Prege. we can come to
understand why a Russell-like treatment would have re-
fined alien to him even were he to have located descrip-
tion up with the quantifiers. To see why this is so is
to be well into an appreciation of the considerations
moving Prege towards his ontology of truth-values, truth-
functions, et al.. with its attendant unsaturation. To
anticipate, I shall suggest that Frege would have felt
great resistance to our suggestion that expressions which
in many ways behave like singular terms can be treated as
contributing to the reference of sentences which contain
them without themselves being treated as names, expressions
with a denotation, that is. he would not like our weaken-
g f his basic principle". Subsequent remarks on the
"origin” of Frege's semantics will bring out why.
Before weaving definite descriptions for the present,
a few additional observations are worth registering. One
of Russell's motivations in coming up with his theory of
descriptions stems from problems incurred in saying what
does not exist. One type of negative existential claim
is that there
corns do not
atically to F;
are no things of a certain kind, that uni-
exist, for instance. This yields unproblem-
regean, as to Russellian, resources, going
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straxghtforwaraiy into a negated existential.
-(.x)(x is
a unicorn). Another type of negative existential involve-
attachfng a denial of existence to a (putative) singular
ar». Thus we have 'The greatest pri.e number does not
exist*, for instance, or again, *Pegasus does not exist*.
The difficulty here is to see how these claims could be
true, as we assu„,e they are. Although Prege does not
discuss this question, we can see how with the first
example, that of *the greatest prime*, we might fashion
an answer. Keeping the explanation of his surrogate
article in mind we give this case the following
treatment.
-(Ex)(x=v^(y is a prime greater than all
others) and xfy(y is a prime greater than all others)).
Here we incorporate Frege *s descriptor and course-of-
values abstractor into more common orthography.
What now of the other exam.ple, that involving
•Pegasus*? It is widely believed that Frege held what
Geach has called the
'•disguised-description theory of
proper names
, that is, that such unstructured expres-
sions as *Frege*, *Aristotle*. and ’Pegasus* are equiva-
lent in content to some (possible) definite description.
For example, ’Frege* might have the sense of ’the greatest
logician of the 19th century* for some. This is Frege’s
view with regard to numerals. But it must be said that
3^* T_h_r]^ Philosophers a p, i37.
l4o
textual evidence that he held it generally is very sli.
indeed. There is the footnote in "On Sense and Refer-
ence". but other than this the only passages which bear
directly on the question (in writings Frege published)
are in a quite late paper.36
widesnread
attribution of the
"disguised-description" thesis to Frege
reflects, in port, a difficulty in imagining what would
be the sense of a simple proper name if ix were not that
of some possible description. Be that as it may. would
this thesis open the way to a treatment of (e.g.)
-Pegasus
does not exisfT Yes. at least schematically, simply
replace, in the earlier formula,
-is a prime greater than
all others' uniformly with 'Pegasises', which itself may
be regarded as an abbreviation for (and failing that a
place-holder for) an appropriate predicative expression.
Let us be clear that our use of 'Pegasizes' here
does not imply any claim about the eliminability of proper
names. (We are not using 'Pegasizes' as Quine might.)
Nor do we want it to. For we should not confuse the view
that any name can be replaced with a definite description,
which there is some reason to believe Frege held, with
the view that every name can be replaced by a definite
oescription. which there is no reason to suppose Frege
-”^5. Writin^^s e p. 58 .
36 . "The Thought" (1913) in Philosophical Logic
I4l
held. That is. we must not equate the two claims,
sentence can''be"reDlaced^h"'*^^^
description without change of°sense^"^^®
sr;S£rOis-"“"
sense.
'descriptions without change of
These are not equivalent since in some cases any definite
description capable of replacing a name may itself con-
tain a name replaceable only by a description itself
containing such a name, and so forth. So the thesis that
every simple name has the sense of some definite descrip-
tion does not imply the eliminability of names.
It has seemed to Leonard Linsky that the way was
open for a somewhat different treatment of negative
existentials than the one just suggested. He writes that
con-eot'^’''^
that existence is a second-level
'the sense
nLl iw considered a prooeri.ame is the same as that of some definitedescription. Thus the sense of ’Homer' is
of^Th^T]??^ sense of 'the authore and The Odyssey *
, , , 'Homer
taken"L^
exist', correctly understood, must beas
. .
. [assertingj what is assertedDy It IS not the case that one and only oneperson authored ^he I Iliad and The Odyssey'.Though this may be true, it does noF^^T^in
ny referenceless names
, so the problems of
^xistentials cannot arise • . ,fThisJ solution ... is never explicitlylormulated by Frege as an answer to the prob-lem .. . rather [itj is a by-product of
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Frege *s treatment of exis-tflnr<a -o « olevel concept. 37
®^iS‘*ence
.s a second-
Linsky see«3 to suggest that his
-solution" simply falls
out of the dual thesis that existence is a second-level
concept and nan,es have the sense of definite descriptions.
But this is not so. A critical step in Linsky-s reason-
ing is the move from (e.g.)
The object which Pegasizes exists,
where 'Pegasizes* is used as before, to
There is exactly one object which Pegasizes.
There is no reason for Frege not to agree that •there is
exactly one object which ...» denotes a second-level
concept; and he might well agree that such pairs of sen-
tences as the above express the same Thought. But this
agreement would not commit Frege, in his ovm eyes, to
claiming that the sentences agree in other important
respects, such as logical structure and implications
.
ihis wo know from earlier discussion ($3). So Linsky*s
elimination requires further argument, at least if it is
to be offered on Frege's behalf.
We can see in Linsky's idea a suggestion for the
elimination of complex names. But to eliminate complex
names would be to eliminate the rationale of Frege's
semantics, as we shall see. This is the source of the
37 • Leonard Linsky, Referring, p, 29.
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resistance I would imagine Frege to have to
along Linsky*s lines.
proceeding
$11. Complex Names and Predications
In discussing Frege's Dictum earlier on ($ 1 ) we
mentioned Quine's remark to the effect that it signalled
an important reorientation in semantics away from name,
or term, semantics." We also noted Quine's view that
this reorientation underlies Russell's theory of descrip-
tions with its use of contextual definitions. I do not
wish to take exception to either point. And yet Russell's
approach is, I have claimed, alien to Frege. The nub of
the reason concerns the eliminability of complex names.
For when Frege turned to developing a semantics for his
Begriffssohrift he took complex singular terms rather
than sentences as his model of significant complexity.
In particular, it seems that he was led po his full-blown
semantics through generalizing certain impressions gained
through pondering the nature of complex arithmetical
singular terms.
Central to this semantics is the view that concepts,
and functions generally, are unsaturated. If we ask just
what Frege means in calling concepts unsaturated, and
correlatively, speaking of objects as not so, but rather
complete, we get this sort of reply. "'Complete* and
*unsaturated
' are of course only figures of speech? but
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all that I wish or am able to do here is to give hints.
If we asic for Prege's reasons for maintaining this view,
xt must bo admitted that we find very little in the way
Of direct argument, still i believe that a more sympa-
thetic understanding of this pivotal idea of Frege-s is
possible than is commonly evinced, m this section and
the next we shall attempt tc trace out a plausible path,
which Frege may have followed, which leads to the
semantics of unsaturated functions. It is hoped that
ensuing remarxs will constitute something of an explica-
tion of such a passage as this one of Frege’s.
• • o the words ‘the concept sou?re root of U*have an essentially different“Dl^rv\l^^^^ ~
[•there i^ 2*- Lt “"^^Sinal sentence
i p ' fhp^-p?'" square root of 4’]j.e. t e reference of the xwo phrases isessentially different. n
Frege’s model of signifioant complexity was that
exemplified by such expressions as! 2+3. We shall focus
attention on this for awhile.
Frege did not doubt but what there are numbers, and
iiT^ldlaS.^ he had argued that numbers are objects.
Let us assume this is correct. Then the relation between
2 , or two
, as in *Two is a prime number*, and the
38. *'On^Concept and Object", in miosophical Writ
p. 33. ings
.
39* ALLd_c, p. 50 ,
1^5
nun-ber two may well strike us as transparent and paradig-
matic - or at least as providing one paradigm
- of the
way words relate to things. Accordingly let us say that
•2' denotes, or names, the number two, and speak of the
relation in question is that of denotation. Just as
paradigmatically do •three*, •3., .q.,
.5.,
.seventeen-,
etc. {at least in certain uses) denote numbers! each be-
longs to a recognizable class of exoressionc: whoop essions se members
we shall call number-names
.
And now consider ' 2+y. if „e are holding that
numbers are nameable. it is not difficult to think of
• 2+3 * itself as naming a number, specifically the number
five. Let us then count
-J+S* into our class of number-
names, and so also *two plus three*, *3-1*, *12-5*,
*(2+3)+7», etc.
We are assuming that
-a-, at least on occasion, de-
notes the number twoi looking then at •2+3*
, and assuming
it to be a name, it would be difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that
-a- denotes the number two in its occurrence
in • 2+3 *. So we are led to conclude that some number-
names have parts which name numbers, that there are
complex number-names.
This conclusion, which I have approached as inno-
cently as possible, has an appeal that is easily felt.
It is one Frege acceded to unhesitatingly. Still, accept-
ing tno idea that there are names with constituent parts
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Which are also na.ee is a crucial step. Pre,e too. it.SO we shall follow.
we assume that . 2.3 ' denotes five and shift our con-
cern to providing anaccountof ho„ it acco.plishes this.
That as. taking it to be a fact that ' 2 ^3 . denotes five
we seek an explanation of this fact. But what is the
nature of the sought-for explanation? In what ter.s
.ight
we anticipate its framing? Here we should recall the sort
Of account envisaged in ($8) of why particular logical
truths are Icgically true. And how this led us to the
idea that to have a lingua would be to have an answer to
the question wldch we phrased this way. How is truth
possible? Though in the case at hand, we are not (direct-
ly) concerned with truth, but with the (supposed) fact
that -2t3’ denotes the number five, we should nonetheless
expect what we cay here to tie in at some point to our
earlier question. Here it seems we wish to require that
an essential ingredient of any explanation of the fact
that •2+3’ denotes five be the fact that •2' is a part of
•2+3' and in this occurrence denotes two. It is to be
further expected that the explanation will be completed
by further specifying "parts" of •2+3’ and indicating in
some analogous way "relations" these hear to other things.
This is rather vague, but that is as it should be at this
stage of the game. We may expect that the attempt to
provide the explanations we seek will make it clearer to
14?
us What we are willing to count as an explanation. And
this process will undoubtedly yield some gain in clarity
of the relevant notions of part and relation as invoked
above. In the meantime, and again remembering earlier
remarks, we shall use 'semantical' to qualify these
terms! '2' is to be a semantical part of '2+3', and
denotation is a (paradigmatic) semantical relation.
Returning to '2+3', we have recorded the fact that
2 , in 2+3 , denotes two. A parallel observation may-
be made regarding '3'. Each of these facts is necessary,
we assume, to explain that '2+3' denotes five. But it is
clear that they are not, individually or jointly, suf-
ficient. Montgomery Furth has put the point this way.
... we cannot regard as a final semantical
account of a denotin,G; comnlex name
. • . a
simple enumeration of the denotations of allits component parts. For while it is truethat a complex complete name is a complete
name containing complete parts, and we aretaking each complete part to .have denotation
on Its own, an account that stopped here wouldleave unexplained the most remarkable fact
of all, that the complete name is itself a
name, denoting a single determinate object,
. • . So we know that a further semantical
role is being played within the name, over
and above the denoting of their respective
denotations by the respective complete parts
of the namer^^
These remarks occur in the context of an assumption
40, Furxh, "Two Types of Denotation"
,
.Studies in Lori cal
( American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph
Series, No, 2, (1968}
,
p, 23.
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on Furth's part that with (e.g.)
.?+v „ ,V ‘tp*; che only denoting
component parts are *2* and »?• u^ 3 . However Furth intends
the conclusion more
.srenerallvgeneral y. He assumes that the further
semantical role played in (e.g.)
-2^3. eannot be played
by a part which itself denotes an object. Or rather, he
assumes that the further semantical role is not played
by some (perhaps other) part denoting an object. Though
I am inclined to agree with thic- t 4.6 xn xnis, I do not see that Furth
has set out support for this conclusion o'-u.ii.j.usion. tor suppose the
reply is made that# appearancpc- +v,a «arances to the conxrary notwith-
standing, the expression which remains when ’a* and 'y
are deleted from '2+'^* i-t-cioi-r a.Itself denotes an object# and that
the account we seek of the fact that *2+3
• denotes a
number, indeed, the number five, is to be found upon
examining the nature of this nev;ly introduced object.
Furth wants to say that no such reply can be adequate,
but I do not find an argument for this rejection. In
what follows I shall offer something like an argument for
Furth's conclusion, one which plays an essential role in
the genesis of unsaturation.
Getting back to the fact that *2+3* denotes five,
let us, for simplicity's sake, think of •2-v3-' as breaking-
up into just *2' and what remains when *2' is deleted
from this. These parts go together, v/e are assuming, to
produce a result which denotes the number five. Our
question may then be put as how what remains when *2* is
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deleted contributes to this. At this point we
.ay atleast infer that the remainder is not itself a name of
would be a two-item
fst and not. as it is. a name of a number (assuming it
could not be both.) This I thinh we Know. And 1 thinK
It faxr to assume that the difference between a name and
a list IS reasonably clear in this case. Thus with re-
gard to the role of our
-remainder-, we are in a position
to say this. Either it bears some semantical relation
(as we say) other than (what we are calling) denotation
to the number two. or it bears some semantical relation
(possibly, but not necessarily that of denotation) to
something other than two. or any other number. The
alternatives, while perhaps not exclusive, are exhaustive.
It is Frege's view that functional expressions, such
as are obtained through deleting a number-name from a
number-name, have denotation, they denote functions.
Thus he takes the second path. V/hy?
Perhaps he reasoned along these lines. Certainly
there are arithmetic functions, or operations, such as
those Cl addition and subtraction. For we know, for
instance, that addition is commutative whereas subtraction
is not. Since with (e.g.) '2+3’ we represent the result
of adding together two numbers, surely addition, that is,
the arithmetic function of addition, must got mentioned
one way or another with the expression '2+3'
. And, given
1.50
hat. :.t see.s clear that .... or .(
mentioning. Or. to revert to our simplified case, it
seems that the result of deleting .3. from .3.3., viz.
•( )t3 -. must mention an arithmetic function, that of”
adding three. So we conclude, more generally, that
functional expressions mention functions. But why. having
come this far. should we conclude that they denote func-
tions? Why. that is. Should we liken the semantical
relationship holding between functional expressions and
functions to that holding between arithmetic names and
numbers? A thought here might run this way. Part of the
force of saying that number-words denote numbers is that,
from their legitimate arithmetic use we can infer that
there are numbers. Analogously, it seems we can infer
from the legitimate arithmetic use of functional expres-
sions that there are functions and so find appropriate
speaking of functional expressions as denoting functions.
I touch this thought lightly here; I shall look more
closely at a similar idea further down. In any case, let
us, for whatever reason, follow Frege in deeming functional
expressions denotative of functions.
Before continuing with our semantical journey, let
us pause for a few words on functions. Compare ' 2 +j- with
the followingi
1+3 (2+3)+3 (5-2)+3;
each has a common part which we can indicate with
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( )+3 .
This incomplete expression (as we may call it. witn Frege)
along with others which similarly arise, has several
notable features. One is that whenever it is completed
with a number-name, however complex, a name of a number
results. Another is that when two number-names which
Share their denotations complete such incomplete expres-
sions. the resulting complete expressions share their
denotation. So we may think of these incomplete expres-
sions as mapping expressions, they systematically relate
the denotations of the completing number-names to the
denotations of the completed number-names. In other words,
and stated mors generally, the reference of a complex
number-name is a function of the denotations of its
number-naming parts. Functions we m.ay think of as enti-
ties through which this mapping is accomplished, and which
are such that no two functions perform exactly the same
mapping service. More precisely, but less generally, if
two function-names are such that whenever each is com-
pleted with an arithmetic name (simple or complex, the
same or different) of a particular number, the resulting
expressions are names of the same number, then the func-
tion-names denote (as we are saying, with Frege) the same
function. In a word, functions are extensional. This
was Frege’s view, and it accords with mathematical
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practice then and now.'^l what is distinctive of Frege's
conception of functions is that they are. as he puts it.
unsaturated ( ungesattist ) , in contrast to object-
.unctions are not seif-subsistent. but rather stanrin
need of completion. We are worlrinn-rk g towards an understand-
ing of this claim and its motivations.
We set ourselves the problem of accounting for the
fact that • 2 +3 ' denotes five. Frege's parsing of this
expression, under our simplifying assumption, yields as
significant parts just '2' and '(
, for each of which
denotation is claimed. Accepting the claims, do we have
sufficient material with which to construct an account
as desired? It would go like this. Since '2' denotes
two and '( )^3 ' denotes a function which maps a number
into that Which is three greater. '2+3' denotes a number
that is three greater than two. Is this explanatory in
the sense we are after? Let us proceed by granting an
in. But Frep did not simply take over current conceptions
Sharpened them? lefCii> anlrodiiction
. pp* 22 "23 *
’unsaturated'to speak of certain expressions much as Frees usedIt. or 'incomplete', to speak of certain ??p?e?sions.however he apparently did notp as Frege did, alsouse It in speaking of entities referred to by such
its usein chtMibwry, wiiich may well have been Frege's
source also. I.M. Bochenski’s A History of FormalLOjg^, pp, 323-24, is my source on Peirce.
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context we want to examine a particular feature of it.
TO rehearse earlier observations with a different
example, consider the expression
•(2.3).7’. which we will,
or the present, think of as breaking up into the two
parts
.(2.3)' and .( ).7.. If we replace the constitu-
ent part
.(2.3)', which is evidently a nu.ber-na.e, with
another arithmetic name of the same number, say -v. the
expression that results not only names a number, but names
the same number as the original. Now if •( denoted
a number, some numeral would likewise, yet no numeral may
replace this incomplete expression with an expression we
recognize as a number-name as the result, at best we come
up with a listing of numbers. So such incomplete expres-
sions are not names of numbers. This was our earlier
conclusion, and not a dramatic one.
Now, considering the language of arithmetic i„ a
broader context, we generalize from our class of number-
names, whose members serve as guiding paradigms, to a
wider class of expressions all of whose members shall be
suitably similar to number-names. Note that here what
we "generalize on" is the idea of an expression being a
number-name, not on that of an expression being a name
of something, or having a denotation. What makes for
suitable similarity, or common linguistic role, is dif-
ficult to specify, though behavior about signs of
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identity (equality) figures importantly. For instance.
9 = (2+3)
planets '
kind of progression which suggests that * 9 ', *thethird planet from the sun* and
.Venus' may replace one
another in these contexts (though in some cases with a
greater or lesser degree of incongruity) so that the other
two Will join .9- in our expanded class of expressions.
The guiding idea is (or seems •‘n ^v
.o be) that expressions gain
entry to our class, and let us call its members singular
terms, by intelligibly replacing paradigms (occurring
paradigmatically. we should perhaps add.)
Notice, first, that sentences (identities) are used
to motivate the expansion, this may not be incidental.
Secondly, such motivation as is provided hardly looks
like a conclusive argument for placing ‘Venus' in the
same semantic bag with '9'. Rather, attention is directed
to certain features of language which, at least while
attended to, pull us in a certain direction. Further-
more. there are other examples which induce an undercurrent.
Wert we to yield to the initial suggestion, what would
we make of the likes of 'Venus + 3' where 'Venus' replaces
’2* IS a paradigm occurrence? We might decide —
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Wittgenstein apparently did'^3 ..
our generalization before it gets going, that they show
that the Whole endeavor to provide a semantical account
of complex names is misguided, m response to this I
think all we can do is to (tentatively) treat these exam-
ples as misleading, as exceptions to be dealt with later
on, once the ball eet<^ rniiithr- o t11 g ts olling. Only by adopting such a
high-handed attitude can we proceed, and only through pro-
ceeding will we be able to determine whether we have been
justified in proceeding, whether in fact we can treat such
examples as exceptions to a pattern persuasively portrayed.
We shall, thus, with Frege, succumb to the set-out temp-
tation. and explore the consequences.
To continue, whereas we previously thought about
replacing a functional expression with a number-name, let
us now consider doing likewise with any member of our
generalized class of singular terms. The envisioned re-
sult is comparable to the earlier one. But now there is
a bite. Before we were led only to reject the obviously
false suggestion that functional expressions denote num-
bers. The view we are now led to reject is that it is
possible to refer to the denotation of a functional ex-
pression with a singular term. Otherwise put, we cannot
® message of the Tractates See
and also Anscombe’s introduction to
wittrons
-coin's Tractatus, p. 120.
‘
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generalize the idea of a nu.ber-na.e to sufficiently
enrtch the class of singular terms to a point where it
includes expressions that may denote the denotations we
have assumed for such incomplete expressions as •( )+3.
More generally, to assume that every significant part of
a complex name itself has denotation seems to require the
view that at least one such denotation cannot be denoted
by a singular term. Frege assumed that functions were
denoted by functional expressions and this, given his
assumptions as to the components of complex arithmetic
names, seems to require that functions cannot be referred
to with singular terms. It is this
-result" which stands
behind Frege
-s view that functions are unsaturated. Re-
phrasing our conclusion, functions must lie outside the
scope of singular terms if the earlier account of '2+3
•
IS to be explanatory. Frege sought some such account
and 30 was led to conclude that functions are insuscep-
tible of singular reference. This. I submit, is just
what the claim of unsaturation comes to. Ultimately, the
suggestion that we can consider functions incomplete in a
fashion analogous to the way in which functional expres-
sions themselves are incomplete is unhelpful. And the
same is true of other metaphors Frege hoped would be
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elucidating.^^
I nave state., tn erfect. t.at tt.e semantical analyses
rege gave to sentences were derived from those originally
given to arxthmetical singular terms. We have just seen.
through a few exam,pies, how Frege-s account goes and why
It brings in its wake the view that functions are unsaru-
rated.^ Next we shall look at some simple sentences in much
the spirit as we have examined *2+3*. Thi'" willj • i.nio , eventu-
ally, serve to motivate Frege's wider application and
generalisation of his semantics of complex arithmetic
names
•
Sentences are expressions with truth-value. (Here
we continue in our earlier conceit ($6).) with-or without
an emphasis on names, ix mighx well strike us that the
simplest sort of sentence is one in which something is
named which the iremaindpp r>rremain er of the sentence says something
about, as is apparently the case with (e.g.)
Jane is an actress.
This sentence, it happens, we know to be true, at least
If we are together on our Jane. We say that 'Jane' names
the actress in question, and thus speak of the relation
between 'Jane' and Jane in the same terms as that between
44 e In "Frege cn Functions" Black subiects severaJ of
ihfPe" and'finL ?^e„ting.
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and two. But for the
.noment we shall set aside those
earlter reflections, not drawing upon the^ yet. As we
here shall use 'na.e-, the paradigmatic cases of names
are expressions that apply to things to which we might
well be able to point, perhaps so to name. And this is
certainly not the case with number-nam.es. Previously we
took arithmetic as providing us with the clear cases of
What we called names, now we think in terms of naming, or
pointing, to gain the clear cases of what we call nam.es.
Sentences such as Vane is an actress'.
-Tom is
tall*.
-Peter is next to Jane*. *George is between Tom
and Sally*, etc., we may call simple predications. With
sentences of this sort, deleting a (complete) name, as
•Jane* in
-Jane is an actress*, leaves an incomplete ex-
pression» e*g.,
( ) is an actress,
which we will call a predicate, or predicative expression.
A predication, then, is the completion of a predicative
expression by a complete name (or pair of names if the
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predicate is doubly-incoraplete, etc.) into a sentence.'*5
I now wish to develop a line of thought, rather
parallel to that gone through with *2+3., which arises in
response to the question. How are we to account for the
fact that *Jane is an actress- has truth-value, indeed,
is true, in terms of what is to be said of its parts,
•Jane- and
-( ) is an actress-? (Note here the assumption
that such most simple predications, as that of our exam-
ple, shall have such account as we desire of them framed
in terms of just two (proper) parts; what we here assume,
with Frege, comes in for mention in ($li) and extended
discussion in ($16).) That
-Jane- names, or denotes.
Jane is necessary to the desired account, but clearly not
slntenc4°?: ^afn f--be xenc^s to g i predicates is not a wholly tran^;-paren- one. Witness the fact that if we delete thename John from 'John loves John* we are left withthe appearance of a one place predicate *( ) loves
Lilhcnlhff forT" ^ binarvrelations ip, or we recognize the same predicate inJohn loves Mary*. Even Frege shipped on thi^*
^^cset^, p. 81. The mofal he?rwc“d se^
through uele-cing occurrences of names from sentences.fiut not any occurrence of a name in anv sentencp
Dropping -France- from
-The capital of ?ran« ifiaris does not give us a predicate; nor does de-leting -2- irom
-2t3=r. Nor is it clear that tneresult of deleting VPeter’ from^ •Jane is an actress
Tho
blonde snou^a be considered a predicateI e moral here is that there is no substitute forjudicious use of examples in introducing theIdea of a predicate, or the predicative occurrence
of an expression. For a related point see note ?2.
l6o
sufficient for it. T+ oiIt IS also Ci.ear that •( ) is an
actress* does not (or not only) functionl v^io to name Jane,
or any other person, since if it hid. Vane is an actress-
would be, in effect, a two-person list, but it is not,
-ince it is a sentence. Here we draw on an assumed
distinction between a sentence and a list, in parxicular.
between a ss'n.fcen''p p’hi-sii+ ^ ^- te -e about a person and a list of persons.
Which parallels the earli^v, + ^ *. •iie. aistinction oetween a list of
nu.nbers and a narne of a number. We then conclude that
•( ) is an actress- either bears other than denotation to
Jane, or it bears some semantical relation, perhaps that
of denotation, to something: oth^^r t /xne than Jane (or anybody
else
.
}
Frege held that predicative expressions denote what
he called concepts. Why was this? In a sense the answer
is quite simple. Frege intends to quantify (generalise)
at the predicative-position, and. as Quine would say, he
knew that to quantify at the place of an expression
(i.e., to replace it by a variable bound by a quantifier)
was inseparable from the assumption that the expression
which occupies that position has denotation. But this
then raises questions as to why Frege did so quantify, or
what reason can be offered in motivation of this move.
A rather common thought on this topic (similar to
that previously offered regarding functions) finds ex-
pre5.3ion in these words of Furth's.
I6i
ingly
"Napoleon “nhesitat-
general and MccIellan'^Sarnot^'to
was something that McClellan was
ihat-t^pr^dlcalr""
to that required comparable
the paraU^ro^eration?®^"""
NOW Of course we do commonly enough in ordinary speech
™ove as Furth indicates. And we may agree, for the jur-
P s of argument, that to generalize at the predicate-
place is to presuppose that predicates denote. But it
n.ay he doubted whether, in the move Furth cites, a
predicative expression ourp nww -sK b p e and simple is generalized on.
Consider simply,
Napoleon was a great general.
In this we have the predicative expression
( ) was a great general.
But to replace this, in the above sentence, with a variable
Which we bind with an existential quantifier gives some-
thing which might look; this way
(Ex) (Napoleon x)
.
I have difficulty in understanding this. At the very
least it does not admit of a reading parallel to that
Which we give the result of existentially generalizing
son°s
' P* See also Straw-
K? Terms and Predication" in Philo-
pp. eoff., and Dummetfs "Fr'S^on Funotionsi A Reply" in Essays on Frege
.
p.^Byz.
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at the position of 'Napoleon'. That gives us
(Ex) (x was a great general),
which unproblematicallv savs th«+ •y y at something was a great
general. The second existential ;u invites the questioni
Who (or What) was a great general^ Here an appropriate
answer is. Napoleon. Now. judging fro^ the quoted
passage. Kurth would suggest that we understand the first
existential as saying that Napoleon was something. Then
it invites the question. What was Napoleon? And here an
appropriate answer would be. A great general. Or. He
«as a great general. In answer to the first question we
give (or may give) the expression on which we had pre-
viously generalised. But this is not so with our answer
to the second question. Might we not suppose that this
indicates that it was not the position of the predicate
that was generalized upon?
These reflections cast some doubt that the move to
Which Furth directs our attention involves generalisation
on a predicative expression and hence gives us reason
to suppose that predicates denote. And Frege never, so
far as I know, offered such an argument for his view that
predicates denote. I think that we would do better to
seek Frege's reasons for assuming concepts as the de,.o-
tations of predicates in the context of the demands of
logicism as Frege saw them. Reverting to the earlier
approximation of Grurid^osetze Basic Law V,
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(B) x(Fx)=Ji(Gx) iff (x)(Fx iff Gx),
if this is going to serve Frege's program of providing
ith the means of apprehending sets, and so ultimately
numbers, then 'F' and 'G' must be construed as genuine
variables, at all occurrences,^'^
'^his tno-o+hxHi , together with the
claim thax (e.g,) 'All and only vixens are vixens’ has
the logical form of the right side of (B), yields the
conclusion that predicative expressions have denotation.
For the present let us just accept the idea that predi-
cates denote.
Predicates denote concepts. What then are concepts?
hell they are the sorts of things which, e.g.. •( ) is
an actress’ denotes, in its occurrence in ’Jane is an
actress’, and are such that the fact that ’( ) is an
actress’ denotes the concept that it does, together with
the fact that ’Jane’ denotes Jane, is sufficient to ac-
count for the fact that the sentence has the truth-value
that it does. We proceed in analogy with our discussion
of 2 t3
. There we assumed a distinction between names
and lists: here, between predications (and sentences
generally) and lists. There we generalized out from
arithmetic singular terras: here we envisage a similar
generalisation, but one where the paradigmatic singular
tenr.s are names of things we could handle or point at —
^7. I discuss this more explicitly in (,'P13),
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expressions that Strawson, for instance, would incline
to count as singular ter™s in the first instance. Thus.
»uch as we know that concepts are not persons, or any-
thing else to which we might be able to point, since if
they were we would be able to provide the denotation of
•( ) IS an actress’ with a name, which upon substitution
would transmute a predication into a list, so we conclude
more generally that concepts are entities which cannot be
denoted by singular terms. Concepts, like functions, are
insusceptible of singular reference) they too are unsat-
urate d.
We have sketched independent accounts of complex
singular terms and simple predications. That they run
as parallel as they do to some extent reflects shared
assumptions; still the parallel is striking. The urge
toward integration of theory is strong. Do we then have
a choice in the direction of integration between assimi-
3-ating complex names to predications or conversely?
Frege's move was to count predications (and sentences
genez'axly) as names, therewith absorbing concepts into
functions, as a special case. Being able to thus treat
^
concepts as functions was undoubtedly felt as an evident
gain; functions were a mathematical commonplace, whereas
concepts were entangled in speculations of uncertain
usefulness and some obscurity. Also, where in our
development we have made use of two somewhat different
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lnt.er.,i»
.. I..,
,
,«.„i.i„,
arithmetical names and "natural" names Ar^n. nd we might feel
that the differences in our regard of names serve to re-
inforce one another with the cumulative effect of a clear-
er categorization. (Though the resultant inclusion of
sentences into this category is a doubtful gain on this
score.) Of course, this is dependent upon being able to
make out a view on which sentences have denotation, which
we have yet to take up.
Whereas this assimilation of sentences to complex
names is thus rather straightforward, there is no equally
simple way of effecting the reverse assimilation of com-
plex names to sentences. It is. however, possible to go
the other way. The possibility is provided by Russell's
theory of descriptions. The process proceeds by, first,
finding what looks to be a predicative expression in a
definite description: thus (e.g.) locating •( ) is a
father of Jane' in 'the father of Jane' so that the latter
may be recast as 'that which is a father of Jane'. Then,
with any sentence in which the complex phrase occurs,
the sentence as a whole is reworked in the familiar fash-
xon with the result that the appearance of a complex
name is eliminated. It then remains to show how other
apparently complex names, e.g., '2+3', can bo treated as
definite descriptions, and so on their way. to being not
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nances at all. Such transformations arc todav a n
, 48 '' common-place • ^
We can now appreciate the resistance Frege might well
ave felt to a Russellian account of definite descrip-
tion. Carried through thoroughly, this approach threat-
ens to obliterate the very phenomenon reflection upon
Which led Frefre fo hi ^eg t his semantics, the phenomenon of the
semantically complex name. And recognising this we. in
turn, might be led to wonder to what extent, and with
what effect, Frege's semantical assimilation of sentences
to complex names obliterate-:;xixerates
.he phenomenon of sentences?
To this we shall return in (.$15),
$12. The Semantics Extended: Problems
If sentences denote, what do they denote? In
S£SEiI£§schrift Frege had, at times. spoRen somewhat
vaguely of sentences and facts, or circumstances, with
the implication that (i) sentences stand in some seman-
tical relation to facts, and (ii) the facts are many -
perhaps not a fact for every sentence, but at least
different facts for many different sentences. On Frege's
later view there are just two facts, if facts are subject
to a constraint implicit in Begriffsschri ft that the
48. In Quine's
_Mathematica] Logie this, and
carried out. — more, is
16 ?
fact Uf such there be) to which a sentence is related
contains, in so^e sense, the objects denoted by singular
ter»s occurring in the sentence. These two facts Frege
calls the True and the False. Needless to say. facts in
such short supply hardly seem facts at all. Why does
Frege hold this view?
Suppose that this sentence is true,
George is a Republican.
Assume that just as
-George- denotes George, the contain-
ing sentence denotes its associated fact, and that George,
however referred to. is a constituent of this fact.
Presumably then any expression that denotes George may be
exchanged with
-George-, in the example, with the result
that the new sentence refers to the same fact as the old.
Thus,
Ton's father is a Republican
is co-denotative with the example if George is Tom-s
father. And if this fellow is the oldest man ever to
five-putt the fourteenth at Pebble Beach while standing
on his left foot whistling Dixie, then each of the pre-
ceding two must be co-~referential with
The oldest nan ever to five-putt thefourteenth at Pebble Beach while stand-ing on his left foot whistling Dixie
IS a Republican,
and if all and only men are featherless male bipeds,
and if Dixie is the best loved song in Little Rock, then
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u--.^^ fourteenth at Pebble
standing on his left for^+whistling the be^t in-TrL^i •
Rock is S Republican
in turn agrees in denotation with each of the other three.
And so forth.
Having encouraged us in •Sense and Reference- to
reflect on such examples F^ege queries.
-„hat else but
the truth-value could be found that belongs quite gener-
ally to every sentence if the denotation of its components
IS relevant, and remains unchanged by substitutions of
the kind in question?**^^
If sentences denote, and if the contribution of a
singular term, occurring as a part of a sentence, to the
fact that the sentence denotes what it does lies completely
in the term denoting a particular object, then we may be
convinced that we have no choice but to treat sentences
alike in truth-value as co-referential. Then again we
may not. Can we conjure up an argument that carries us
directly to this conclusion?
We are assuming that predicates denote, and we may
suppose that just as the contribution of the subject of
•George is a Republican' to the fact that the sentence
denotes what it does is exhausted in its denoting George,
likewise the contribution of the predicate lies just in
Writin.^s
. p. 64 ,
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Its denoting a particular concent. Hence any predicate
co-denotative with ( ) i^ . Keputlican' is intercdange-
e with xt, in our example, salva irritate
. And if
concepts are construed as a special case of functions.
two concept-words (pr^dicate^ 1 wsn v.v *-a d s; will be co-denotative justin case whenever co-denotati ts_ngu.».ar terms complete
the™ to for™ sentences the results have the same denota-
tion. But clearly this information is of „o use to us in
tryrng to argue that sentences equal in truth-value are
co-denotative.
We try another tack. Sentences denote facts, so we
are assuming, but not every sentence denotes a fact dis-
tinct from What any other sentence denotes. Some sentence
pairs are co-denotative. For instance, a pair of sentences
which ciffer only in that one arises from the other through
a substitution of one singular term for another will be
co-denota1;iv^ if +hp» crnyio-nio,- xII «ne singular terms are. Further, if
S
abbreviates an arbitrary sentence, then its self-conjunc-
tion
S and S
will surely be sufficiently equivalent to .S to insure
that the pair are alike in denotation. And similarly
with self-disjunction: surely
S or S
will be co-denotative with the first, and so also with
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the second of the above pair.
Since sentences denote we can make use of other of
Frege
-s logical notions so as to form such singular terms
the unique thing that is the same as S', briefly,
(Tx) (x=S)
,
bs surG dGno+pti io xe ue owes what o does so that
(Tx)(x=S) = s
must be true. As, of course, will be
(Tx)(x-S) = (Tx)(x=S).
Here our interest is less with this being true than with
the fact that it is a sentence of Frege's logical theory.
Let us look just at the left term. It contains as a part
the predicative expression '( )=s'; we can thus schematise
this term with
(Tx) (Fx)
.
Recall that on Frege's theory of descriptions such exprss
sions (or the equivalent ones in his notation) denote the
sole F, if such there be, otherwise, (roughly) the class
of Fs. Now let us consider the slightly more complex
predicate *S, and ( }=s* with which we replace *F* to
obtain
(Tx) (S, and x=3)
.
What does this denote? A moment’s reflection reveals
thai, if S 13 true, then this expression denotes just what
S does, and if S is false it denotes a certain class
(roughly, the null class.) Thus the following
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(Tx)(S, and x=S) = (Tx)(x=S)
and the original S will be true and false together. Here
as before the equivalence is determined through our under-
standing Of the logical ideas drawn upon, and so. as be-
fore, we may conclude that the pair are co-denotative
.
Now we are in a position to argue straightforwardly
fo. trege s conclusion that if sentences denote facts,
there are at most two facts. We begin with two sentences.
S and R, alike in truth-value. Now, (a) and (b)
(a) S
(b) (Tx)(S, and x=S) = (Tx)(x=S),
we have just shoxm to share their reference. Then so too
must (b) and (c)
(c) (Tx)(R, and x^-S) = (Tx)(x=t.s),
since by our assumption S and R are alike in truth-value,
and so (c) arises from (b) through substitution of cc-
denotative left terms. The expressions *(Tx)(S, and x=S)*
and *(Tx)(R, and x=S)» are co-denotative since if both S
and R are true each description picks out whatever it is
that the sentence S denotes, and if both S and R are false
then each description will denote (roughly) the null class
as no object will satisfy either of the conditions *S,
and x=3* and *R, and x=S*. Finally (c) and (d)
(d) R
will share their reference for the same reason that (a)
and (b) do. Since the argument works for any pair of
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sentences alike in truth-value, we have reached Frege's
concluoion that all the true sentences denote one thing,
and all the false ones another.?^ The common denotation
xs called the True in the one case, the False in the
other.
Just before launching the above argument we reasoned
that two concept-words will share denotation Just in case
sentences that result fro. the. through co.pletion with
co-denotative singular terms themselves are co-denotative
.
Having arrived at the view that sentences denote truth-
values we can be more specific. Two concept-words are
co-denotative just in case whenever a name completes each
to form a sentence the resultant sentences are alike in
truth-value. Since concepts are functions, this is no
more than what we would expect. But it is worth lingering
over this a moment, since there has been a history of
misinterpretation of Frege at this point. The source of
the trouble lies undoubtedly in the fact that Frege does
not come out and say that concepts that uniformly yield
the same Values for the same arguments are one and the
50 argument (called by some Davidson's
sharpened into some-thing 11,ce tnis form by Church in his review of
Cai. nap g jjltrQ'l^^ction to Semant ics ( Philosouhical£evi^/r t>^ U 9^ 3 )» p. 29S-3()Hy:^^t has recent]^
cone in lor considerable discussionj see, forinstance, John Wallace *s ’'Propositional Attitudes
ana .Ldentitv" ( Journal PhiloGophy
, 66 (1969),pp» 165“ 132 ) and references therein.
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so^e stricter identity-con.itiors for concepts. However
this IS
.istalcen. As emphasised earlier, identity is a
first-level function (relation)
. one which holds only for
and. so can Vo j. •cn.re be no question of identity
conditions for concepts, still one may feel that even
if we are precluded from asking under what conditions are
••two" concepts identical, a somewhat analogous question
can still be raised. To such the following can be taken
as Frege’s reply:
• • «coincidine; in extpnc?ir,n ^
anH ^Axensio .is a necessaryd oufficient crixerion for the holding
of the re,lation co^resDond-
not objects. ( Identitv' doe^^
concettf!)5f speaking, hold for
By 1955 Geach52 had directed attention to the fact that
identity was inapplicable to concepts and to the above
quoted passage; this should have served to clear matters
up. And with the publication of Furth's fine introduc-
tory essay, excuse for error was removed altogether. That
error over the "extensionality" of Frege's concepts has
51 The passage is from Frege's review of Husserl'sjihiic§.°.?h ie Arithmetlk (.Leiozig, 18qi). extractsfrom Which will found in £hiiil4kical
4 have quoted from Furtn:r~^‘Editor’s Introduction'*, p. xliv.
52. "Cl Concept”, The Philosophical R eview , LXIV
t pp» j6l-570. Reprinted in hssa’vs on Fre^fe:
see p. 2o4. — — —
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been so widespread. 53 particularly a.ong writers with alogical bent, is perhaps somewhat accounted for by the
fact that Carnap, a Known student of Frege's, went awry« The logical Syntax ^ Language, where misinterpreta-
tion first occurs, to my Knowledge. 5^^ Nevertheless it is
regrettable that, for instance. Quine continues in his
wayward way in his recent Philosophy of Logic. 55
Recapitulating recent thoughts, we have seen what
motivates treating predications as complex names. But
then If predications have denotation it is natural to
assume tnis is so for sentences generally. Given this,
we have constructed an argument of some force that issues
in the conclusion that the range of denotations of sen-
tences contains just two members, the True and the False,
so called. But if sentences denote truth-values it is
appealing to treat truth-functional correctives as a
special case of concept-words, that is. as incomplete
expressions that denote functions taKing objects (in
53. See Furth's "Editor's Introduction", p. xxxviiifor a partial catalogue. ^ xvm.
^ iHIlSHnES (first published in
and 259-f6o: 1937). See pp. 136-137
place in Grundla^en (p* 80, n. 1) Frereidea that
-different conoLZ ^mc-y have the same extension. But of course thi- i-
development of his seman'Iics on wMch"concepts are functions.
55« See pp, 66-6?.
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particular truth-values) into truth-values
. And given
that predicative expressions denote functions an account
Of universal and existential quantification see.s at
hand. The universal
^ tvexiotential) closure of a predica
tive expression denotes the True Just in case the completed
concept-word denotes a concept that yields the True for
all (so:ne) arguments. Seen this way quantifiers too seem
something like functional expressions. Treating them as
seoond-levei function-names denoting functions in their
own right then provides an account of third-level function-
names in terms of these second-level functions similar
to that of second-level function-names in terms of first-
level functions. And so forth.
Our aim has been to lay out. compellingly if possible,
na.urd steps to Frege’s semantics, what Frege might have
called the semantics of unsaturation. This unsaturation,
the unspecifiable ontology, is problematic, and one way
or another we shall be concerned with it for most of the
remainder of this essay. However there are problems with
Frege’s semantics which have nothing directly to do with
the view that functions are unsaturated, which it behooves
US to mention, if not mull over.
There is a problem with multiple quantification. We
understand, given the foregoing, the conditions under
which semething of the form
( X ) Fx
1?6
rue
- just in case F denotes a function which yields
the True for all argu,.ents. But what are we to say with
regard, for instance, to something of the form
(x)(y)(Rxy)?
Frege does not tell us how to regard the semantic con-
tribution of an embedded quantifier.
I'here is an analogous difficulty with connectives,
conditionality is explained for all objects as arguments.
but this dees not tell nou.o thv, semantic import of the
conditional in sentonf'^o -p •J.n o .nces of, for instance, the form
(x)(Px:r> Gx).
The conditional-sign, the horseshoe or Frege's, has not
been explained for contexts in which it is not completed
to a proper name by proper names, but rather serves itself
to complete a second-level function-name to a proper name.
It IS through such a use of connectives that we enrich
the expressive powers of a finite supply of predicates.
So we could just as well say that the problem here men-
tioned is with the semantics of complex predicates as
that it is with connectives in quantlficational contexts
(and higher-order contexts generally*)
Related to this is a problem with
-what Frege tells
us about predication itself. Something of the form
wixl be true just in case a falls under the concept F.
But what are we to say of polyadic predications ; of, for
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instance, something of the form
Ra, b?
In "Function and Concept" Frege writes
In
X > y
we have a function with two argumentsindicated cy *x* and the other by *y*
3 > 2
we have the
arguments
.
56
value of this function for
one
and
the
But of course we do not have the value of the function
for the arguments, for there is no unique value of the
function for the arguments. Rather, what we have is the
value of the function for the arguments taken in a cer-
tain order, in the order in which we most naturally would
take them. I quote Frege's words here not just to catch
him up, but to highlight the fact that his practice in
this passage is his practice generally. Always in dis-
cussing polyadic predications he relies on the natural
convention of plugging mentioned arguments into available
argument-places of the predicate so that the first men-
tioned argument goes into the "alphabetically earliest"
position, and so on. But this means that Frege in fact
has no way ol keeping track of the argument places in
many-place functions. At least he has given no sense to
talk of a particular function having a first, second, • •
Philoso phica l Wr Ltin/^s
. p, 39 .
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kth argument place, anymore than he has to a particular
function having a top and a bottom, or a left and right
side •
This problem Tarski solved with sequences. And it,
in turn, led to solution of the problems with complex
predicates and multiple quantifications, which, after all,
are somewhat artificially parcelled out as separate prob-
lems. Sequences are no solution for Frege, however. For
sequences are “set-like", indeed, definable set-thecreti-
caily. Thus for the semantics to call upon sequences
would be for it to undercut the very philosophy of math-
ematics that was intended to be argued for through the
use of the logical notation. It is not clear whether
there is any way of providing an adequate semantics for
Frege s logic which at least s.ccord5 with the spirit of
his logicism. To Frege's idea of reducing arithmetic to
logic we return in the next section, in particular we
shall look at his philosophical attitude towards set
theory, lirst, let me repeat that the problems just con-
sidered are independent of those caused by Frege's deeming
functions insusceptible of singular reference; these
matters we return to in ($14 ).
$13. Classes, Concepts, and Consistency
In developing Frege's semantics v/e worked on the
assumption that such simple subject-predicate sentences
(t) 0% q.x0u ST
( )
pxno« a3e.,,
.ua.a^a^s XBuot.aTaa sx^, jo
•iCjBW 04. q.x0u ST :i0q.0j
sous:).U0s B^•:^
^©pTsuoo
•nq^ptOAP aapxaSoxXB aaa uox^Baniasun uaaSsag
JO aaouanbaauoo paiuPMun aoy,.at,« aaAo aq xxt« uaaauoo
oxjToads
.no a.aqM
OMJ^dn a,ax xiaqs a,,
-sasoexo pua oqdaouoo uo s.ugnov,
s.aSaaj to uoxasnosTp
.oMq.nj oq quxcd K.qua ua sa aapx
ST'« osn TTX^qs a«
..oasmok 'o.aH
.aouaquas apq jo q.ad
quaoxjxuSis a Jiasqx sa saouaquas sjaoxpajd-qoafqns aiduixs
JO axndoo TBUoxqxpa.q apq sqaa.q qaqq axsApaua
^a«-aa.Tuq
SujdoxaAap jo /Cjxxxqxssod aqq
.apxsuoo sn qaq
<i,S0ou0:;.U0s 9^'BOTp9ad~4.o0Cqns
JO EXsXxaua q.ad-OMq a jo uoxqdumssa auq SuxqoaCa. iCq
saxqxqua paqa.nqasun jo uoxqonpo.qux aqq pxoAa oq axqxssod
aq qx qp3xM •qsxM pxnoM a« sa uiaqq qnoqa j(xeq qouuao aAi
XJ a.add^ .oxqeaiaxqojd aaa sqdaouoo paqa.nqasun qons qng
•poqa.nqasun a.a sqdaouoo qaqq MaxA s.aSpjj oq paap uao
‘aAxqaqouap a.c suoxssa.dxa aqaxduiooux qaqq «sxa aqq qqxM
paxdnoo *uoxqdu;nasa sxqq «oq uaas SAaq a« puv -.ssa.qoa
sx ( ). pua .auar, (-S-o) ,snf .apxs oxisxnguxx aqq
uo ‘paXoxdiua 0m anxBA-qqn.xq SuxAaq ux paaoans qons «oq jo
qunoooB ua gutuiajj ux snqx
-squad quaoxjxuSxs OMq qsnC
aAaq
.uaoxxqnday a sx ag.oao, pua .ssajqoa ua sx auap, sa
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Plete expressions which flank it into a sentence, that
each of these three parts denotes something, and that the
doubly-incomplete expression has a doubly-unsaturated de-
notation. The suggested alternative is to try to make
something like this analysis work for such as
-Jane is an
actress- through treating
-is- as a two-place connecting
expression, but in such a way that unsaturated entities
sli*g no"t for*c6d upon us»
Let us assume that, if we treat the copula as denota-
tive, previous reasoning will lead us to the conclusion
that Its denotation is unsaturated, doubly-so. And it is
clear that Frege would have held that if the copula is to
be construed as a genuine relational expression, then it
must be thought of as denoting something. That is, if
the alternate analysis is otherwise acceptable, it requires
that we count the copula among the denoting expressions
of, for instance, 'Jane is an actress'. That this would
be his view is borne out by these remarks.
Somebody may think
. . . that there is no
need ao all to take account of such an un-
manageable
_
thing as what I call a concept;that one might
. , , regard an object'sfalling under a concept as a relation, in
wnich xhe s.ame thing could occur now as
object now as concept. The words 'object'
and 'concept; would then serve only to in-dicate the different positions in the re-lation. This may be done; but anybody who
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very
We have suggested that Frege had sufficient reason
to hold that, on his analysis, predicates denote, since
he was to quantify at the predicate place. And that such
quantification was essential to his logicist program, m
efieo., Frege developed a set tneory through quantifying
over concepts, indeed he maintained that this was the onlv
way one could intelligibly ascend into set theory. But
this reason for quantification, and so for the assumption
that predicative expressions such as •( ) is an actress'
have denotation, does not carry over to support the view
that on a three part parsing of subject-predicate sen-
tences the putative relational expression must denote.
For It seems that we gain no additional logical power
through quantifying at the position of the copula. Either
set theory arises independently of such quantification,
or not at all. So perhaps the copula need not denote,
and hence not denote something unsaturated*
But if we are to make out an alternative three-way
analysis, we shall have to explain, or make clear, what
It IS thax is denoted by such general terms as 'an actress'
and 'a Republican*. This, Frege would claim, we cannot
do, except through also assuming concepts. To understand
57* Ibid., PPo 5^-55
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Frege
-s thought on this will both clarify his thinking
on set theory and heip us to understand his cc.itnent
to concepts.
On the imagined alternative analysis, as applied to
•Jane is an actress',
'Jane' denotes Jane. 'ig. is
denotative; its semantic function lies in other than
having denotation. This aside, what of the remaining
piece of the new picture?
'An actress' denotes. But
What? (Of course this expression does not look much like
a name, but then neither does 'is an actress'.) clearly
an actress' does not denote an actress. Perhaps it de-
notes. collectively, all the actresses. But then presumably,
in like fashion, 'a two-headed actress', as in 'Jane is
a two-headed actress', denotes the two-headed actresses.
But since there are no such creatures, apparently there
is nothing for 'a two-headed actress' to denote. But
notice that if 'Jane' failed of denotation — suppose we
learn that there were really twins, only one of whom
appeared publicly at any time — we would probably say of
•Jane is an actress' that it failed of truth-value, and
so dropped off the stage of our concern. (This feeling
woula undoubtedly be enhanced if just one of the twins
was an actress.) While the fact that there are no two-
headed actresses does not incline us in the least to
suppose that 'Jane is a two-headed actress' lacks truth-
value*) On the contrary, it is straightforwardly false.
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So» since *Jane is a +wr»x Tiwo-headea actress • truth-value
a- is an aotres.- aces, if
-an actresa-
.as deno-
tation. then >a two-headed actress-
.ust as well. The
problem is that there does not see. to be anything for
It to denote*
Nowadays an answer is reTHiit- -r^IS adily forthcoming. Let such
general terms as are here ro-nvir-aA -t-qu ed to nav'e denotation
denote classes, and so. in particular,
-a two-headed
actress- will denote a class, the class that has no
members. How adequate a reply ia this? Well, what is
a class?
Fr-ege found discussions by his contemporaries full
Of mistake and confusion. There was psychologistic con-
fusion found in the talk of forming sets by abstraction,
or putting things together in the mind by a process of
attention, etc. There was failure to distinguish the
relation of an object falling under a concept (class
membership) from that of one concept falling within
another (class inclusion), and either of these from the
part-whole relation of one object to another. And ihere
were mistakes arising from failure to distinguish ade-
quately concept from object. Thus, for Instance, it was
not sufficiently recognized that whereas there could be
no non-self-consistent objects, there was nothing improper
about a self-contradictory concept. Hclated to this was
the attempt, by Schroder for instance, to by-pass concepts
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and consider t.e elements of a class as constituitive of
the class. This resulted in the situation that the idea
of the null class, the class without members, was unin-
telligible.^°
What of our contemporaries? Let us listen to one
Of the clearest. In his Set and Its Logic Quine
says, in the first paragraph of the introduction, that
this will be
wp ifpo-r. neip than hindrance unless
or colLctInfLre Ts"t"co“
displacement of 't^e obJec^sTand fur?ber-ha*
lecUon:'or'c^mblnaUon'‘on
awlon Ox objects just so long as 'agg^esa+e
'
-combination' is undfr-Stood strictly in the sense of 'class'. 59
It might seem that if Quine is not canceling out
with the last sentence all salient suggestions of the
first, the problem of the denotation of 'a two-headed
actress’ re-emerges, for the notion of an aggregate or
collection or combination of nothing is unintelligible.
And this, again, was Frege's primary objection to set
58.
o
Gruribf^esej^ $0. and "A Critical
Some Points in ii. Schroder's Algebra
Philosophical Writings
.
IhSL^^ and Its ^,gic, p. 1,
Elucidation of
der Logik ” in
59
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theory as hejcnew it. Thus Frege directs these words
againstSchroder* *
far^used iw we have sothe word, consists of obiect-- ?+
tLm" “ collective unity, of
jects vfnis^ when these ob-
Thus the'*’
thereby burn down theere can be no empty class.oS
+ei^e* oannot be an emoty class if wetake a class to be a collectiL or LtalTL
ti'iat, as the author savs
v?rtnei-®^
consists of individuals or indi-iduals make up the class.
But it is doubtful that in this we have an objection
to Quine, who did. we now remind ourselves, preface the
passage we have quoted with the claim that rt]he notion
of class is so fundamental to thought that we cannot
hope to define it in more fundamental terms •.^2
continues in his second paragraph to characterize this
nobion as Tollows*
tion n- articulate on the func-Ox the notion of class. Ima^.ine a
var^nMo something. Put a blank oriable where the thing is referred to.lou have no longer a sentence about that
but an open sentence, socalled, that may hold true of each of variousthings and oe lalse of others. Nov/ the
is sup-posed to be, in addition to the varioustnings 01 which that sentence is true, also
60. Philos ophical Writinf^s
. p. 89.
61. Ibid,
, p. 102.
• ^Gt Cheery
, p . 1
,
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Though the null class does not co.e in for explicit
T-ention in this passage, it does implicitly,
-x is a two-
headed actress' liKe any other open sentence determines
a class.
We must. Of course, take the talk of an open sentence
determining a class in its mathematical sense
. Quine does
not think that open sentences, or general terms, create
classes, since, among other reasons, classes outrun our
resources for talking about them.^^^ On this Frege agrees.
Since Quine, no more than Frege, construes classes as the
denotations of predicative expressions, perhaps it would
be best to say simply that for (most) every general term
(or open sentence) there is assumed an associated class,
though not conversely. (The parenthetical 'most' is a
hedge against Russell's paradox, which will remain off-
stage for now.) We can then go on, with Quine, and say
that if two general terms are true of just the same things,
the class associated with the one is just that associated
with the other.
Up to this point Quine’s classes and Frege’s extensions
^3. Ibi d.
.
p. 102.
64, See Set Theory
, p. 2.
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seem to run quite parallel. Co-extensive ox concept-words
3.re 3-ssoci3.t0Q wi xh —it the same oourse-of-values
. albeit
through the denoted concept. So it would seem that, up
to this point. Prege could have no complaint with Quine's
Class talk. Could we now treat Quine’s classes as the
denotations of general terms so as to serve the needs of
our alternative analysis without incurring Fregean ob-
jections?
Frege might well object that we still had not made
clear this nol;icn of class for fhc.t e follo'wing reason. A
class A and a class B are to be one and the same when
each is associated with a general term and the associated
terms are true of just the same things. But not only
When, since classes outrun general terms. So how are we
to express the desired extensionality condition generally?
In words, classes are identical when they have just the
same members. But here we qroav o-f o..iiez spe k of sameness of class in
terms of sameness of members, and now our concern refocuses
upon the latter notion, which is as yet unexplained. If
class A and class B are the same when they share their
members, then if neither has any members they share no
members i once again the null class is unintelligible.
Frege might have argued.
Since Frege’s set theory is developed within a
second-order logic, he can state the desired extension-
‘^lity condition for classes (extensions), and courses-
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of-values generally, with his Basic Law v.
-(x^(x)=x'>T(x))
= (~^0(a) =V(=1)).65
0 and
-V’ are variables ranging over one-place,
first-level concepts (and functions generally), including
those - or rather that - under which no object falls.
Whence the null class.
Now we
.ight expect a Quine to retort that one could
only think that the notion of a concept with an empty
extension is clearer than the notion of a class with no
members if he were clearer about what is a concept than
about what is a class. And just what is a concept? To
this Frege may reply that concepts are just a special case
of functions, and what a function is is clear enough.
Now Quine would agree that functions, as they are called
upon in classical mathematics, are unproblematic; they
are on a par with, and submit to much the same treatment
as, ordered pairs. What is problematic Quine might insist
is Frege’s insistence that functions, and so concepts,
are unsaturated. And if we then turn to ask why Frege
maintains this view we are taken back to our beginnings.
And led in something of a circle. For what initiated the
discussion of this section was the question of whether
65. Here I use the modi
exposition and have
this may be compare
in note 25 .
fied Fregean notation of our
ignored the asstrxion-sign;
d with the statement of BLV
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it would be possible to provide a relational analysis
Of such a sentence as Vane is an actress' in a way
would avoid commitment to unsaturated entities.
For us here the answer to this question turned on the
possibility Of construing (e.g.) the denotation of
-an
actress', in the example sentence, as a class, and in
such a way as to overcome the objection that on such a
view 'a unicorn', or 'a two-headed actress' would require
denotation, yet fail of it for want nr oXU l of an appropriate
class •
</hat IS at issue in our imagined exchange between
Frege and Quine is whether, as Quine contends, the notion
of class, or class-membership, is fundamental to thought.
The reason Frege gives for denying this, which we have
developed, is that it would render the notion of a null
class unintelligible. But this may be symptomatic. For
to hold that the notion of class was fundamental might
seem to commit us to viewing BLV as a synthetic a priori
truth (if a truth at all), and hence to commit us to the
sort of epistemological Platonism which I have urged we
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err in attributing to Frege,
Earlier ($4) i claimed that Frege regarded BLV (or
its instances) as containing alternative analyses of a
given Thought. Let me now offer some textual evidence
for this interpretation. In "Function and Concept" Frege
writes of the
"transformation" involved in BLV this way.
Vi'e have generallyi
x^-4x s= x(x-4)
whatever number we take for v tthis as follows, the function 'x.'xlh)
as the function x2-4^[.In the example^ we have not ort -r * • *
LHfthe funrti--n y/'v lae-of-values of
funoi^n^ y 2 "that of thecvion X
-4x, • and h.ere v/e have ar eouaJ’tvholding generally between courses-of-vl.ues!^7
Frege puts this equality, or identity, into his notation
this way,
(a) x(x^-4x) = x(x*(x-4)).
If we set (a) to the left of the identity sign while
66. However Quine is someone who both rnrards theof class as fundamental and i- no* inpi ii-f-rtn i e.+ T ‘w x. ciuu o t opaS 1 6m o 1 o£Tj ca 1
"wfne^r^n* Smart's assessment.
Platonism.5 need detenu on
, r ^ intuitions of a special intel-
t. tual realm. Such a Platonistic epistemolop-y can-
On?
squared^with a biological view of man,Quine s account we need no such non-erriDirical in-
vUitions, ( '’Quine’s Philosophy of Science",
19 (1968), p. 5.)
'
Writings, p. 26, (I have modifiedthe tianclation to standardize usage with Furth,}
191
putting on Its right side the universal closure of Frege’s
example,
(l>) (x)((x^-4x) = x(x-4)),
to its right, we thereby for. an instance of BLV.
Now how should we take Frege’s remark to the effect
that such a pair as (a) and (b) say the same thing? Frege
answers when he says, of his previous example, that
before Cit] in the same sense as
this expresses [aus_drbcken] the iam^sen^e
oat in a diff^FiTTt' way. U presentsthe sense as an equality holding
-^»nerallv^
is
newly introduced expression [fa) 1IS simply an equality, and its r’lrh-h ^
eaually its left --riP ??? xg t side and
complete in itselfto^’ something
Here we may assume that Frege is using ’sense’ and ’ex-
presses’ as he does in ’’Sense and Reference", which had
been written, though not published, at the time of this
address. Thus he is saying that such pairs as (a) and
(b) express the same Thought, though clearly they differ
in logical structure and ontology.
In GrundgeseJ^ itself we do not find such an ex-
plicit assertion that "instances" of BLV have the same
sense. But we do get explicit denial of this in the case
of a rather similar pair of sentences. Suppose we have a
function F which yields different values for different
arguments generally. Then if we apply this function to
P- 27.
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a "pair- of oourses-of-values we will get the same object
as value just in case the oourses-of-values are one, not
two* that is. the following sentences are true and false
togetheri
(i) F(x(Gx)) = F(x(Hx))
(ii) x(Gx) = x(Hx).
Where
-G. and are any one-place, first-level function-
names. Then, given BIV. (i) will also share truth-value
v/ith
(iii) (x)(Gx = Hx),
for any G and H. Having noted all this Frege makes it a
point to add. in a note, that
-this is not to say that
the senses [of (i) and (iii)] are the same. -69 u„der the
advocated interpretation Frege held that (ii) and (iii)
were the same in sense. That he does not deny it in this
context, provides some, indirect, support for this.
On the understanding here advocated, BLV was to pro-
vide Frege with the means of apprehending the objects of
arithmetic For numbers are to be gained set-theoretioallv.
and BLV gives us our sets. Sets (or classes, or extensions)
are not reducible to some other sort of entity. Nor can
discourse about sets be forgone in favor of more basic
discourse. Still, for Frege, the notion of class is not
an episxemologically fundamental one, at least not as
^9* Grundf’.esetze
, p. ^6
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compared with that of concept. For we are to gain it
through redistributing the content of an expression which
maxes mention of concepts but not classes. Here we may
recall our discussion of Frege's Grundl_agen example of
judgments concerning parallel lines and directions ($3,.
Directions are not reducible to other geometric entities,
nor talk of directions eliminable in favor of more basic
geometric discourse, still the concept of direction is
not. according to Frege, epistemologically on a par with
such a concept as that of one line being parallel to
another. Parallel lines, we might say, are geometrically
prior to their directions. It is an analogous vein that
I would "fca-ltGFlTG£r * *S UGrraTk +h'a-J-^ s remar tha^ uhG concept is logically
prior to its extension.”'^® And sirril'>rlvviiu o i fiixc.! y
, oUCh a rGinarX
as this
,
phrases of ordinary mathematicalterminology, the word 'function' certainly
corresponds to what I have here called the
+
^ function. But function,n the ot-nse oi the word employed here, isthe logically prior [notionj.^^
how I Wish to return to another theme of the earlier
discussion of Grundlap;en. As we read Frege, such
"definitions’* as
(A) NxFx =: NxGx iff the Fs equal the Gs,
?0. Philips ouhical Writin.^s
. p. 106«
* 1h i
d
.
,
p, B6, note.
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were methodologically unsatisfactory in that they did not
provide sharp toundaries for the introduced concept. In
Vol. II. Fnege expresses himself this way.
A defini-tion of a concept
. , . must hpcomplete! it must unambiguously determinp
«ny object. I.the/oTlll ITunden tlie concer't 4-' i_ j-.
us men, with our defective knowled|p>, thequestion m.ay not always be decidable^ We
the rnetaphorically as follows,concept must have a sharp boundary.W
He subsequently adds that
iust^-nc+hr” '"iddle is reallyj t a ot er lorm of the requirement thatthe concept should have a sharp boundary.Any object that you choose to take eith-^r
uodP^ concept 0 cr does not falln er it; xertium non datur » ^3
Further, it is instructive to see that this requirement
is equivalent to Frege's "basic principle" of Grund.reset 7.e
which we have already mentioned, the "principle that
every correctly formed name is to denote something.
.
a principle which, says Frege, "is essential for full
rigor.” For, if some concept-word denoted a concept
such that some object neither did nor did not fall under
the concept, then there would be sentences which fail of
denotation, and so are neither true nor false. If, on
the oxner hand, we had, for instance, a (one-place) concept-
72 .
73.
Ibid.
, p. 159,
Ihid.
, p, 159.
195
wor. an. a pnopen na.e, eac. o. wnic. succeeds in .enoUn.
but Which are such that the completion of the concept-
«ord by the proper name does not denote, i.e., denotes
neither the True nor the False, this would mean that the
ubiect denoted by the proper name neither did nor did not
fall under the concept denoted by the concept-word.
In Grimdcesette Frege sought to guarantee that all
concepts, of whatever level or degree, which can be de-
noted by primitive notation of Begriffsschrif t however
complexly put together, have sharp boundaries through
insuring that the "basic principle" was in force. His
approach was to insure that each of his eight primitive
names, each of them function-names, uniquely has denotation
and then to guarantee that the rules by which new names
may be formed from old ones pass this feature on. This
he set out to do in Seotions 28-31 of Grundgesetc-.o
. This
procedure was of considerable importance. For it is
reasonably clear that Frege's axioms would be true, if the
names of the Begriffsschrift univocally had denotation,
and likewise that the rules of inference would be truth-
presorvtng. Thus, to show that the "basic principle"
was in force would be to establish that the system of
logic of nrundgeset7£ was consistent. For no falsehood,
and hence no contradiction, could be forthcoming.
It seems clear that Frege held that a system of logic
mus ,, bo constructed in such a way that we can be certain
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fro. the outset that it is free fro. oontradiotioa.
in Grur>4Ia£en he had written that
rw\rt'he proorrl.iLfa"
are iu=tirted A ? definitions
our falli^ii 5 ^ afterthought, by
tion. By these''^e?hodrwe shal?°"a*'‘bo?:
general logical foundations of our scl’ence
For
Yet I know of no place where he indicates that his "basic
principle” was intended for this purpose, (still I feel
that this was the case. I am inclined to think that the
fact Russell
-s fateful letter evoked such a dramatic re-
action from Frege was due. in part, to F'rege’s believing
that he had proven that no such contradiction could
arise.) Since Frege’s logic is susceptible to Russell’s
paradox we know that Frege failed in his attempt to show
that Begriflsschrift names univocally denote. Not sur-
prisingly, the problem centers upon the notation for the
course-of-values of a function. In Section 31 "Our
simple names denote something" Frege errs in his attempt
?5, ^_undl_ago|>
, p. ix. Remember that with Grundgesetze.
axioni^j take up the ro.le of introducing ontology
which .QrjLmdl^^^ definitions had been allowed to
perform.
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to snow that his oourse-of-vaiues function-name yields a
denotation of an object whenever appropriately completed.
But I shall not here trouble to detail his procedure or
his mistake,
Russell s paradox dealt a severe blow to Frege's
logicism. It showpfi 4- •d ohaw the two sides” of BLV did not
express the same Thought, and so discredited a central
idea of the Grun^agen program, that which we focused upon
before ($3)» Reportedly Fre'^-e + rwr- +.I xj. eg later came to regard set
theory as an intellectual aberration.
$14. The Concept Horse and Consequences of Unsaturation
Let us review and recast our earlier discussion of
Frege's semantics of predication, which we saw to be a
major stepping stone to his general semantics.
We seek an account of the fact that such a sentence
as
Native Dancer is a horse
has truth-value. Wa assume that, in this case, the answer
IS to be framed, on tho linguistic side, just in terms of
the two (proper) parts. 'Native Dancer' and •( ) is a
horse'. Suppose then that we are led to regard both posi-
tions in our example sentence as open to quantification,
that each of the sentence parts denotes something. We
?6, See Dummetc, "Frege”, p. 22?,
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then encounter a conundru.. if entire contribution
Of each Of the two expressions to the fact that the sen-
tence has truth-value lies in each having denotation,
then the positions of our predication would be seman-
tically indistinguishable with the result that replacing
•( ) ie a horse- with
-Native Dancer- should be a sen-
tence, a bearer of truth-value. But this is not so.
Unsaturation is a solution. I'rege ruled that whereas
both singular terms and predicative expressions have de-
notation. the entities they denote are significantly
different, different enough that the denotation of one
type of expression cannot be denoted by expressions of
the other type. The denotations of predicates are in-
susceptible of singular reference. Correlatively, the
denotations of singular terms are insusceptible of pred-
icative reference. The difference in denoted entities
justifies the assumption of positions of two distinct
types in such simple predications as
-Native Dancer is a
horse *
•
Thinking of predications as resulting from names
completing predicative expressions, which are otherwise
incomplete, the denotations of predicates are spoken of
by Frege as analogously incomplete, or unsaturated.
Once sentences are construed as names of truth-
values, the denotations of predicates then are treated
as functions which always yield a truth-value as value.
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x.e., as concepts. Then predicative expressions, such
as •( ) is a horse', are said to he concept-words, that
IS. expressions which denote concepts.?? similarly,
singular terms, such as 'Native Dancer', are said to be
proper names, that is. expressions which denote objects.
Given this we may say that 'Native Dancer is a horse' is
truth-valued since 'Native Dancer- is a proper name and
•I ) IS a horse' is a concept-word. And so, the sentence
will actually be true if Native Dancer falls under the
concept jTojise, false, if it does not fall under this con-
cept. However, this last statement cannot be taken liter-
ally by the true Pregean. since it attempts, with the
phrase, 'the concept horse', to refer by means of a
singular term to a particular concept.
Discussions of Pregean unsaturation have tended to
savrthet'‘.j;cc"^ worth commenting upon here. Purth
cept' "a?= ^ntenLr^" ‘denotes a con-p . i nded to be related by that st'^i rt-ciot
and®2xnUca‘or..°^I?|“'"^ <=°r.nects expilcandum
Rnt +ho;':^ Denotation-, p. 22 .
)
.m, t'
- do not cover the same ground. In'
•The class each of whose members is a primris aprime
, or x(x is a prime) is a prime', the firs'-occurrence of • ( ) is a prime' is not p^edVL.-tive;the second is; yet at both places the exoressior
w?"h (e ^ suia?ioni^ .g.) That which is a father of Tom is alather of Tom', or '(Tx)(x is a father of To^) isTom'. In other words, predicates donot always occur predicatively, at least not in
t^hammar. And there is no reason to supposethat thought otherwise.
200
focus upon What has been called the paradox of the con-
cept horse. In "On Concept and Object" Frege responds
to remarks of Benno Kerry this way.
•th^con^er't^iir® following example.
ed', snd"thirlF^ai^+f easily attain-
art
' ^^inko
..hat the concept horrje isfact, one of the obTects th?tfall under the concept concent
.j«uite so; and the three wordr"* thJt^nciFt"^*horse; do designate an object, but or?ha*
^ery account they do not designate a oon-'”cept, as I am using the word. To
Apparently it is Frege's view that
(1) The concept horse is a concept
is false. False, since the object denoted by the first
three words is mapped by the denotation of ’( ) is a
concept' into the False. ^9 ^his is regarded as para-
doxical since the expression 'the concept horse ' has been
deo^gne_ explicitly for the use which, according to Frege,
it cannot perform.
Frege's reasons for denying that (1) is true come,
it should be clear, straight from the heart of his seman-
tics. It is perhaps less clear why Frege must claim
76
• igMlosophical Writings
, p. 45.
79 We might go so far as to say that (1) is logicallyfalse on^ i,he grounds that any sentence which resultsirom filling out the context ‘the concept—is a
concept' will be false. This would lead us to con-
strue 'the co.ncept horse ' as a complex singular
term^ formed througn completing a one-place,^ second-level function-name by a one-place, first-level
concept word.
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that (1) IS false. Both Dummett and Geaoh, in rather
different ways, have suggested that Frege need not say
this. Exploring these suggestions will serve to deepen
and round out our understanding of Frege's semantics, in
particular his semantics of predication.
Here is what Dummett has to say in his paper ''Frege
on Functions: A Reply".
unsuccessfullytried to overcome ... and which threaten‘d
theory, could have beenby adopting (to use well-worn
i
formal instead of the materialmode of speech. Most people would admit thatr-rege made clearer than anyone had donrbefoJe
difference in logicarro^foPwhat he callea proper names, concept-words,
second-level concept-words, and so on . . .bad confined himself to talking
abouo vnese various types of expres sion , in-stead of that for which they stood, the ap-pearance of paradox, the awkwardness of phras-ing# vhe resort to metaphor, which pervade
i^’^^bing would all have been avoided.
. .in the material mode of speech Frege was forcedinto such at least superficially contradictory
expressions as *the concept horse
concept*, 'the function x2 is~not“
not a
function* tbut when we are talking about'express ions^then we have no motive for denying the ob-
^be g^edicate * is a horse®vious fact that
is a predicate
What is Dum.mett saying? For one thing, he sees
Frege *s denial of (1) as a threat to "his whole system
Not that he regards this denial as capricious. If I
read him correctly he sees the "paradox" forced upon
80. Dummett, "Frege on Functions" in Kssavs on Fren-p.
p. 269.
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If
Frege for very much the reason I have suggested,®!
predicates, like singular terms, are denotative, their
denotations must differOlli significantly, if predication at
Its simplest is a two-party affair. Since Dummett sees
great value in the distinctions of frege-s grammar I take
it he accepts Frege’s parsing of (e.g.) ’Native Dancer is
a horse’. And so Dummett would trace Frege’s difficulty
to the claim that predicates denote, which he regards as
mistaken.
However the quoted passage seems to carry another mes-
sage. First, Dummett wants to say of. for instance,
(2) The concept-word ’( ) is a hors^’ is aconcept-word, xo
that this is unproblematical from Frege’s point of view.
In this regard he directs our attention to a note in
Which Frege says that
happens when we say asregaroo tne senoence **this rose is r-ed':The pammatical predicate ’is red’ belongsto the subject ’this rose’. Here the words
^Ihe grammatical predicate "is red"* are nota grammatical predicate but a subject.. Bvthe very act of explicitly calling it a ‘
„predicate, we deprive it of this property.
81
ite
thx.ng complete, i.e., an object, and thus cannot
stand I or anything incomplete like a relation; thisIS so by the definition of ‘object* and ‘relation*."
{ i'rege on functions", ^^s^ays cm Frcre
, p. 281.
^2. £]?ilc§^ixai Writings, p. 46, note, •
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But, claims Durnmett, Free:e norieg nad no reason to deny, for
instance, that
predicate *is a horse* i*, ^grammatical predicate. n s a
And no .ore does he have reason to deny the truth of (2).
Since (2;. lUte (3), 3^ unproblematic we nay have recourse
to it in place of the •superficially contradictory (1).
'
And similar shifts win avoid other problems, or apparent
problems, arising with "the material mode of speech".
This is Dummett’s idea.
It IS important for our understanding of Frege to
realize how mistaken this is. To this end. consider
(^) The concept“Word ) ic; o ^
concept horce!
‘ ^ “ ^orse- denotes the
For F. ege, this does not state that a (first-level) rela-
tion holds between a concept-word and a concept. It is
not. in this respect, similar to
-John loves Mary' which
does state that a particular relation holds between John
and Mary. It does not. since if it did then a concept
would be denoted by a proper name, which is impossible,
given Frege's account of predication. Now Dummett recog-
nizes this, and. as well, sees that Frege also recognized
this. But it is additionally the case that (k) does not
state the "intended" relation for the reason that tnis
would require a concept-word to be denoted by a singular
term, v,iz. 'the concept-word * ( ) is a horse", and this
too cannot be the case, given Frege's account of predi-
204
cation. This cannot be. since a concept-word, it is
explained, is an expression which denotes a concept.
Thus, (4) is equivalent to
And this implies
(6) The expression •( ) is a horse* denotes a
But if (6) were true a concept would be denoted by a
singular term, which we know is not possible. Within the
confines of Frege’s theory we can no more use a singular
term to refer to a concept-word than we can use one to
refer to a concept. What is insusceptible of singular
reference may be referred to only by what itself is like-
wise beyond the reach of singular terms.
We see then why if Frege was to call (1) false we
would expect him to say the same of (2). But what of
(3)? If the intended reference of ‘the grammatical
predicate 'is a horse*’ is the concept-word of ’Native
Dancer is a horse’ then since the expression ’the gram-
matical predicate ’is a horse” is a singular term. (3}
would be false for the same reason that (2) would bej
singular terms cannot denote concept-v/ords
.
83. A similar situation holds for senses* What denotes
oOmething unsaturated has as its sense something
unsaturated, which sense can only be expressed, or
denoted, by something itself insusceptible of
singular reference.
We must be careful to keeu mirr' ^ •nd tnat m speaking
of concept-v/ords
, and of ^expressions generally, we do not
na.G in mind various "mounds of ink", that is, certain
physical objects. Words get spoken and written down with
ink. Chalk, and so forth, but particular words are not to
be identified with particular configurations of sound
waves, chalk marks, or ^nk sootc: ^ i" • p ts. Any ink spot, however
configurated, can be pointed at by scneone in its vicinity.
This Frege does not deny. But wo might suppose that we
could in pointing at an ink spot point through it, by
What Quine calls deferred ostension,®'' to the word (if
any) written down with that ink. This Frege would deny
with respect to concept-words, and function-names gener-
ally. Though this requires qualification. To take an
example of Frege's, consider
(7) Trieste is no Vienna.
Here 'Trieste* is a proper name. 'Vienna* is not: it is
either a concept-word, or part of one. Though there are
other contexts in which 'Vienna* is a proper name,
for instance,
(8) Vierjna is no Trieste.
Expressions, at least in natural language, play parti-
cular semantical roles in particular contexts, and can
84. Quine, "Ontological xEelativity" in Ontological
Relativity, p. 40 .
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play one role in one olaoe an-^ ,
- another (or none at all)
in another. ^ This snr+ ^ -u*o t of ambiguity would be banished
a lingua eharaoteri ra .
Returning to Dummett, it should be clear that he
has seriously misappreciated the semantics of Frege’s
notation, at least as Frege understood it, he does not
sense how deeply ingrained in Frege’s thinking is the
phenomenon of unsaturation and the importance of this.
In this, however, he is hardly unique. 86 However, the
situation with Dummett is complicated by ihe fact that he
his own axe to grind on related matters. It is not
simply, as earlier suggested, that Dummett would reject
Frege’s view that predicative expressions have denotaticn.
Rather, it seems, Dummett would have us. while recognizing
the merits of Frege’s grammar, reject, not in detail, but
in conception. Frege’s truth-oriented semantics. With
this goes a rejection of the classical conception of
discusses concerns the sentences
ing s-ir
Venus’, and (ii) ’The morn-oa lo no other than Venus*. In ( i)
,
the evrrpc.Sion • IS* denotes the relation of idenui;i in (ViIt plays no independent semantical role, Lin^ a"non-deno native part of another expression whichdenotes the relation of jdertit” -’oo pwStv!
p. 44.
J-aen L^.. ,^ee IhUosojQ.h2^
86. For instance William Kneale says that ''[ilf we
aistinauish carefully between expressions and
about functions without
-tailing into Frege's perplexities...'
.0^ p, 622 .)
( opine nt• « •
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"tr'U'bh* t-viicM essay these must remain passing
remarks
.
Frege is committed, we have said. 'to the view that
concept-words, and function-names generally, are. like
functions, unsaturated. This suggests that function-names
speciax case of functions. And likewise that proper
names.^including sentences, are a special case of ob-
jects. Geach advances this suggestion.
-The sign of
a function”, he says, "is i^elf a function
, and not an
actual quotable expression! if so, it is futile to try to
make our
-function sign” to be a more intelligible term
than
-function-. -89
Frege in Dummett's way out*
87. See '•Truth.% especially pp. 55.56 .
88 . I'here is, however, the following problem t- ^ n
funct?o range of any first-leveT
instate- Tnoon‘,‘for
“ Argument for * ( J is prime *
. but weshould also be able to take\L moon its^iFas'^Lgu-
function. In the first case tS value
'Argument is the sentenceThe m-on is prime
. But what will it be ir thesecond case? And notice that whereas in the' flrs +
denotes
,h?
^^ere appears to be no analogous way in
Tn
the value yielded in the secondCc^se, i.n a manner consonant with Frege’s semantics.We cannot say, for instance, that the value of •( )IS prime^ for the moon as argument is such and suchan ODjeCk# lor this would be to treat a function,here a linguistic function, as admittiiig of singular
reference. <,And similar puzzles will come up with
senses.) ^
* > hree Ph ilosophers
, p. 147,
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Nonetheless Ceach feels that Frege could have avoided
claiming that (1) is false, and so at least this appear-
ance Of paradox. He would have Frege reject the idea
that such expressions as
-the concept horse ’ in (i) have
denotation. He suggests that just as
sentences with ’some man’ as their
matical subjects are not assertioL "about
a conopni stands neither foran object; where it is
The Idea is that, just as we, with Frege, regard the
structure of ’Some man is wise’ as made more explicit with
•Something is a man and is wise’, so (e.g.) ’The concept
am is realized’ can be, and should have been by Frege,
regarded as a sentence with the same logical properties
as ’Something is a man’. And as to the sentence ’The
concept hors.e is not a concept’, which Frege was prepared
to count true, it and other "sentences not exponibls in
some such innocent way
. . . may be regarded as non-
sensical. "9^ In another place Geach puts his thought this
^3.yt The concept horse * v/ould have to stand for a con~
cept if it stood for anything; in fact it does not, and
sentences in which it occurs are at best circumlocutory
(•'falls under the concept horse " = "is a horse") and at
90. ’Trege's urundlaf;en"
, in Essays cm t'rerCf p. 4??,
9-* Ibid.
, p, 4?7.
»
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worst philosophers* nonsense . "92
It goes with this view that such sentences as
Native Dancer is a horse
and
Native Dancer falls under the concept ho^
are just stylistic variants! they do not differ in any
way in their semantical properties, which are more per-
spicuously displayed in the former. A similar attitude
would be taiten by someone adopting Russell *3 theory of
descriptions with respect to such a pair as
The winged horse flies
it'’flieL°"^ winged horse and
Here the latter would be preferable on the grounds of
avoiding an inappropriate appearance of singular reference
to a particular object. When the offending appearance of
a singular term cannot be removed by a paraphrase Qeach
would have Frege count the containing sentence as non-
sense.
It must be granted, I believe, that Frege was com-
nuttcd to viewing certain occurrences of such expressions
as ‘the concept hor^* as non-denotative
. These are those
like the occurrence of *the concept hors e * in the phrase
•the extension of the concept horse *
.
My reasons for
92 » Three Philosophers
» p. 156.
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oxaiming tnis is that such phrases are represented in the
Begriffsschrift with course-of
-values notation by such
expressions as. J(x is a horse)
.
(See $9.) And this
contains no proper part which itself is a proper name.
Still Frege would, I think, have been disinclined to take
Geach-s advice. For one thing, Geach is assuming of such
sentence pairs as those lately discussed that if they
express the same Thought, then they are to be accorded
the same semantical accounting. But this is not a view
Frege accepts, his logicism requires its denial. 93 For
another, the appeal of Geach's suggestion for paraphrasing
out offending expressions will depend significantly on
being able, in this or some other way, to handle all the
problematic cases. But to deal with (1), and others,
Geach appeals to a doctrine of philosophers' nonsense.
It may be that Frege, even while recognising that much
of his expos itional discourse went irretrievably wide of
the mark, would have balked at the idea that it was
"philosophers * nonsense".^^
93 * ^ee also Philosophical Writings
. pp, 47-/49
94 Pl}.i^t.')sophers Geach offers Frege another solu-tion; this is to use such sentences as 'Horses are akind_ of thing* in place of the likes of (1). But it
IS difficult to see how Geach will put this in terms
of Frege's grammar in a way compatible
-with the truth
of, for instance, 'Unicorns are a kind of thing*. We
might try *(x)(x is a horse ri x is a horse)', but Idoubt wliet her Geach has this in mind, for, intuitively
speaJeing, there seems little sameness
-in meaning
between it and (1).
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Suppose Frege were not to adopt Geach’s advice and
continued to maintain that (1) „as false. The question
then arises as to what object 'the concept horse- denotes.
Frege, so far as I know, never discussed this question in
his published writings. This is particularly strange
since there is a natural candidate for the job. I sug-
gested earlier (in note 78 of this chapter) that if such
an expression as
the concept horse
is to be a proper name its logical structure is that of
a second-level function-name completed by a first-level
concept-word. And this is just the situation with
Begrifi sschrift expressions of the form
x(x IS a horse)
.
So the natural thought is to treat the former, problematic
proper name as denoting extensions of concepts; on this
suggestion the above two names would agree semantically
part for part.
Why did Frege not endorse, or even discuss, this
212
suggestxon?95
^here have been those who thought that
Frege
-s concepts were, like the attributes of more recent
literature, in greater supply than the classes associated
*.-ith them. If this were the case then expressions like
•the concept h^. could not (at least generally) denote
class6s« Two decade? a'^o Rninr- wxcti/.,^ KU-kon Hells was moved by this
c ons 1dorat i on to coin „ •V.O m the term
’concept-correlate* to
95. But perhaps in the juxtaposition ofpassages we do find what amounts to an sndiL'ement.
aiscussions one quite oftenneeds to assert something about a concept,and to express this in the form usual fo>"
asserted of the concept into the contend
lyp one wou^d expect that tne reference ofthe grammatical subject would be the con-'
cept; but the concept as such cannot olavthis part in view of its predicative na-''tuie; It must first be converted into an
object, or speaking more precisely, repre-
sented by an object. We designate this
object by prefixing the v/ords *the con-
cept*; e.g.:^ 'The concept man is not
empty. ( Philosophical Writiv^p-s.
pp. 46-47.1
It has been suggested
. , . that in fur-ther developments, instead of second-
level functions, we may employ first-level functions • * • this is made pos-
sible through ihe functions tha.t appear
as arguments of second-level functionsbeing represented by their cou.rses-oi-
values — though of course not in such
a way that they simply give their places
to them, for that is impossible.
( Grund^^esetze
. p. 92,)
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speak Of the denotations of the problem phrases. 9^
thfs ter. has enjoyed so.e ourrenoy. particularly with
Gustav Bergroann and his students. 9? However the ter. was
introduced under false pretences. As we have said earlier,
CO extensive predicates are co-denotative; thus no class
have
.ore t,han one concept associated with it.
If our suggestion were adopted, tagging along would
be certain bizarre consequences such as that the concept
ILOT-? Q is the class of horspci t -n oes. But I aoubt whether here
we find a reason for reticence on .-oge-e part. His account
of definite description has consequences such as that the
Winged horse is the class of horses. Though undoubtedly
aware of this, he advocated the view nonetheless.
As far as I can see the suggested identification is
perfectly coherent with Frege’s other views. But let us
not forget that all he gains in clai.ing that (e.g.)
'the concept horse’ denotes an object is an avoidance of
96.
97.
R.S. Wells, "Frege’s Ontology" in Essays on Frege
Gustav
Essays
spread
Carver
hence he had to suppose that each
.Dergmann, "Frege's Hidden Nominalism" in
^
The idea, however, is more wide-
;
ohe usage of this term. Thus Newton
says thaw even Frege wished to talk about
con-cept hdo a special object associated with it whichserves only as an object to talk about when we mean
("Subject and. Fredicate" in^dwards'^F^^;^^ Vol, 8
, pp. 36 - 37 .} And
"thri? ‘^e.Uars speaks of "the peculiar objects which,
talks aoout when one attempts
^
aiiout concepts," (S_cl g n_c_e, PerceDtion. andReality, p, 228, n. 1
.)
meaninglessness for the likes of (l). Por Frege is pre-
cluded by what he speaks of as "a kind of necessity of
language -98 literally what we all can feel
he wished to state. So our proposed identification,
wlii,l0 i ionlsss
>
is usGlesc; Por'ho—
,
bexess, Perhaps we may reflect
Frege’s attitude this way. Given that, for all his
philosophy, the concept h^rje could be a class it did not
matter what it was.
A couple of observations will serve the purposes of
summary. In all but his earliest writings Frege rigorous-
ly distinguished between the use and mention of expressions,
to use Quine’s terminology. He was, perhaps, the first
philosopher both to see the need for this and to minister
to It. It is thus somewhat ironical that, excepting pro-
per names, all expressions which play a semantical role
for Frege are, in isolation, unmentionable
. These include,
hesides predicative expressions, connectives, quantifiers,
indeed, all the primitive sjonbols of his Begriffsschrift
This is the first observation.
1 he second builds on the first. A legacy of Frege's
work is xhe notion of a formal system, with its method-
ological distinction between constructed system, object
99
9S» Phi losophical Writln.^s
. p. 54.
. The asserxion-s ign (and kiiidred expressions) may
be an exception to this.
99
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langu<ige Go-cailed, and me ta-language
. In the latter pro-
ceeds discourse about the system, including, of course,
directions for the construction of the system. One com-
mentator has gone so far as to call
-the distinction con-
tained in his work between formal language and meta-lan-
guage by means of which is accomplished the construction
of a given formal language," "the greatest merit of
Frege". 10° But from the point of view of Frege's semantics,
since the primitive symbols are unmentionable, formation
rules are unstatable. Thus in place of the distinction of
language and meta-language we are left with one between
literal language and metaphor. "I must confine myself to
hinting at what I have in mind by means of a metaphorical
expression ... I rely on my readers agreeing to meet me
haIf
-wav.
In Chapter II a conception of logic was set out under
which logic is to provide the grammar of a ( potent ialiy)
universal language. Attributing this conception to Frege
leads us to consider his Begriffsschrift as providing, in
intention, such a universal grammar, or at least a start
of one. But logic involves more than grammar. In Frege’s
mature thought laws of logic are called laws of truth.
Also in II, discussion of this idea led us to attribute
iOO, B-V. Birjukov, Tv/o Soviet Stud.i es on Frege, p. 44,
Philosophic al Writin-^s
, p. 11
5
,
101 .
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to Frege a oorception of logic on.er which logic provihes,
schematically, an answer to the question. How is truth
possible? It does this through our providing a referen-
tial. truth-oriented semantics for the grammar of logic.
Frege's semantics, in particular that of predication, has
been our concern in this chapter.
,Vhat has emerged is
that the semantics Frege provides for his logic seems to
place a limit upon the universality of his lingua. For
the semantics of the lingua cannot be stated within the
lin£!ia. Though we should not put the point in a way which
suggests that the semantics can be stated, just not in the
preferred notation of Begriffssohrift. For a "necessity
of language" blocks the expression of Frege's semantics;
we are confronted with an essential inadequacy of lan-
guage. We might sum up Frege's view hers this way. It
IS not possible to say how what we can say can be true.
The fact that Frege's semantics cannot be (literally)
stated consistent with its own import, what has been
called its self-referential inoonsistency.l<52
10
.ew,
to
"Frege's Theory of Incomoleteii.ntities
, ^ilosophv of
_Sc ience
, 32 (1965)*,
pp. 329-341; he terns this "fatai" to Frepe's vi
j
imilarly Sellars claims "it is reasonabledemand ox a philosophy that it be self-referentialiv
consistent; i.e-, that its claims be consistent withIts own
_ meaningfulness p let alone truth." (Science,
and p. 208.) Here SeHars"is“
speaking oi the Trac
t
atus , but would undoubtedly
^PPly such remarks to Frege's philosophy as well.
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widely taken to establish that something is
at least some portion of Frege
-s views must
or excised. Thus Dummett, having discussed
Ca.ttxm
.-hat ( 1 ) is false, concludes that
wrong, that
be given up
(e.g.) Frege's
(at first sight trivial) difficultvshows conclusively that the two pjrts ofrrege-s theory - the method of ?lassifvir^expressions into "proper names," first-'
'
and second-level conceot-words
, etc " anithe doctrine that each' of the"; kln^; ofexpression stands for something — v/ill notbang^J^ge^her; some modification is called^or,
Max Black speaks of "the disastrous consequences
the view that it is logically impossible to refer to a
• » of
function*'^^^ and adds.
if Frege's view implies
formulation of the view
no further refutation is
that the very
is nonsensical
neededo'b'^
f
William Kneale, having all so diplomatically mused that
pb.ilosopher is in a very awkwerd po-
he finds himself driven to saythat his thought cannot be expressed
adequately,
goes on to claim that Frege's situation "is due to a
defect in his theory of language • ^
^
103» Dummett, "Frege on Functions", pp, 282-283.
104. Black, "Frege on Functions", p, 242.
^^5* Ibid.
, p. 242.
106. Development of Logic
. pp. 50O- 5OI,
^^7* Ibid
.
, p. 501 .
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So much for sampling of negative reaction. Sub-
sequently I shall want to argue that the fact that Frege’s
semantics is subject to "self-referential inconsistency"
is not sufficient reason for rejecting his views, in whole
or in part. For. I shall argue, this situation is un-
avoidable
•
In the meantime there is a somewhat more internaly
and specific, objection that can be made against Frege's
semantics. The unmentionability and inexpressibility
problems trace to the presence of unsaturation in the
Fregean scheme of things. Unsaturation in turn, is in-
duced through the assumption that predicative expressions
relate to items of what there is in a fashion analogous
to thau of singular terms. But, we may object, the effect
produced by unsaturation strains to the point of breakage
the analogy which leads to its appearance. The denotation
relation between a proper name and its denotation is a
two-place, first- level (semantical) relation taking as
arguments a pair of objects, typically a linguistic ob-
ject and a non-linguistic object. Whereas the denotation
relation of a (one-place) concept-v/ord and its denotation
is a two-place, second- level (semantical) relation taking
as arguments a pair of (one-place) first-level functions,
typically a linguistic furiction and a non-linguistic
function
.
For want of common terms of comparison the
vVe
analogy between these modes of reference breaks
might conclude that Frege’s account of predicat
withstand the breakdown of this analogy.
108. Much this point was made to me by Kugly.
108
on cannot
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. . .on thorough investigation
the obstacle is essential, and f
oi our language;
it will be found that
ounded on the nature
FREGE
CHAPTER IV
UNSATURATION t AN ASSESSMENT
$15. Names, Sentences, Horizontals* and Assertions
We shall begin here by reviewing once more the rea-
soning which leads, with some plausibility, to the con-
clusions that arithmetic functions are unsaturated and in
parallel manner to the conclusion that concepts are un-
saturated.
Taking the example ’ 2 +3 * and assuming that, seman-
tically speaking, its (proper) parts are * 2 ’ and ’( )+3*
— this involves the previous simplifying assumption —
we begin by stating that *2+3
* is a name of an object,
viz., the number five. '2* also names an object, and we
assume that it is through this that it makes its contribu-
tion to the fact that * 2 +3 * has denotation. What of
( ) *^3 ? If it denotes an object, then that object has,
or can be provided with, a proper name, so that, if the
contribution of *( )+3* to the fact that *2+3* has deno-
tafcioii lj.6;s in this fact, i.e., that '( )*>*3' denotes an
object, then replacing ’( )+3', in *2+3', with a proper
name of the denoted object would not affect the semantic
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Character of the larger expression, i.e., the result of
replacement would, lihe .2+3.. be a (complex) name, in-
deed it would, in this case, denote the number five. But
this is not so; replacing •( )43. with a proper name does
not leave a (complex) proper name. Therefore, we con-
clude that •( )+3* does not denote an object. (At least
that that is not the (sole) source of its contribution to
the fact that *2+3* has denotation.)
In much the same way, taking the sentence ‘Jane is
an actress* and assuming that its (proper) semantical
parts are *Jane* and •( ) is an actress*, we say that
•Jane* is a name. In this, we assume, lies its contri-
bution to the fact that *Jane is an actress' has truth-
value. What then of •( ) is an actress*? If it, like
•Jane*, denotes an object, then that object has, or can
be provided with, a proper name, so that, if the contri-
bution of *( ) is an actress* to the fact that *Jane is
an actress* has truth-value lies in this fact, i.e., that
’( ) is an actress* denotes an object, then replacing
( ) is an actress', in *Jane is an actress*, v;ith a pro-
per name of the denotation of * ( ) is an actress* would
not affect the semantic character of the containing ex-
pressi.on, i.e., the result of replacement would, like
Jane is an actress*, be a sentence, indeed one v/hich,
like 'Jane is an actress', would be true. But this is
no u so; replacing *( ) is an actress* with a proper name
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does not leave a sentence. Therefore, we conclude that
( ) is an actress* does not denote an object, or at
least that that is not the (sole) source of its contri-
bution to the fact that *Jane is an actress* has truth-
value.
In these reasonings we employ the ideas of object
and name of object, i.e., proper name, and it might be
objected that we have nowhere explained them. But this
is not quite correct. What we did, previously ($11), was
to begin with certain words and things, and speak of such
words naming, or denoting, such things. We subsequently
roamed over portions of our language — or imagined such
roamings —
— collecting together other words which struck
us as suitably similar to those begun with. And then
thought of these on the model of the first as denoting
objects. Thus we increased the extension of the denota-
tion relation at both ends; v/e gained more objects and
more names of such. By such linguistic bootstrapping we
moved tcv/ards the general idea of an expression denoting
an object, which, once in hand, v/e then used to explain
proper names as just such expressions. To concede a
point, explaj.n the idea of (e.g.) proper name, for in-
stance, we perhaps have not donee But if not, then
explanation is not possible here. This situation should
be likened to that of our inability to provide an expla-
nation of negation, for instance, on account of the problem
1
223
of circularity.^
Returning to our examples, what shall we say is the
semantic function of ( )+3.. on the one hand, and •( )
is an actress* on the other? We may regard the earlier
reasoning as establishing this much. If such expressions
are to have denotations accorded them, their denotations
must differ essentially from objects, the (possible)
denotations of proper names. This was Frege’s position.
For reasons stemming from his logicism Frege counted
predicative expressions as denotative, and drew our con-
clusion that concepts, the denotations of predicates, are
unsaturatea, this being their essential difference from
objects. Similarly, for functional expressions and func-
tions, A result of this is that sentences get classed as
a species of complex proper name.
This conclusion seems to present a problem, one we
have thus far passed by. If (e.g.) •Jane is an actress*
itself denotes an object, then should it not be the case
that it and (e.g.) *Jane* are intersubstitutable? And
if they are not, then should we not conclude, by parity
of reasoning, that sentences do not denote objects? Yet
sentences must denote objects if predicates denote func-
tions. There is, I believe, a wide-spread suspicion that
Frege s semantics harbors a contradiction in this area.
1* See Quine, Philosophy p_f Lo/yjc
, p, 40. .
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The principles which (in the context of certain assump-
tions) lead to the conclusion that the denotations of
predicates are insusceptible of singular reference also
(in the context of similar assumptions) lead — so runs
the suspicion — to the conclusion that the denotations of
sentences are likewise beyond the reach of singular terms.
Yet Frege maintained that sentences are proper names, a
thesis which cannot be given up without ur,raveling the
whole semantics.
Black has voiced this thought this way.
The following argument seems to me tc be
a sufficient refutation of Frege’s view that
sentences are designations of truth-values.
We may assume that if A and B are designa-
tions of the same thing the substitution of
for the other in any declarative sentence
^isver result in nonsense. This assump-
tion would not have been questioned by Frege.
Let A be the sentence “Three is prime” and B
the expression ’’the True". Now “if three is
pr.lme then three has no factors” is a sen-
sible declarative sentence; substitute B for
A and we get the nonsense “If the True then
three has no factors” . . . Hence, according
to our assumption A and B are not designa-
tions of the same^thing — which is v/hat we
set out to prove.
Black here argues that if ’Three is prime* is true it
would, on Frege’s view, be co-denotative with ’the True*.
But since two expressions which have the same denotation
are intorsubstitutable, such expressions as ’If the True
then three has no factors’ should make sense. Since they
2. Black, “Frege on P'unctions”, pp. 229-230.
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do not. Frege is wrong in his view that sentences denote.
Black assumes that Free-e woninx-x g uld not question the
principle that co-denotative expressions are intersub-
stitutahle without going from sense to nonsense. 1 agree,
but wish to so further and attribute a somewhat broader
principle to Frege. The intuitive idea is that expressions
which make the same semantic contribution to containing
expressions are so intersubstitutable, classes of such
expressions comprise, we may say. semantic categories.
1 can provide no general characterization of the idea of
same semantic contribution, or semantic category. How-
ever proper names should comprise one such category, on
Frege's semantics. Thus the broader principle requirss
that any name of an object can replace any other name of
an object, so occurring, preserving nonsenselessness, these
exchanges not being limited to the oo-denotative. So also
first-level function-names of like polyadicity should
comprise semantic categories. Similarly with second-
level function-names j and so forth. We may state this
general semantical principle (G3P) this way.
If and/- are expressions of the same
semantical category, then the result - •
with - in any e.xpression
0 '^ill he of the same semantical category
as •
The idea this principle aims to capture is an old one,
one which guides Plato in the Sophist I should say. More
to the point of this essay's interests, adherence to this
226
principle is required by the philosophy of logic we have
attributed to Frege ($8). if „e see ourselves as attempt-
ing to say how truth is possible through spelling out how
words relate to the world, then we must suppose that ex-
pressions which bear the same semantical relations to the
same (ontological) sorts of worldly items are making the
same type of semantical contribution to wholes which have
them as (semantical) parts and so can replace one another
preserving the semantical character of the wholes
• That
Frege came to hold that functions are unsaturated I take
to confirm that he was guided by our GSP. But what then
of Black's charge that Frege was wrong on his own princi-
ples to maintain that sentences denote objects? I want
to show that Frege has a reply to the reasoning Black
employs, one which leans heavily on the peculiar function-
name, the horizontal. Still in all, Frege's semantics
does violate our GSP, indeed violate it wholesale, and
the source of the problems does lie with the view that
sentences are denotative. But when we get a better over-
all view of the lay of the land I think we shall not be
inclined to see in such violations a rejection by Frege
of the general semantical principle. Nor shall we find
reason to retract our attribution to him of the philosophy
of logic of ($8),
First let us see hov/ Frege can reply to Black's
objection? here we shall use the example
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(1)
Theaetetus sits only if Plato flies.
In this we cannot, we might suppose, replace
-Theaetetus
sits- with
-Theaetetus- while saving the semantical
character of the containing expression. Certainly the
result
(2)
Theaetetus only if Plato flies
is not grammatical. However I shall argue that, in this
case, the failure of grammaticality is rather incidental,
at least for thoroughgoing Fregeans.
Let us remind ourselves that (1) would go into
Begriffsschrift notation this way.
(3) Flies
’(Plato)
^^^S(Theaetetus)
•
The vertical is Frege’s condition-stroke to which the
horizontal is attached at three places. And let us remark
again on certain differences between the Fregean (3) and.
for instance,
SitS(^heaetetus) Plato)
as standardly understood. First, whereas both »|’ and
Z) * express truth-function conditionality, Frege’s sign
is a two-place, first-level function-name denoting a func-
tion which takes any object as an argument, not just truth-
values. The horseshoe is most typically considered as
non—denotative
, and, whether sentences are treated as
names or not, only sentences are allowed to complete it
to a sentence.
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More importantly, Frege's ( 3 ) differs from the above
in that the horisontal is counted as a piece of notation
on a par with the condition-stroke. It too is a function-
name; it denotes a function which yields the True when
its argument is the True, and yields the False when any
complete denotation other than the True is its argument.
Thus A will denote a truth-value provided only that
c< denotes an object» any object*
Holding onto these reminders, we may formulate our
understanding of (3) by saying that it is true (denotes
the True) Just in case if —
. aenotes
the True, which it will Just if ’Sits. ' senotes
the True, then ' aenotls th^ ru:! which
it will just ix
^^^®®(piato) * also. Or somev/hat
more simply, (3) is true under just these conditionsj
Either *Flies^-,^ v • denotes the True, or *SitSy«.(Theaetetus
does not (i.e*, denotes something other than the True.)
For Frege such remarks render our understanding of (3),
lor, by our stipulations it is determined under what
conditions the name denotes the True. [And t]he sense
of this name — the Thought — is the thought that these
conditions are fulfilled. To understand under what
conditions a sentence would be true, its truth-conditions,
is to grasp its sense, the Thought which it expresses.
3 * Grundgesetze , p. 90.
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Now suppose we replace, in (3), ’Sits,^^ .
•Theaetetus' to get
heaetetus)
(-O
-J-
*
— Theaetetus.
Do we undetstand the truth-conditions of this? Yes.
(4) is true just in case if
—Theaetetus- denotes the
True then
• does also. Alternatively put,
is true just when either
• denotes the
True or ’Theaetetus* does not. And so we know that (4)
is true, since we know ’Theaetetus* to denote other than
the Irue, But this is by the way. Of importance is the
fact that, as Fregeans, since we understand the truth-
conditions of (4) we grasp the Thought which it expresses,
-or thciu IS the txiought that these conditions are fulfilled.
Now we wish to use these observations to answer
Black’s objection. I take our task to be to show how to
render the likes of (4) into recognizable English. We
knoy^ (2) will not do, since it is ungrammatical and hence
not fit to e-wxpress the Thought of (4). But a suggestion
Oj. Dummett’s, made in the course of brushing aside the
argument of Black’s under consideration, is relevant here.
If sentences stand for truth-values, but
there are also expressions standing for
truth-values whicl'i are not sentences, then
the objection to allowing expressions of
the latter Kind to stand
-vherever sentences
can stand a.nd V2.ee versa is grammatical,
not logical. V.'& often use the word ’thing*
to provide a noun where gramma.r demand.^
one and we have only an adjective, e.g..
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•That was a disgraceful thing tc do'! andwe could introduce a verb, sav +
Of^co^^
purely grammatical function
**
o nverting a noun standing for a truth-value into a sentence standing for thesame truth-value.^ ^
Applying Dummett-s suggestion to an example of his. we
would turn the ungrammatical construction 'If oysters are
inedible, then the False* into something we can. with good
Crammatical conscience, count among our English grammat-
ical constructions, namely, 'if oysters are inedible, then
the False trues*.
On first reflection it might seem that Dunmetfs
suggestion would not be applicable to our problem with (2)
since with *Theaetetus only if Plato flies* we have no
noun standing for a truth-value" which v/e could convert
"into a sentence standing for the same truth-value . " We
do have ’Theaetetus
* , but this, we assume, denotes
Theaetetus, and not some truth-value. And it would de-
feat our purpose to think that this expression had some-
how shifted its denotation. For the point of this exercise
is, as we may put it, to see how to deferid the claim that
when (e.g.) Iheaetetus
* , with its sense and reference,
replaces a sentence the result expresses a Thought,
Upon second reflection, however, it should occur to
us that there is no reason not to extend (if that is what
Dummett, "Truth", pp. 49-50.
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we do) Dunn^etf s suggestion to apply to the general case.
Our situation is that of having a Thought, that expressed
by W. to render in a recognizably English sentence.
Why not employ Dunnetfs device to tailor the nongrammati-
cal (2) to our needs thusi Theaetetus trues only if Plato
flies. It mist be admitted that this is somewhat altered
English. But then we might expect some grammatical
adjustments to follow in the wake of looking upon sentences
as denoting expressions. The suggested adjustment is to
allow (or require) that a singular term "grow a verb"
when replacing a sentence. Such an adjustment is merely
grammatical. We must keep in mind that the expression
which occupies the sentential position, the singular term
with Its attendant ’’verb’*, has the same sense and denota-
tion as that we have (or may have) substituted, (e.g.)
•Theaetetus’; ‘^growing a verb'* in no way affects the sense
or denotation of the substituted singular term. Such,
then, IS the defense I would have Frege offer against the
criticism of Black.
We have just seen how such a problematic case as
that of (2) can be made sense of* But remarks made thus
far may not make apparent why Frege’s horizontal is
essencial to the line of reply I am offering to the
charge of inconsistency. This since it is possible to
treat tne condition-stroke in such a way as to avoid the
need for its pair ol trailing horizoritalf}
. Qn Frege’s
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understanding' — /•7 ; „
j
Cienotes the True
L«,^
does not denote the True or /? does.
just in case either
and if we interpret
the condition-stroke just this way we need not attach
any notational significance to either of the trailing
horizontal strokes) they become
.just pieces of punotua
tion. (And similar observations can 'oe made of the
negation-stroke
,
)
But there will remain the "limiting case" where, to
move back into English, a singular term is substituted
for a sentence which is not itself a truth-functional
component of a larger sentence. What do we say of the
result of substituting for (l)
Adopting Dumpiett*s grammatical
, in entirety, *Theaetetus *
?
convention the result will
read* Theaetetus trues. But what 'Thought is thereby
expressed? If we think of such substitutions as pro-
ceeding within a suppressed initial horizontal, then we
may say, generally, that trues* will be true when
denotes the True, false when u denotes other than the
True. The Thought expressed is thus that this condition
is fulfilled where is
•Theaetetus* denotes the
’Theaetetus*, that, in other words.
True. And recalling a remark of
($9)» a Fregean can make explicit the presumed implicit
English horizontal'* with the phrase *i't is the case that*;
thus we may render (4) as* It is the case that Theaetetus
trues
«
We have considered interpreting the results of a
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sentence being replaced by a proper name. For complete-
ness we need to consider what we shall say of the results
Of a reverse substitution, for instance,
(5) Theaetetus sits sits,
in whicn the sentence 'Theaetetus sits* replaces
’Theaetetus* in 'Theaetetus sits’? What sense can we
make of this? As Frege understands the construction of
predication, a most simple predication is true just when
the function denoted by the predicate yields the True as
value for the denotation of the proper name as argument.
When we think of 'Theaetetus sits' as itself an expression
which denotes an object then the Thought in question is
that the function denoted by • ( ) sits' takes the denote.-*
tion of 'Theaetetus sits' into the True. This is the
Thought which (5) would express were it grammatical, and.
so eligible to express a Thought. Is it grammatical? If
the foregoing has had its intended effect this question
will not strike us as terribly important from the point
of view of present concerns. If (5) is not grammatical,
let us ’’punctuate" it, perhaps with a sprinkling of
hyphens or parentheses, so as to render it graTninatically
acceptable to us. Once again our position, if we are
Iregeans in our semantics, is one of grasping a certain
Thought which is (perhaps) not readily expressible in the
confines of received English. (This would not be the
only place v&icre Frege’s theory had an impact on Fnglish
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constructions; think of the phraseology we accept in
rendering quantifications, or negations, for that matter,
back into our mother tongue.) But again, such altera-
tions as attend the expression of these thoughts are
•’meaning neutral", vve might compare them in this respect
with the grammatical adjustment of the ungrammatical
•Some cow are bro-wn- to the grammatically acceptable
•Some cows are brown*.
Summing up. the point of the last several pages is
that Frege's semantics is not shown to be incompatible
with the general semantical principle by the line of
reasoning Black sets out. We mobilized Frege’s hori-
zontal to this purpose. Let us look further at this piece
of notation.
The presence of the horizontal in the notation as
laid out in is puzzling. V/hat v/ork does it
do? Why does Prege include it? Is this simply a case of
a piece of machinery held over from Begrif fs s-chrift which,
hav.lng 'oeen stripped of its earlier function, had to be
supplied with some explanation? Our response to Black
perhaps provides something of an ansv/er. For there is a
natuial iiicli.nation to treat sentences as comprising a
semantic category.-^ Indeed this v/ould seem to be required
5 » And in effect we have earlier. On this see note 13,below.
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by Frege's Dictum. This category disappears once sen-
tences are construed semantically as a case of complex
prop_r nam.es. The inclusion, or retention, of the hori-
zontal, w.ith its Grundgesetze explanation, provides at
least the semblance of a class of sentences. For we may
think of all ordinary sentences as simply having 'it is
the case that’ as a suppressed prefix so that the results
of substituting ordinary names for ordinary sentences get
accommodated
.into an expanded class of "sentences" along
the lines sketched out in reply to Black. ^ Thus we may
see Begriffsschrift formulas and their natural language
translations as forming a kind of surrogate-sentence class,
the class of horizontals .
However our maneuver does not serve to square Frege’s
semantics with our general semantical principle, for the
class of horizontals does not itself comprise a semantic
6* If we do not think of English sentences as having
a suppressed initial horizontal, then we shall en-
counter the following situation. There will be
expressions which we shall not be able to determine
whether or not they are ?iarnes of truth-values
, evenknowing of their (proper) parts whether these are
truth-value names. Consider *(Tx)(x=:3 or x~R)’.
If *S* and *R* are co-denotative
, then the whole
expression denotes either the True or the i’alse.
But if 'S* and *R* are not co-denctative
, then(on Freege’s convention) the whole denotes the
class whose members are the True and the False.
So we cannot determine v^hether the whole denotes
a truth-value, or as we might also say, whether
it expresses a Thought, except by determining if
*S* and *R* are alike in truth- value.
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category, since for every member of this class there are
other, co-denotative. expressions themselves not hori-
zontals. Thus, let S be any surrogate-sentence, then
•(Tx)(x=S)- denotes what S does but. lacking as it does
an initial horizontal, it is not itself a surrogate-
sentence. The sane is true of •(Tx)((x=S) and S)’t and
so forth. Any such expression may be replaced by a
horizontal, saving semantical character, but not con-
veroely. And generally, a horizontal may replace a proper
name, saving semantical character, but not conversely.
The horizontal-stroke performs the suggested role of
fc-niing a Gurrogate-sentence olars through giving sense to
the results of replacing sentences, naturally taken, by
names, naturally taken, the semantics of the horizontal
provides Thoughts for such replacements to express. But
it can do this only at the cost of its own immovability
from the position of initial prefix to Begriffsschrift
formulas.'' So it is that the class of horizontals does
not comprise a semantic category.
So it is also that the class of proper naraes^ which
incluaea truth~value names# is not a semantic category.
7 It could# with justice# be pointed out that in Frege*
grammar the signs for both negation and condition-
ality suffer a similar syntactic immovability.
The difference is that there is no external require-
ment fox'" thi.s in their case as there is with the
horizontal.
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And for similar reasons one-place, first-level func-
tion-names do not form a semantic category. The horizon-
tal IS such a function-name, and while it may replace
any similar funotion-r.ame, saving semantical character,
the converse does not hold*
Indeed, for similar reaso/is, it follows that Frege's
semantics of Begriffsschrift flouts the general semantical
principle at every turn} his semantics admits of no seman-
tic categories* By picking an appropriate Begriffsschrift
formula and making an appropriate deletion of some name
or names, we can display a function-name of any particular
level and degree; this name may then replace others of
like level and degree, but not conversely. As an example,
take the Begriffsschrift translation of 'Everything sits*.
and delete
*Sits^
^
®
Sits (a)’
the one-place, first-level
This leaves the one-place.
function-name
second-level func-
tion-name.
where
, as before, is a place-holder* This may replace
any other similar function-name, but other ouch function-
names may not, in general, replace it in the above. For
instance it cannot be replaced, saving semantical char-
acter (or in conformity with Frege's syntax), by the
similar course- of-values notation,
Frege's semantics is in complete violation of our
^
^ euided by
.so„,e suchincxple xn bis semantics. For we can look at this
situation this way. Deeming sentences denotative seeming-
y induces failures of substitution. The horizontal
serves to localize these violations so that failure of
substitution occurs onlv at +v>d- •y the horizontal. Unfortunately
such failure is infectiosic; +V i.xmc ious, and the horizontal touches
expressions oi all would-be semantic categories. So the
Whole system suffers the disease, looked at this way the
wholesale violation of the GSP may be seen as resulting
from an attempt to handle the more blatant violations of
this principle brought on by counting sentences as names.
Still we should emphasize that since in the end
frege-s semantics is devoid of semantic categories, there
is in particular no such category whose rsembers are dis-
tinctively concerned with truth. Frege then has not given
us a lingua with respect to which we might entertain the
Idea of answering our question 'How is truth possible?*
in the ostensive fashion previously considered. For such
an answer - “These ways" - would seem to presuppose
that forms therewith indicated, or all lexical fleshings
out of them, possess a distinctive semantical character,
the character possessed by those linguistic items at
which we may sensibly direct the queryi Is it true?
Again we observe that this situation results from holding
that sentences are proper names. I would have us see
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how "this* in "tho PnH ;e d, IS incompatible wi+v» o «
,
o Dx W th a conceptioniw.
p.« «=„„ibi. ,„
the first place. Here we may find a »'e''-o7> f +• •0^ j-xna ^e^s n
.for thinking
that move to be mistaken.
There is another, somewhat subtle, difficulty which
results from the inclusion of the horizontal in the
system of C-rundges^. Tahe, for instance, the truism
that the disjunction of a truth with itself is a truth.
We would expect a system of logic such as Frege's to
encompass this, perhaps through showir^ by some means or
other that a self-disjunction
Si
is true just in case itself is true. However there is
a clear sense in which Begriffsschrift is incompetent to
this task. And the inadequacy in no way turns upon the
lack of a (primitive) symbol for disjunction, which we
may suppose is present. The problem is that a self-
dis junction, like all disjunctions, has a symbol for
disjunction as its main (truth-functional) connective,
and^no Begriffsschrift formula can be so structured. Since
all Begriff.sschrift formulas lead off with the horizon-
tal, it will always be the main connective.
V/e may put the same point in terms of a mode of
inference. To move to a conclusion by modus ponens we
require two premisses; one is a conditional which has as
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It.
„„„„ „
,,,
^
noequent that of the conclusion. But since no
Begriffsschrxft formula will be a conditional, that is, aformula whose main connective is a -irm Prtxw o gn for condition-
ality* no Be£:ri^f<^«?f'hr"5
-f+sn.^oocn iit nioves can bo made in accordance
with modus ponens, at least Pd •. x o as this is intuitively under-
stood. Similar problems affect (f'’i'«?-+^ nr»-i-»yt.\ixtruo vi^ist-o der) quantifi-
cational rulec, and so forth, since, as suggested, the
presence of the horizontal i„ £rund^_^e^ reflects the
dccxsion to count sentences as names, in the inadequacy
Of Begriffsschrift to intuitive logic we may find a
second reason for rejecting that decision.
Curiously, thxs problem of capturing intuitive logic
turns up in CBjndgeset^ „ot just once, but twice over.
Recall that the Basic Laws (axioms), and so too the
theorems, of Grun^esetze are not themselves names of
anything. They are expressions wherein the assertion-
sign prefixes a proper name. Equivalently described, they
are expressions wherein the judgment-stroke prefixes a
horizontal. Such expressions we might naturally call
assi^ions.® (But remember we speak of strings of symbols
of Frege's system, not speech acts or the like.) Since
the assertion-sign can only occur in a left-most position.
8 . In ($9)
sitions
.
vt-e followed Furth in calling them propo
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we cannot, for instance, truth-functionally compound
assertions. Hence the problems just noticed with hori-
zontals attend assertions also.
Assertions are problematic in other ways. Since an
assertion of Begriffsschrift is a law of logic it must be
trues laws of logic are laws of truth. But now consider
the fact that cf some linguistic items it is appropriate
to say that the truth-value of the whole is a function of
the truth- values of the parts. This requires that we be
able to speak in one breath of wholes and their parts as
being true or false. But this is not so with assertions.
The sense in which an assertion is true cannot be that in
Which any of its parts may be. For an assertion cannot
contain an assertion as a (proper) part. And. whereas
truth-valued parts of assertions are names of truth-values,
an assertion is not a name.^
It seeias that Frege has, or owes us, two theories
Of truth, both at the level of linguistic artifact. One
in terms of semantical relations between words and things,
this IS well arxiculated. And another which discusses how
truth-value accrues to such non-names as assertions, this
we do not get. Further we would like to know, for instance.
And w nave similar problems with derivations. Rulesof inference are officially stated for assertions, taut,
xoi .instance, when Frege derives Russell's paraaox
pp* 130-132) he civoids using formulas
with a prefixed assertion-sign.
1. 1
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the True.
Further, we may wish to ask of some theorem of
Begriffsschrifti I3 it tmev » .* X ru .' And do so even knowin?
that it is a theorem. But it seems that Frege precludes
this, for to do so we would have to be able to consider
an assertion non-assertively.
I do not wish to pursue further the topic of Frege
on assertion except to reim-ri- +h--s- •i a k that it 13 not imiplausible
that the assertion-sign, like the horizontal, found its
v.-ay into the Gjiundgesetze system in part at least under
the felt pressure to recoup what gets lost when we lose
senteiices as a semantical category. I*’ Here we may find
further reason to judge mistaken the treating of sentences
as names.
We Shall now return to Frege’s philosophy of logic
as earlier discussed and inquire as to whether, consistent
with this and so with the enunciated semantical principle
required by it, it is possible to frame a semantics for
predications which avoids the unwanted consequences of
Fregean unsaturation.
10 . argued that if you could assert the Truevhen you could assert the number two — which 'Simpossible; hence truth-value names are not assert-iDie, eno a new type of expression is needed.
243
$16. Alternative Semantics of Predication (1)
On Frege's view predicative expressions have deno-
tation, they denote functions. These denotations, he
says, are unsaturated, they lie beyond the reach of
singular terir.s. As a consequence Frege's semantics of
predication carmot be stated consistent with its own
import
•
I'hus for the Fregean there is something, indeed much.
Which cannot be said. For instance, that '( ) is an ac-
tress' denotes a particular concept in its occurrence in
•Jane is an actress'. Here we can. in a certain fashion,
show that the expression is. or is taken to be. denota-
tive, we do this by existentially generalising upon the
predicate position. And in this way generally we may
show that a certain expression is denotative, while work-
ing within the system, for Frege any denotative expression
(excepting a lead horizontal) may yield up to an existen-
tial generalization. Sometimes what can be so shown can
also be stated. Thus we may. in good conscience, state
that 'Jane' denotes Jane. But this is the exception.
Oniy objects admit of such specification of denotation.
The non-believer finds Frege guilty of saying what
he says cannot be said, he accuses Frege of "self-referen-
tial inoonsistency". This "inconsistency" and the above
ir.elfaoility are two descriptions, or accounts, of a
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co..on phenomenon, we may oall it the Frege phenomenon.
The question which shall now exercise us is whether,
and if so how. this phenomenon can be avoided or done
away with. More exactly, given the Pregean conception of
logic keyed to the question “How is truth possible?-, can
we provide a semantics of predication which avoids the
ineffability, or inconsistency, attendant to Frege's
account? As to what could count as a "semantics of
predication", I shall rely on the content this idea has
acquired thus far in the course of the essay, though this
will be extended and modified in various ways in ensuing
investigations. But a cautionary note is in order.
Whereas wo shall be focusing our attention upon predication
we will do well to keep in mind that this construction
interlocks with others, notably quantification, in nota-
tions such as Begriffsschrift
•
We shall survey a numher of alternatives to Frege's
account of predication, investigating something more than
a random selection, but perhaps something less than all
possible alternatives, even within our task-set boundaries.
The hope is that techniques displayed in discussing these
examples will be applicable to variations which may be
unmentioned so that generality is achieved. In this sec-
tion y^e shall look at a number of alternatives which we
may see as agreeing with Frege in counting predicative
expressions as denotative. In the subsequent, and final.
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section alternatives which arise through denying this
feature of Frege's semantics will come in for considera-
tion. Each of the various alternatives will resemble the
views of certain well-known figures, some of whom, at
least, will be indicated. However in critical discussion
I snail stick with the basic idea of each alternative and
not specifically take up the positions of others, who. in
any case, may not intend, or wish, their views to be taken
as attempts to deal with our question. An exception to
this policy will be the position of Quine, a closer look
at which close the essay.
Before explicitly taking up such alternatives we
shall spend a little time developing a critical tool, one
which derives from, and works well in conjunction with,
the general semantical principle which we have seen Frege's
conception of logic requires. Consider once more Mane
IS an actressM On Frege's view this is composed of two
semantic parts, the proper name Mans* and the function-
name *( ) is an actress'. These expressions are of dif-
ferent semantical type, since, so gees the view, whereas
each denotes something and therewith makes its semantic
contribution to the fact that the whole expression has
truth-value, the denotations involved are essentially
different and thus so too are the expressions. But now
suppose, for example, we wish a view on which it is
possible to refer to the donotationL=! of predicative
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expressions with sing,,,,
additional
conplications.
-Jane- and •{ ) is an actress' will be of
the same semantic catee-orvgory, oo, with regard to 'Jane is
an actress', our general semantic principle will require
that some semantical function gets performed other than
those accomplished by 'Jane' and '( ) ie an actress' each
denoting something. For we must be able, for instance,
to replace either one of these names with the other with-
out disturbing the semantical character of the containing
expression. But. failing additional interpretation.
-Jane
Jane', for instance, lacks truth-value. Kenoe the need
for more in the way of a semantical accounting of 'Jane
IS an actress' so that such substitutions already licensed
may proceed in accordance with our guiding principle.
Given that neither 'Jane' nor •( ) is an actress' be re-
quired to perform additional semantical chores, it is most
natural to locate the additional semantical feature in the
juxtaposition of 'Jane' and •( ) is an actress'. The new
account will in this respect differ from Frege’s. On
Frege's view each semantical function performed in (e.g.)
'Jane is an actress’ receives expressional representation.
On the type of alternative to be considered a semantical
function is performed by a non-orthographio feature of
the sentence, the juxtaposition of subject and predicate.
Now it would seem that wo could represent the addi-
tlonci.1 somaiitic roature in explicit notrition* Since ’Jane'
2^7
and .( ) is an actress- are to be counted of a co^on
semantic category we may, without worrying the syntactic
details, portray the claim of
-lane is an actress- more
explicitly with a sentence of the form
-( )R(.)..
•R' will stand for the additional notational element,
it is to perform as does juxtaposition in
-Jane is an
actress
'
.
Since any sentence, or at least any humanly under-
standable sentence, must be party to just a finite number
of semantic features, it might well seem possible to re-
flect in explicit notation the semantic features of any
sentence. And i-r thic: ic -r.orus IS oo, xt mght seem that we could
orthographically represent the semantic features of any
sentence with another sentence semantically indistia-
guishable from the first. (Unless the first already wore
its semantic features in its orthography.) To this it
could be objCs^ted that being able to render any semantical
feature orthographically does not imply being able to
aceoinplish this with a semantically indistinguishable
sentence. Perhaps rendering explicit previously implicit
features induces additional features newly implicit.
We need to look carefully at this idea. Suppose
there is a sentence with a non-explicit semantic feature,
such as the juxtaposition of 'Jane* and *( ) is an actress*
in *Jane is an actress' is on a semantics where the two
pieces are co-categorematic
. What would it mean to say.
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^or instance, t.at tHe semantic Sanction so pe.ro^e.
cannot to onthognapMcaU,
repnesente.
.it, a sentence
semnttcally indistinguishable from
-Jane is an ac-
tress*? Just thic? +>>«+rs. that the semantic function cannot,
literally, be cut into words at all. Th;-cit CU.X, is may not be
readily apparent, but reasoning in ^-srm- of a- .t, o our example
should make it rso,
I^et 'cx R/? • be a sentence inj-ii tne semantic
features of Vane is an actress, are rendered explicit
through functioning as does
-Jane', ag ^oes
*( ) is an aotress-, and <R. as does the
.luxtaposition of
these two elements. Now suppose it is said that •>: •
is semantically distinguishable from
-Jane is an actress’
through containing an additional semantic feature, (Per-
haps one shown by the grouping of ’iX* and ’/? • about
•R’.) This would contradict the original supposition, at
least if taken in a way intended as supporting the alter-
nat.lve viaw being considered. If %x*, % and *R*
each performs just the semantical roles of *Jane*, •( } is
an actress*, and juxtaposition, respectively, then it will
be possible to deploy these elements in such a fashion
that a truth-valued expression results. This might re-
quire some incidental grammatical adjustments, but cannot
require any additional semantical elements. This is so
since *Jane is an actress* itself is a truth-valued ex-
pression, and one which gains its semantical character
2^9
under our assumption through just the three features in
question. Any new semantic feature must be superfluous.
Thus 1. oiRp* contains an essentially additional feature
the original supposition is false* Pot- o^ io . F r ease of exposition
let us assui5i9 that if r a? • i.-.vn x
.. R/- is essentially richer than
the original sentence, then
-R- is our culprit, that
-R-
does not function just as does juxtaposition in *Jane is
an actress' contrary to the original supposition. Then
we have failed to pat into words the semantic function of
juxtaposition in our example. Perhaps this failure can
he rectified, but only at the cost of rendering implicit
something previously explicit. This is the force of the
derived contradiction. To maintain focus, let us ignore
such complications. So we shall conclude that if '^R/S.
e^senuialiy richer than "Jane is an actress* it will
not be possible to use an expression, any expression, to
do what is done in 'Jane is an actress* by juxtaposition.
Ii this IS the case, then a version of the Frege phenom-
enon has been forced back upon us*
To facilitate understanding let us approach this
through some examples. We may state the semantic function
Of ’Jane* (in our example) this way,
•Jane* denotes Jane,
Here we use ‘Jane* (on the right) in the role we are
speaking oi , Again, to take a somewhat different case,
suppose we were to think of the predicate *( ) is tall*
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in, say, 'Tora is tali', not. itself as a denoting exores-
-on, but rather as one which perior.s its semantical
function through being true of some, none, or all of
various objects. Then we cou3d stat- its *•UJ.U 3-c c.. semantic func-
tion this way,
•( ) IS tali' Is true of what is tall.
And here we use the predicate (on the right) in the role
we attribute to it. Now. if are to be able to state
the semantic function of juxtaoo^i ti nr, •jcx^i-posxtion (as in our exampla)
it seems we shall want to say something like this.
Juxtaposition performs thusly.
Here, having indicated the appropriate semantic relation
(e.g., denotation, or satisfaction, or what have you) we
would use some expression in the role performed by juxta-
position in (e.g.) 'Jane is an actress'. But since we
are unable to provide an expression to perform that role,
we cannot state what we would wish to say,
Frege was precluded by his semantics from (literally)
stating the semantioal function of (e.g.) ’( } is an
actress'. What we have just seen is that to hold that
some sentence contains a semantic feature which cannot
be orthographically represented in another sentence
semantically indistinguishable from the first is to be
committee to something of a piece with Fregs'fi forced
silence. In the example pursued, what we learn, subject
to some simplifying assumptions, is that we would be
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precluded by our sen,antioe fron (literally) stating the
semantical function of the juxtaposition of
-eane- with
•( ) is an actress'. Thus if we are to avoid the in-
effability, or inconsistency, attendant to the Frege
Phenomenon we shall need to require that our semantics,
whatever its details, bo in accord with the following
representation principle a
sentence possessing a serranticfeature wnicn is not renrssentad in
possible to Jon-struct anoxher, semantically indistineuish-able from the first, in which
receives orthographic representation
Since our intention is to attempt a semantics of pre-
dication which avoids xhe consequences of Fregean un-
saturation W8 shall want to adopt this pr.inciple.^^ But
let us keep in mind that to shew that a particular seman^
tical interpretation breeds inaffacility through violat-
ing the representation principle is not, by itself, to
provide sufficient grounds for concluding that it is mis
taken* For we have not shown that such ineffability is
altogether avoidable.
This principle, in tandem with our general semantic
11. Actually this principle is not as strong as v/e prob-
ably v/culd v/ant. It requires the representation of
any feature, but not the (simultaneous) representa-
tion of ail features. This, since it allows the
possibility that rendering an implicit feature ex-
plicit diminishes one xnat was explicit so that it
IS now implicit# However the principj.e as stated
will adequately sez'va present purpose-s.
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principle, injects a certain rigor into our semantical
investigations. When the CSP turns up inexplicit seman-
tical features the representation principle authorizes
rephrasal into more explicit forms. Whereupon GSP may
again be trained upon our quarry. And so forth. This
said, let us get on with the inquiry.
In this section we shall take up four alternatives to
Frege's account of predication, each of which agrees with
Frege in construing predicates as denoting expressions.
The first three will be versions of the idea that in (e.g.)
•Jane is an actress', juxtaposition of the subject and
predicate is semantically significant. On one view this
has the significance of functional application! on a
second, that of a relation! and on the third, that of a
non-relational tie. The fourth position to be considered
here attempts to avoid the attribution of an additional
semantical feature through what we shall call the "meta-
language move*'.
It is convenient to shift to *2 is prime* as our work-
ing example of a most simple- predication. Then, given
that the predicative part * ( ) is prime* has complete
denotation as does *2* so that these expressions are
semantically co-categorematic and thus interchangeable,
we must find additional semantical work done in the sen-
tence, Suppose then that we see in the juxtaposition of
subject and predicate notation for the application of a
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function "to 3.n tirdJTicGr'"fc.^^argj ccnt. This IS more intuitive if we
represent *2 is prime* as
Prime
( 2 )*
Here we have two positions, these we eiay show with
(•)
( )•
The juxtaposition of these positions is to be treated as
indicating functional application. This additional seman-
tic role may then be made express ionally explicit this
v^'ay,
A [(•),( )],
or, in the particular example, with,
A [(Prime)
, (2)],
which IS intended to be semantically indistinguishable
from *2 IS prime'. We may read the last set-off expres-
sion as *The application of the prime function to the
number two*. And this will be true Just in case the func-
tion in question yields the True for its argunient, which
it does, since 2 is prime. However, on the suggested
semantics and given our general semantic principle, any
naifie of any object may sit in either of the two available
slots. And what, we may v.'onder, will we say, for instance.
12. This view is similar to those suggested by A.lonzo
Church in his review of Black’s "Frege on" Functions",
£l Symbolic Logic , 21_ (193b), pp. 201-202,
XlilrpdiUcziGn to Mathematica l Logic, Chapter 0.,
and by M*U* Resnick, "Frege's Theory of Incomplete
Entities • '*
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When seething other than a function is denoted by a name
in the left position. We need to provide an interpreta-
tion for the notation of functional application which will
handle such "waste cases". But note, the need for this
does not arise with the introduction of explicit notation.
It stems from an even-handedness towards the semantically
akin. Perhaps it will do to simply take the idea of
"functional application" broadly so that we may say that
in all cases where the application of one argument to
another does not yield the True, that it yields the Palse.
It is with another aspect of this approach that I wish to
be critical.
Taking juxtaposixion as having the semantical sig-
nificance of functional application requires agreement
with Prege s view that sentences have denotation# We
have already indicated problems with such a viewj here
we may expand upon these.
If sentences have complete denotation, then our gen-
eral semantic principle licenses substituting fer the sen-
tence '2 is prime* such an expression as, simply, *2*.
In this y/0 might suppose we have a violation of our urin—
cipls, since this substitution takes us from a sentence
to a non-sentence. If so, we would have to conclude that
*2 is prime’ is not semantically explicit. And if it is
not, for this reason, then neither would *A [(Prime)
,
(2)]'
be semantically explicit. Indeed, the condition of
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oxpl.c..ne.s
„ould p.ove unattainable. But the situation
a not as clear as it „ight be. We violate our guiding
principle
.hen replacing one expression by another of its
semantic type alters the semantical character of the con-
taining expression. (Where the relevant notion of con-
tainment is stretched to the limit to accomodate such
substitutions as recently contemplated.) In replacing
•2 IS prime- with 'S' we shift from a truth-valued ex-
pression to a non-truth-valucd one. But is this a change
of semantical character? Ccnstant through such substi-
lac.
.hat always nave a denoting expres-
Sion. Is this perhaps not saving semantical character
enough? This response is. I believe, sufficient to show
that our semantic principle by itself is not able to rule
cut counting sentences as names
Let us review the situation with Begriffsschrift
,
Frege's sjratax. breaches the general semantical principle
through disallowing general replacemeiit of horizontals
py proper names. He thereby gains a class of truth-*valued
expressions. And so can, in effect, provide a semantic.s
for his notation through stating truth-conditions for
expressions of this class, the horizontals. And it seems
clear that any notation which is intended to be inter-
13» This, and what follows it, is what is referred toin note •
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pretea thro.g. t.e p.ovtain. of truth-conditions
.iii have
to Uhevise »a:te syntactically inper^issihle certain seman-
tically authorised substitutions if aentencea are names.
And so perhaps we should say that whereas replacing
-2 is
prime- with -2- may not violate the general semantic
principle, it does undercut itw For holdinfr «i^u n iGing sentences to
be names, thus licensintc such pi nssn"?*noung o»o a replacement, is incompat-
ible with the conception of logic that motivates the
semantic principle, since, if free replacement is allowed
we shall have no means of focusing in upon just those
expressions which are truth-valued*
To sum this up, if treating sentences as names does
not lead, with Frege, to a flouting of the GSP through
judicious sjTitaotical restrictions, it will result in the
indiscernibility of bearers of truth-value and so void
the possibility of a truth-conditional semantics, hither
r^y Frege-s conception of logic suffers. So, I oonclada,
' that the laws of logic are laws of truth, as pre-
viously discussed, sentences are not themselves names.
Since treating juxtaposition as functional application
requires sentences to be names, this approach must be
discarded*
Let us turn to some alternatives which are not
faulted in this way* Suppose we treat juxtaposition as
having the semantical import of a relational expression.^'^
If predicates, including relational terms, do not denote
functions, this move need not force sentences to be names.
On this interpretation.
-2 is prime- could be rendered
semantically more explicit with something of the form
where • cX' does the work of -2-, •/.?. that of
is prime- and
-R- indicates some relation. The par-
ticular relation can vary with variants of the basic idea,
hut it could, for instance, be that of class membership.
Then the idea would be that -2 is prime- would be seman-
tically indistinguishable from the more explicit -2 is a
member of the class of primes -.^5 However, without fuss-
ing over details, a simple argument seems to show the in-
adequacy of
-this approach*
If -2 is a member of the class of primes- is a rela-
tional statement, then. -( ) is a member of the class of
prices* v/culd be a predicative expression* v.»hich, if
and students
% S instance, it is found, attributed toiit-ge, It is often com-
sentences have denotation*
out this IS not necessary*
1^* iiarlier we discussed one cbjection Fresco hadto in^/roducing classes in this way* In passing we
may mention another ncssible objection* If classofs
are iiriported with the semantics of predication at
the ground level of logic* then there will be hardly
araything left to the Idea that logic is throughout
ev.\dent (J|>5)j this thanks to Russell *s paradox and
the adjustments it requires*
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predicates denote objects, would itself have complete de-
notation. Then, bringing our general semantical principle
to bear, we realize that *2 ia a member of the class of
primes' is not semantically explicit. For '2' and •( )
is a member of the cIrc^c; n-p •primes must be substitutable
one for another in. for example. <2 a member of the
'
class of primes', saving semantical character. Nor could
•2 is a member of the class of primes' be rendered ex-
plicit by interpreting the juxtaposing of '2' and ( ) is
a member of the class of primes' as relational notation.
This would bs to step off on a vicious regress. So. if
the proposed semantics were adequato, '( ) is a member of
the class Of primes' could not be a predicative expression.
But then neitner could •( j is a msi.iber of (’)' be a two-
plaoe predicative expression denoting a relation. Since
this was to have the same function as j’.ixtaposition in
2 is prime', if the proposed semantics were adequate,
juxtaposition could not have the force of a relational
expression. But just that was the idea, which must thus
be rejected*
oince niithing in this reasoning depends upon the
relation in question being that of set-meinbership, we
conclude generally that juxtaposition is not to be accorded
the semantic role of a relational expression, not, anyway,
if predicates are construed as denoting objects.
Suppose we say that the juxtaposition of *2* and
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( ) xs prime' is not to be considered as an implicit
relational expression, but rather what we may call, iollow-
ing Strawson, a non-relational tie.l^
^e as concrete
as possible, let us as before take classes to be the de-
notations of predicates, though nothing shall turn upon
tne specific nature of these denotations. Then we may
offer *3 is tied to the class of primes’ as a semantically
explicit version of *2 is prime'.
Now we may ask whether * ( ) is tied to the class of
primes’ itself is a predicative expression. If it were,
then *2 is tied to the class of primes’ would not be
sewcxntically explicit, as we could shov; through use of
the GSP as before. So we conclude that the expression
( ) io tied to the class of prime.s" is not a predicate.,
Likewise, we infer that • ( } is tied xo {'}» is not, it-^
self £. two"-place predicate denoting a relation. The
reasoning here parallels that gone through with the last
pioposal. But in this case the conclusions that since
( ) is tied to (*)* is not a relational expression
neither is it the case that juxtaposition is implicitly
a relational expression, is not a rediictio of the pro-
posal; it is the proposal. It is, anyway, verbally, bat
the expression ‘non-relational tie* remains to be ex-
plained.
l6. See Strawson, Individuals
,
p. 169 ff.
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The semantical funotinr^ ^ . .of j ux oapos ition may be ren-
derad expUcix by •( ) i, xied to (•)•. or so..e such ex-
pression. (Recall that to deny this, which would be xo
violate the representation principle, is to introduce the
Frege phenomenon we seek to avoid.) But what is this
semantic function? f^'iore oartinni.ur p oicularxy, are we to assume
that *( ) is tied to (')* x 4--, .-ti j •\ i maKv-s It.-, distinctive semantic
contribution to (e.g.) *2 i.s tied to the class of primes*
through itself having denotation? Let us suppose that
this is so. And that •( ) is tied to {•)* denotes, not
a relation, but what we shall call a tie.^^ Now if * ( )
io tied to { ) has denotation, so too. presumably, does
(Geg.) •( ) is tied to the class of primes*. Then, if
th.is expression were co-categorematic with (e.g.) * 2 *,
these would be
.interchangeable, and so we would learn that
(e.g.) the sentence *2 is tied to the class of primes’
would not be semantically explicit. Since on the pro-
posal this is explicit, we must conclude that *2* and
’{ ) is tied to the class of primes' are not of xhe same
semantic category. This is to conclude that, although
( ) is tied to the cl.ass of primes’ is to be accorded
denotation, its denotation canjict be denoted by a singular
term. And so here, once again, encounter the Frege
1?. For such a view see Bergmann, Logic and Realitv»
p, 229.
“
phenoinenon* we can encaDsulate thUi. j.ax is reasoning as follows.
If relations are denotabla by sin^^uloT' ro..y ng ar terms, it must be
that ties are not.^®
At this point we might reject the idea that the
semantical function of • ( ) is t’eri to ' . i . , •V I v')* lies in its
denoting something and explore the possibility of a
semantics for predications in other semantical terms.
But if we are going to approach the semantics of predi-
cation this way, we might be better off to simply treat
predicates themselves as non-denotative and inquire direct-
ly^ into the possibility of a semantics for predication on
which some semantical idea other than denotation plays
the central role. In any case, this is the tact
-.ve shall
take, we shall pursue this latrer idea in the subsequent
section. Problems there to be encounxered can be applied
bt-c.k to vhe other idea of rephrasing predications in terms
of ( ) is tied to (•)» and then taking this as non-deno-
tative. With this, we set aside approaching predication
through the idea of attributiiig to juxtaposition the
significance of a non-relational tie.
Treating predicates as denotative and then finding
a further semantic feature in juxtaposition has not yielded
18 . Unless we wish to introduce
fashion, of Russell's tiieory
not enable us to avoid the' F
now v/ill turn up over such s
objects of various types*
kinds of objects in the
of types; but this will
rege phenomenon, vi?hich
laternents as there are
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a semantics of predication «nich avoids the unwanted
consequences of Prege-s own account. So let us looK at
how we night attempt to circumvent the apparent need for
such additional semantical accounting through recourse to
"metalinguistic discourse-’. We have been considering
Prege-s Begriffsschrift. enriched to whatever extent with
carious proper names and function-names. And we have
been attempting to provide it, or substantially it, with
(at least the beginnings of) an interpretation, a semantics,
otner tnan Prege*s own. Cur remarks in this vein are not
framed with sentences of the notation of which we speak.
This talk we may think of a progressing in a metalanguage
whose object language is Begriffsschrift. or kindred nota-
tions. This distinction of object language and meta-
language is useful, even necessary for the attainment of
full methodological rigor. Against this background, to
make the metalanguage move is (l) to claim that predicates
have complete denotation — and we may, as before, assume
that classes are such denotations, so that (e.g.) •( ) ia
prime* denotes the class of primes. (2) deny that, in a
given language, say that of Begriffsschrift, the denota->
tions of predicates may also be denoted by singular terms.
(3) deny also that s?ich denotations are altogether
insusceptible of singular reference through allowing
the possibility th.at the (or a) metalanguapje may employ
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singular tents to just this purpose. ^9
But to no avail. This r.ove at best postpones prcb-
leas. For. if our general set,antioal principle is in
effect, then singular ter«s occurring (actually and potcn-
tially) in the metalanguage limit the predicates which
may occur, or be introduced into, the metalanguage.
Specif.oala.y, the metalanguage may contain no predicate
unsion IS that 0. a class nameable in the meta-
language, Such a metalanguage would pretty clearly seem
to be too impoverished to even serve the purpose of laying
out the syntax and semantics of its object language. Wa
orxng this point home by observing that if the meta-
langvae^e xorms class-no.mes by applying an "abstraction
operator'’ to predicates, then the specificaticn of the
denotation of * ( ) is prime’ will itself draw upon an
inacuiissible predicate*
It might be rejoindered that this objection prcsiip-^
poses that we v/ill, indeed must, apply the semantics we
attribute to the object language in like fashion to the
wetalajiguage, but that this need not be the case* Were
we to fo.^!r:uiixe that metalanguage itself we would bs free
to offer a different sort of semantical account of its
19. Furth reports that both Richard Montague and David
Kaplan made much this suggestion in his discussions
With them of Frege* ("Two Types of Denotation",
P* 21, n* 2?*)
® ® j> now a Es •> 4- o 1 »»in n^.eta.otalanguage, than that accorded
expressions of the (original) oboect language.
This type of response underscores a fundamental
incompatibility between Frege’s picture of logic and one
vhich. When thought in terms of it, encourages such
••i.etalinguistic“ scramblings. For to move this way is
to reject the jdea of a logical notation, such as Begriffs-
schrift, as (potentially) a universal language. To
this we shall return later. But for now we have found
no way, consonant with Frege's conception of logic, to
hold predicates denotative and avoid the Frege phenomenon.
$17 . Alternative Semantics of Predication (2)
In this concluding section we shall explore the pos-
sibility of diverging more sharply from Frege's semantics
of preaication through not according predicates denota-
tions
€it axl. For Frege, *2 is prime' has two (proper)
semantical parts, *2' and »( ) is prime*. This can be
maintained compatibly with both cur general semantical
pij.riciple and the view th?».t each denotes by ruling the
denotations of predicates unsaturated. If however pred-
icate denotations are objects, then our principle requires
20. Recall the earlier remarks on Kalish's idea that
trwth-in-e-model is a more general idea than that of
truth. See also Gvidel's remark in note IB, Chapter
III. We shall return to this in discussing Quine.
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a third semantical role to be played. But not. we have
argued, with the effect that the consequences of unsatu-
ration are avoided. If now predicates are to be thought
Of as non-denotative such an additional semantic feature
will be uncalled for. But if they make their semantic
o'thoi'wi.s 6 * liow so?
let us first consider a tjqje of view which agrees
with Frege's (and other views thus far examined) in this.
A predicate stands in some semantical relation to some
entity. The divergence is over the relation! it shall
not be that of denotation*
We fine, such an idea in William Kneale's discussion
**
of Fr^e^e* Ke suggests that we say thatj in terms of
our example, * ( ) is prime* expresses the attribute of
being prime, while maintaining that denotes the num-
ber two*
-The attribute so expressed, and attributes
genera.lly., can be referred to with singular terms* *The
atti'ibute of being prirae* will do, or, equraiy well we
may use simply *primeness** And we can, on this view,
state that, for instance, the number two stands in a
ceix«,in relation to this attribute* For we may say*
2 exemplifies priraeness* Further, it seems to be Xneale's
vieiv that this sentence shares its content with, expresses
21 » Kneale and Kneale, The Pevclc pTnen t of Philosophv,
p* 566.
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the same thought as.
-E is pri„e- rr »uy •If SO, then this pair
would be regarded by Kneale i.. .. .y a in a way similar to the way in
e.e thinks Of 2 IS prime- and -2 falls under the
concept prime-. ^ However, of importance to matters at
hand is the fact that on the considered alternative, the
-2 is prime- and -2 exemplifies primeness- are not
semantically indistinguishable, this is indicated by the
fact that the latter is Feruine^v » y.^aTc-i.- ig n .
> a relational statement,
whereas the former is not® Each mluscn statk-ment is regarded as
bemantioally explicit. Thus the reasoning, used before.
which loads towards a vicious regress does not have a
foothold from which to get started.
There are. however, other problems with this type of
approach. Consider again the previous statement relating
2 and the attribute of being prims,
2 exemplifies primeness
®
Soth -2- and
-primeness- are names and so from this we may
extract a one^place predicative expression,
( ) exemplifies ( ),
of seif«-exe:r<plification. The negation of this would bo,
”[( ) exemplifies ( )],
a predicats of non-self-cxempllfication. But now if prci-»
dicates express attributes and this is a predicate, it
must express an attribute. But it cannot. For there is
22
. ibid p.
26?
no attribute of non-self~exemplif
^-ation far ^— c.xj.on lo it to express,
since if there were it would exemplify iteelf just in
case it did not do just that, which is a contradiction .23
But if there is no attribute for •-[( ) exemplifios ( )]•
to express, then, if •-[( ) expresses ( )]• is indeed a
predicate, it is not the case that predicates, generally,
express attributes, and so a semantics of predication
cannot bo provided in these terms
^
On the other hand, if '-[{ ) exemplifies ( )]• is
not a predicate, then neither is •( ) exemplifies (
i'hus, for want of a predicate, v-e shall not be able to
state such relations as hold between objects and attributes
as that we seemingly put in words this wayi 2 exemplifies
primeness. Generally, if there are attributes which
things exemplify, we shall not be able to say that this
xS so, at least not if we are conceiving our semantics
of predication as turning upon this relationship* So v/e
see that, once again, ineffability is the cost of gaining
an account of predication.
23 .' Here we encounter a form of Russell paradox, and
we draw' Russell’s conciuoion, the only one compatible
with Iroge's philosophy of logic, that something we
thought we had described does not exist.
2h, o?o deny this v/ould be to deny that every predicate
has a negatio?3, and so to reject standard logic.
the negation of a sentence has a sense,
the sentence itself is without sense." Frege,
J^iiiCb^ ophical Writings
, p. 104.)
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A similar problem occurs over such statements as
( ) IS prime' expresses primeness,
Which purports to state a relation between a oredicate
and an attribute. From this vve may extract a one-place
predicative expression#
( ) expresses ( }
,
of self-expression, which in turn, by negation, gives «s
one of non~self-expression#
“[( ) expresses ( )]„
But. much as before, there is no attribute for this pred-
icate to express, since if there were it would be one
which has a particular trait oust in case it does not
have that trait. ^5 predicates, then
it cannot be, generally, that predicates express attri-
butes. In which cass we cannot provide an account of
predication in these terms. Thus to gain an account cf
predication along these lines we shall have to deny that
-C( ) expresses < )]• and •( ) exprssses ( } ' are pred-
icates. But then v/e shall not be able to state (e*g,)
that •( ) IS prime* expresses p.rimeness# at least not if
we are limited in our attempted semantical accounting to
25* Vthat attributes do we suppose v/e are speaking of? I
can say this# but no more. Any expression which
expresses an attribute wh.ich it itself exemplifies,
expresses the attribute of self-expression. And
analogously lor the attribute ol' nori’'Seif--oxpres 3 ion*
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drawing upon expressions of sewartic;,!b antical categories employed
in the account as reouirpri •o l quired by Frege's conception of logic.
Thus, inuch ss before, we shall conclude that if there are
attributes which predicates er.press we cannot say that
this is the case, or at least not in such a way as to
thereby provide an account of predication. Again, if we
have an account of predication it is one. as was Frcge-s.
Which requires its ow'n ineffability.
It rernains to emphasise that these difficulties with
the approach just consldorp'* are quite general; they attend
any approach to predication which proceeds in terms of
treating each predicate as relating semantically to some
ejitity.
This .may encourage us to try a somewhat different
approach, ona which does not rely on thinking of each
predicate as pertorming its semantic function through
relating to some particular non-linguistic entity. Suppose
we assume that, for instance, '2 is prime* has just two
(proper) semantical parts,
-Z- and ’( ) is prime*. And
that *2', as all along, denotes the number tv/o. But now,
instead of bringing in new entities in terms of which to
speak of the semantical contribuxion of predicates, let
us attempt; to provide a semantics of predication in terms
of just the sort of things whicn our singular terms are
cJcnoiving. And so we shall say that a one-place predicate,
such as ’( ) is prime*, is true of such objects, some.
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none, or all o-^ thpm ao -n,O. e as the case may be. or that various
objects satisfy various predicates In tho^ x'-cxi.cs. i e case of *2 is
prime*, we shall sav that ^ sc, • . .y xn ( ) 2.3 prime* is true of (or
satisfied by) all obipotc
^ are prime, and so *2 is
pi ime * wi ll be true iu^^t if 411 denotes one of those
primes
.
Since on this approach we do not proceed in terms of
some relation holding of predicates and classes or attri-
bui-us, or the like, it will be immune to the first of the
pair of diffiouities with the last considered idea, that
is. our account of predication will „ot uncover a version
of Russell's paradox.
However, the second of those difficulties is still
with us; we shall, in this semantics, turn up a version
of Grelling-s paradox. From, for instance,
TvvO satisfies ' ( ) is prime',
we ma^r extract 3, one—place predicate,
( ) satisfies ( ),
of self"Satisfaction* Its negation will be,
*•[( ) satisfies ( }],
conveying non-self-satisfaction? this will be satisfied
hy just those things which do not satisfy themselves.
But now what of this predicate itself? It will satisfy
itself just in case it is a non-self-satisfier, that is,
juot if ib does not satisfy itself. We come again >ipon a
contradiction. Since we cannot live with this, something
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will have to be denied or given up.
In the analogous situation with the previous alter-
native we denied the existence of a particular attribute,
the (supposed) attribute expressed by the predicate of
non-self-c-xpression. But since we are no longer viewing
predicates as functioning senanticaily through relating
to particular entities our situation is one in which, to
put the point in a paradoxical manner, we have no entity
around to. deny, or none whose denial would be to the point.
In the earlier situation, denying the attribute led
to denying that •( ) expresses ( ) • was a predicate.
There we argued that if this were a predicate and pred-
icates express attributes, then it. and so its negation,
would have to express an attribute; but in the latter case
at least that there is such an attribute is denied. And
here is a parallel with the present situation, for in this
case we are constrained to deny that •( ) satisfies ( )•
is a predicate. Here we argue that if this were a predi-
cate, .so too wou3d be its negation- But then in carrying
through wi the idea that piedicates function senantica.ily
through being satisfied by objects — some, none, or
all as the case may be —• we encounter the fact that if
*-[( ) satisfies ( )]• is a predicate, then it satisfies
Itself just in case it does not satisfy itself. Here we
are not to deny the existence of the expression *( ) sat-
i-Sfi.es ( )*, which would be absurd. What we deny is the
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possibility Of this expression, or any other, performing
a particular predicative function; deny that •( ) aat-
isfies ( )• is a predicate. So. once again, we find our-
selves in a situation where, if we have an account of
predication, it is one which we cannot state, or cannot
state compatibly with that account itself. Once again
the Frege phenomenon is encountered.
This completes my survey of alternative semantics
lor predication; I am ready to conclude that the unwanted
consequences of unsaturation are unavoidable. However,
since the last considered alternative is essentially that
of Quine {following Tarski), it will prove instructive to
consider what Quine's position is on the Frege phenomenon.
This will serve to put the course of our inquiry into
perspective. And it may also help to dispel the feeling*
which some may have, that the problems we have been re«
peatedly encountering stem from the sort of failure to
keep sti-aight use and mention Tarski wrote of this way*
People have not always been aware that the
language ?» bout which we speak need by no
means coincide with the language in which
we speak# They have carried out "the*~ernan“
tics ol a language in t?iat language itself
end, generally speaking, they have pi*oceeded
as though tpere was only one language in
the world. ^ -
Our general conclusion does not, I should say, depend
26 . Tarski, **The Hstablishment of a Scientific Semantics
in Logic , Semantics , aj^ci Me tamathe ,i\a 1 1 c s
,
p. ^i02.
M
2?3
upon inattention to such matters
I shall briefly review some of Quins's remarks in
Chapter 2 "Grammar" and Chapter 3 "Truth" of his recent
Philos^hj Of Logic. In this I will assume rather much
as to the reader's familiarity with Quine's use of
Tarski's work on defining truth for formalised languages,
and also with Tarski's work itself, though more with his
“results’, how the thing goes, than with the technical
details*
For his canonical notation Quine employs a ’'standard
logical grat.imar" of an "austere" sort, one which draws
upon just (nearly enough) four constructions
.
£r<^C 3ti.^
consists in the adjoining of predicates (of various de-
gree) to (appropriately
.n.any) variables. Open sentences,
with free variables, result? these are considered sentences
fur pcij. poses oi exposition* (The grammar vises no names
and a single style of variables, in Quine’s familiar
fashion.) ion consists in prefixing a sign for nega-
tion to a sentence. Con J u_nc_tion consists in joining two
sentences with a sign for conjunction* And existential
2- construction whereby through prefixing
8.T) cxi£'tential Quantifier to an open sentence whicn has
an alpluibeticaiiy similar free variable a closed sentence
may result. (And will result if the open sentence con-"
taincd just one free variable.)
Subsequently Quine tuzns to provide a semantics for
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this notation, and so for any language with just its
gramisar. He offers a semantics of predication in terms
of a notion of satisfaction which is a generalised version
of the idea we have considered. The generalization occurs
in speaking of open sentences as satisfied by sequences
of objects) this allows its application to such expressions
as polyadic predications, which we have conveniently i-r_
riorea« Indeed, xhe sacisfaction concept of Tarski's which
Quins employs is adequate to provide a seinantics for the
entire canonical notation; no other semantical idea need
be called upon. This semantics has its penultimate cui»
mination in a recursive, or inductive, definition of sat-
isfaction lor a language ouilt upon the grammar of the
notation} the definition will have one step for each of
the predicates of the particular languafie, and then one
step 1.01 each of the constructions of negation, conjunc-
and existential quantificatioru Given this, a
definition oi truth for a language falls oiit; a sentence
is true if always sstisfied* i.e., satisfied by any
sequence whatsoever; false, otherwise. Here we shall
simply pass by the details. Quine then shows us how to
go about transforming such an inductive definition into
an explicit, or direct, definition» d.rawing upon ideas
due to Frege* ?<!ore of this in a moment.
Suppose that the logical grammar has been stocked
with some predicates. Tht^n we have not merely a grammar.
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or ianguage.frar.e, but a language in which we are able
to say things. Call this the object language. And call
then our ordinary, unf0nr.ali7.ed mother tongue its meta-
language. What can be said in the object language will
depend to some extent upon what predicates we have intro-
duced into it. Thus if it lacks the predicate * ( } is a
cows then we shall not be able to speak in it of cows,
unless in other terms. And there v/ill be no point in
our taking cows among the values of the variables of the
object language. Ail this, I repeat, from the vantage
point of our unreconstructed mother tongue. Similarly,
for instance, with the predicate *( ) is a class' or the
relation cf set-membership. If the object language lacks
the Cleans for speaking of sets, then v/e have no reason to
count sets amcivg the values of its variables. And this
e\en though in pro\-iding a semantics for the object
language v/s do, at least in effect, speak of sets through
our talk of sequences satisfying expressions.
Let us get back to the matter of turning a recursive
definition into a direct one. Set theory is available in
our metalanguage. Though it is somewhat indefinite as to
Just v;hat this set theory is, as to v/hat are its existence
assumptions, or requirements
. The point at hand is that
given sufficient set-theoretic resources in our meta-
language we can turn our recursive definition of satis-
faction for the object language into a direct definition
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thereby elirrdnating the talk of truth and satisfaction as
directed upon object language sentences in favcr of (just)
the language of logic and set theory. The trick here is
to take the steps, or clauses, of the recursive definition
of satisfaction — there will be 3-^n, where n = the number
of predicates - and replace 'satisfies* by a variable.
We can then state that the satisfaction relaticn. which
will be a certain set of ordered pairs, is that relation
which answers tc the open sentence constructed as just
described. This sentence we may abbreviate^ with Quine,
to
• Again we do not linger over the details, and
shall simply assume that wa have such a definition of
satisfaction for some sample object language. And gener-
ally, that we know that no matter how well supplied our
object language may be v/ith predicates, we may always
directly define satisfaction for it in the metala?iguage
.
(If satisfaction gets defined directly, truth will also,
taggi?ig along as before.)
Having sketched this in, Quine proceeds to develop
a version of Grelling's paradox. Ke reasons that if our
object language were itself to have the resources of set
theory and devices sufficient to enable us to speak v;ith
it of expressions of the object language, then it would
seem that we could reconstruct in the object language the
direct definition of its own satisfaction predicate.
Thus we Y/ould, in effect. have in the object language a
predicate •{ ) satisfies (•) a»d so also the predicate
-[< ) satisfies ( )]•, from which we move directly to
contradiction as before.
The stage is set. What does Quine say now? How
does he react to this looming contradiction? Th:.s is
where our interest lies. Here is the response.
The induc-cive definition
, . , was all right,ana can be translated wholly into the cbiectlanguage except of course for the new termthat is being inductively defined -- the verb
satisiies*. Accordingly which weget from fthe steps of our recursive defini-tion Ox * satisfies*] by dropping that verb
and supplying * 2 *, is fully translatable intothe object language, moreover 'SR^* doesindeed require of 2 that its member pairs be
pairs <x,yg such that x satis-
iet> y. i)0 tar go good. But is there a
set 2 meeting this requirement 'F',"T''7~'che
ansv/er is , . . negative, by redurt-'o F*d
such seTrrr"oF\vF“wouid
be Daclc in Grolling’s contradiction,^?
If ’( ) satisfies (*)* were a predicate of the object lan-
guage and object language predicates are satisfied by se-
quences oi objects, then there would have to be a set of
sequences ansv;ering to this predicate. And though from
the perspective of the metalanguage it seems v/e can speak
of vhe satisfaction set” of the object language, it can-
not be that this set is among the values of the variables
of the object language. It cannot, since otnerv/ise con-
tradiction would ensue. And this is so despite the
2? 8 Quine, Phi losophy of Logic
, pp. A4-'4'5.
fact
278
that the imagined object language
of class«Tnembership,
Riay employ a relation
Thus Quine takes GrelUng's paradox as it turns up
in the context of a Tarskian senantics in much the spirit
of Russell
-s paradox, each brings home to us that some-
thing doss not exist*
on this theme*
Two paragraphs dowTi he continues
• • • we have been forced by Grelline-'s Para-dox to repudiate a siipoosed set z. But itShould be noted that this repudiakon L a
in this respect:the k. that repudiaxes was not a set xha**"
was purportedly determined by any open sen-y:y?ssible in the object language. Itpurported inaeed to be the set of ail pairs
NXiy,> such that x Satisfies y? sra so Dur—ported indeed to be dexermined by the open
sente?^xe 'x satisfies y* * But this is not asentence of the object language* As Greiling’sparadox has taught^us, it is untranslatableforeign language
Quine *s conclusion is an interesting one* Let us
hold it in abeyance for a moment while we recall some re-
marks he has made elsewhere on the theme of the universal
adequacy of standard logical notation*
Taking the canonical notation • « «
austerely^ • * « we have just these basic
constructions? predication* universal
quantil icat ion • • ** and the truth func-
tions (reducible to one) * * * Wihat thus
confronts us as a scheme for systems of the
world is that structure so well understood
by present-day logicians* the logic of
quantification or calculus of predicates*
Not that the idioms thus renounced are
26. Ibid* * p« 45
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supposed to be u^eeded in the market place
onli ^
laboratory
. . . The doctriney that such a canonical idiom can ho o>>
B»nt°of'*-^"?
adhered to in the atete-"e of one s scientiiio theory. Thedoctrine is that all traits of realityworthy of the name car. be set do-m in anidioai of this austere form if in any idiom.
Quine'S cancnicsl idiom is much the same as that in which
Frege couched fundamental logic in hi.s Begriffsschrif t-
And Quine's doctrine, as here stated, partakes of much
the same spirit as the view attributed to Frege in our
discussion of the idea of logic as lingua cj^acto^^
($6 ),
Now returnii-ig to Quine's conclusion j'ioted before, let
us observe that, with regard to our reflections upon the
Frsge phenomenon, the upshot of Quine's viev73 is much the
same as that we have arrived at, with Proge, For when,
with Quine, we set out to set dovm traits of reality, we
shall sally forth in the knowledge that we shall be pre-
cluded from stating, in a general way, how it is that such
truths as wc manage to inscribe do succeed in reflecting
reality® For to say this we would need, what we cannot
have, an expression of the idiom with the meaning of
( ) satisfies (
'
)
'
®
The semantics of the idiom resists
its own statement in the idiom. This we know. Thus v/e
also know that our attempts at its statement are, strictly
29 ® Quine, Word a.nd Object, p. 228 ®
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speaking,
“untranslatable foreign language", that is.
meaningless to speaker.® of the idiom.
Let us cover this ground once more, We begin by
carving out a bit of language upon which to reflecti the
grammar of logic together with such predicates as we choose
to include. This done v/e spsak of it as the object lan-
guage about which wa reason in the remaindei- of our lan-
guage, the metalanguage so-called. But then if. with
Quine, we think of this
-object language- as a canonical
notaticn, as a lang;uage in which, given suitable pred-
icates, we can set down any
-trait of reality worthy of
the name
, then these metalinguistic ruminations take on
a somewhat different cast. They come to taka place in a
kind Of limbo. For if the import of such remarks should
escape expression in the
-object language- we shall,
ultimately and upon taking up the perspective of the
-object language” look back upon this discourse as non-
sense* And such, in a curious way, is the situation with
Quine & attempt to provide a scraantics for the ‘’austere-
idiom* From the point of view of this idiom v<fe are able
to grasp the point of the direct definition of satisfac-
tion v'hich was offered in the
-metalanguage", for we
appreciate the point of the recursive steps which lead
up to it. This despite the fact that since we cannot
pull this talk down into canonical idiom v/e must, so long
as W8 retain this perspective, regard the earlier discourse
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&s lacking literal ineaning. Ultimately then the meta-
language is at best metaphoric. Or, to alter and invert
the image, our metalinguistic exercises provide us with a
scaffolding with which to construct the object language,
and in this they have a pragmatic or instrumental use;
still this significance is only instrumental, forf as we
have seen, they are like Wittgenstein’s ladder, to be dis-
carded once used,'^^
My conclusion is that the Frege phenomenon is real.
Pz*ege*s conception of logic is truth-oriented. It encour-
ages us to provide for our preferred notation a clear under-
standing of how it is that sentences of this notation are
true, if true, through supplementing its syntax with a
truth-conditional semantics. This, together with a claim
to universal adequacy for the notation, focuses attention
upon the question* How is truth possible? Frege’s an-
swer Yfas tmstateable in its om terms. He held, in effect,
that a necessity of language precludes the answering of
our question. I think he v/as right. It remains to assess
the importance of this.
30. Quine uses Wittgenstein’s image to a related purpose
in discussing the nature of the ccmpieteness proof
for quantification theory. {'Reply to Strawson'S
S>q>these , I9 (1968), p, 29?.)
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